AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT June 10, 2015

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. Yemen’s al Houthis escalated the conflict with Saudi Arabia by firing a Scud missile at a Saudi Arabian airbase and conducting an attack alongside Yemeni military units against Saudi border forces, which may further impede efforts to reach a negotiated political solution.

2. Iranian IRGC Deputy Commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami’s comments on the Yemeni people indicate a rhetorical escalation on the importance of the Yemeni conflict.

3. Al Shabaab may be able to exploit friction points between the Somali federal government and local administrations as the country’s federalization process moves forward.

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ASSESSMENT:

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al Qaeda NetworkNine al Qaeda-linked religious scholars signed a fatwa, religious decree, declaring it permissible and a duty to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in al Sham—Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories. The scholars cited ISIS’s advances in and around Suran, Syria, as cause. Al Qaeda senior leaders and prominent radical conservative scholars, including some of the signatories, have previously sought to prevent Muslim bloodshed and have attempted to re-unite ISIS and al Qaeda under al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri’s leadership. The fatwa may be a sign of disagreement among al Qaeda-linked religious scholars over how to respond to ISIS. Al Qaeda senior leadership has not made public statements about the fatwa.

Outlook: Al Qaeda will continue to prioritize the fight in Syria, but will also take advantage of recent gains in Yemen. It is not clear how it will respond to the growth of ISIS cells in the Maghreb and Sahel. Al Qaeda will also continue to try to inspire low-scale attacks in the West.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesJamaat-ul-Ahrar, a faction of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), urged Rohingya Muslims to take up jihad against Myanmar’s rulers. The group offered training, resources, and personnel to aid Rohingyas, a historically persecuted minority, in their cause. The offer of support from the TTP adds to evidence pointing toward its role in the global jihadist movement. The TTP previously announced it had sent fighters to Syria.

Pakistan’s military and security forces are continuing ground and air operations against militant groups in tribal areas surrounding the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

Outlook: Pakistan will continue Operation Zarb-e-Azb against militancy in the tribal areas.

AL QAEDA

ASSESSMENT:

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PoliticalThe UN will lead scheduled Yemeni peace talks in Geneva on June 14. Both the al Houthis and Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government stated that they will participate. Hadi’s government, however, indicated that it does not see the Geneva conference as a negotiation, but rather as a platform through which to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2216, which calls for the al Houthis to disarm and withdraw from seized territory.

Outlook: The June 14 Geneva talks will probably not result in a political solution among Yemen’s warring factions.

SecurityThe al Houthis escalated the conflict along the Saudi Arabian border by firing a Scud missile at Saudi Arabia’s largest air force base, King Khaled Airbase, in Khamis Mushayt, Saudi Arabia, and reportedly leading an attack against Saudi border forces alongside Yemeni military units. Saudi military sources reported that two Patriot missiles intercepted the Scud. The attack is the first use of ballistic missiles in the current conflict and contradicts previous claims by Saudi Arabia that airstrikes had destroyed Yemen’s ballistic missile capabilities.

Outlook: The al Houthis’ escalation of the conflict with Saudi Arabia will probably be used to further justify continued Saudi airstrikes in Yemen and will complicate a negotiated settlement.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)AQAP’s Ansar al Sharia militants and pro-ISIS Wilayat al Bayda militants claimed credit for multiple operations targeting al Houthi militants in Dhi Na’im, Rada’a, and Zahir, al Bayda, from June 2-8. Yemeni news sources attributed the majority of these attacks to popular resistance fighters, indicating a possible level of cooperation between popular resistance fighters and Islamist militant groups fighting the al Houthis in Yemen. Outlook: Pro-ISIS and AQAP militants may seek to use informal alliances with popular resistance fighters to help ingrain their organizations within Yemeni society and expand their control and influence over increased geographical territory.

YEMENGULF OF ADEN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: YEMENGULF OF

ADEN

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1) 06 JUN: Al Houthi militants fired a Scud missile at the King Khaled Airbase in Khamis Mushayt, Saudi Arabia. Saudi forces intercepted the missile with two Patriot missiles.2) 02-08 JUN: Al Houthi militants attacked Saudi positions along the Saudi-Yemeni border.3) 02-08 JUN: Al Houthi militants continued to battle popular resistance forces for control of Yemeni cities.

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalSomalia’s ongoing federalization process encountered further disruption on June 6, when the Interim Jubba Administration (IJA) announced that it was withdrawing all of its working relations with the Somali Federal Government. The announcement came after the Somali Federal Parliament passed a vote of no confidence in the Jubbaland Assembly, a move the IJA claims is unconstitutional. The Puntland Administration has publicly supported the IJA’s actions, further complicating the matter.

Outlook: Somalia’s federalization process continues to face challenges from local administrations seeking to maximize their authority, and the infighting will likely distract attention from the ongoing fight against al Shabaab.

Security Somalia’s regional state formation process, part of the federalization process, is driving insecurity in central Somalia. The moderate Sufi group Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ) captured Dhusamareb, the capital of Galgudud region, from Somali government forces on June 7. This is the second bout of fighting between ASWJ militants and government forces this year. ASWJ believes it is being marginalized in the process to establish regional states.

Outlook: Conflict between the Somali government and ASWJ will likely continue until the dispute over representation has been settled. Al Shabaab may be able to exploit the infighting and re-establish itself in parts of central Somalia.

Al ShabaabAl Shabaab continues to present a narrative of defending Muslims. Al Shabaab released a video on June 4, which depicted three separate attacks in Kenya. The video emphasized that al Shabaab spared Muslims in the attacks and also framed the group’s attacks as being in retaliation for Kenyan actions against Muslims. Al Shabaab also called for Kenyans to join the militant group since the fighting has spread to Kenya.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to craft its narrative around being a defender of Muslims and will try to exploit Kenyan security measures to expand its support base among Kenyan Muslims.

HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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HORN OF AFRICA

GULF OF ADEN

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HORN OF AFRICA

GULF OF ADEN

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HORN OF AFRICA

GULF OF ADEN

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HORN OF AFRICA

GULF OF ADEN

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1) 02 JUN: Kenyan airstrike targeted an al Shabaab base in Gedo region.2) 02 JUN: SNA and AMISOM forces recaptured Toratorow, in Lower Shabelle region.3) 05 JUN: SNA and AMISOM forces recaptured Barawe, Lower Shabelle region.4) 07 JUN: Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a forces seized Dhusamareb from Somali government forces in Galgudud region.

ASSESSMENT:

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AQIM Algeria continues to respond to the growing presence of ISIS in north Africa. The Algerian military deployed fifty thousand troops to Algeria’s southeast border due to concern of ISIS fighters in Libya. Algerian authorities also confirmed the intention of the pro-ISIS organization, Jund al Khilafa, to establish an ISIS state in Algeria consisting of former AQIM members. A group of AQIM leaders pledged support for ISIS in 2014.

Outlook: ISIS will seek to continue expanding in Algeria and also to draw members away from al Qaeda. Algeria will likely counter threats from both organizations by cutting off weapon supplies and dismantling recruiting cells.

Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)Tunisian security forces continued counterterrorism operations throughout the county. Security forces dismantled two terrorist cells, intercepted a weapons cache in Tunis, and engaged in deadly confrontations with terrorist groups in the Kasserine region. Separately, the pro-ISIS media group, Ifriqiyah Media, alluded to the unofficial creation of an ISIS state named Wilayat Tunis in a recent publication, indicating ISIS fighters may be seeking to assault Tunisia’s capital.

Outlook: Tunisian security forces will look to thwart ISIS-related threats through targeted operation, particularly in the Kasserine region where militants are able to hide.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) Violence continues in Mali despite progress in the peace talks. The ethnic Fulani group, the Massena Movement, which reportedly includes individuals who received training from the AQIM-linked Ansar al Din, conducted its first attack since its January 2015 founding. Separately, pro-government militias have refused to sign a peace accord in Menaka, which led to an increase in violence targeting civilians in the area. The Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA) accused the AQIM splinter group MUJAO, which recently pledged support for ISIS, of carrying out the attacks on civilians. The CMA agreed to sign the peace accord, which places Menaka under MINUSMA control.

Outlook: The situation in Menaka is likely to become more violent if pro-government militias refuse to leave the city, which in turn may derail peace negotiations. The continued deterioration of Mali's security situation will allow Islamist groups more room to operate.

MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: MAGHREBWEST

AFRICA1) 03 JUN: Moroccan security forces dismantled an ISIS-linked terrorist cell in Casablanca, Morocco.2) 03-07 JUN: Tunisian forces clashed with militants in Mount Salloum in the Kasserine region.3) 03-07 JUN: Tunisian authorities dismantled two terrorist cells in Mehdia and Jendouba.4) 04 JUN: AQIM attacked an Algerian military convoy near Batna, killing three soldiers.

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

WEST AFRICA

1) 04 JUN: Armed men from Guinea killed 9 policemen in Kangaba, Mali.2) 02 JUN: Massena Movement militants killed a police officer in Diabaly, Mali. This is the group’s first attack since January.3) 06 JUN: Unconfirmed reports stated that pro-government militia fighters assassinated two civilians in Menaka, Mali.

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SAHEL

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Regional Developments

IRGC Deputy Commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami stated, “The Yemeni people are more oppressed than the Palestinian people.” The Iranian regime has long characterized its involvement in regional conflicts as “aiding the oppressed” in those locales, such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. The regime has historically accorded great importance to its involvement in Palestine, and so Salami’s comments indicate Iran’s commitment to supporting the al Houthi movement and an escalation in IRGC rhetoric on the importance of the Yemeni conflict.

Outlook: Other IRGC officials may also escalate their rhetoric on the prominence of the Yemeni conflict.

Nuclear Talks

Iran and the P5+1 resumed deputy-level negotiations from June 4-6 in Vienna Austria. Both sides continued to work on resolving persisting technical issues ahead of the June 30 deadline for a final nuclear agreement. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), meanwhile, stated that any access to nuclear centers will be managed to prevent IAEA inspections from compromising Iran’s national security. Regime hardliners, nevertheless, remained skeptical and made clamorous objections to any proposal that would allow inspections of Iranian military sites and interviews with nuclear scientists. IRGC Brig. Gen. Massoud Jazayeri explicitly stated: "We will not allow any visits to military centers, whether [they are] limited, controlled… or in any other form."

Outlook: Discrepancies between the Supreme Leader’s red lines on inspections and the IAEA’s stated objectives and criteria for resolving issues related to the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Tehran’s nuclear program that have already been agreed upon under the Additional Protocol suggest that rhetorical opposition to the Additional Protocol is political grandstanding for domestic consumption in Iran.

IRAN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN

02 JUNE – 08 JUNE 2015

02 JUN: President Hassan Rouhani reiterated Tehran’s commitment to supporting the Syrian government of Damascus during his meeting with Syrian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Jihad al Laham.

02 JUN: Iranian ambassador to Baghdad denied the BBC Persian report that claimed Iranian forces of 15 were killed in Iraq by ISIS.

02 JUN: IRGC Qods Force Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani “visited conflict zones in Syria.” 03 JUN: The AEOI stated that any access to nuclear centers will be managed to prevent IAEA inspections from

compromising Iranian national security. 03 JUN: Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh met with Vagit Alekperov, the President of the Russian “energy giant” Lukoil, on

the sidelines of Friday’s 167th Ordinary OPEC Meeting in Vienna.03 JUN: Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh met with Shell CEO Ben van Beurden to discuss Shell’s plans to repay its $2 billion

debt to Iran once sanctions are lifted. 04 JUN: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei justified the 1979 seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran in a speech

commemorating the 26th anniversary of the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and called upon a unified Muslim world to resist the West.

04 JUN: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif met with his Russian and Chinese counterparts in Moscow to discuss regional affairs.

04 JUN: Deputy Foreign Ministers Abbas Araghchi and Majid Takht Ravanchi led the Iranian negotiating team in talks with the P5+1 in Vienna, Austria.

05 JUN: IRGC Brig. Gen. Massoud Jazayeri explicitly stated that Iran will not allow “any” inspections of its military sites as part of a final nuclear deal.

07 JUN: IRGC Deputy Commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami stated, “The Yemeni people are more oppressed than the Palestinian people.”

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ACRONYMSAtomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)

Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)

Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)

Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)

Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)

Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)

Libyan National Army (LNA)

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)

Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)

The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)

North Waziristan (NWA)

Pakistani Military (PakMil)

Possible military dimensions (PMD)

Somalia National Army (SNA)

South Waziristan (SWA)

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT ANALYSTS

Katherine Zimmermansenior al Qaeda analystkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Alexis Knutsenal Qaeda analystalexis.knutsen@aei.org (202) 888-6570

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Mehrdad MoarefianIran analystmehrdad.moarefian@aei.org(202) 888-6574

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project,visit www.criticalthreats.org.