AEI’s Critical Threats ProjectUpdate and Assessment

February 7, 2017

2

TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

1. Aggressive actions against the al Houthis in Yemen to counter Iranian regional influence may drive the al Houthis further into the Iranian orbit.

2. Al Shabaab may be expanding terrain under its control as security and governance falter in Somalia. Predicted food shortages may make conditions more permissive for al Shabaab in central Somalia.

3. AQIM is likely supporting the growth of a Salafi-jihadi insurgency within the Fulani ethnic group now spreading across borders in the Sahel region.

2

13

3

| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA

Al Qaeda NetworkAl Qaeda exploited the bad publicity that a January 29 U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) raid against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen received to advance its own narrative of events and propaganda. Al Qaeda’s media wing, al Sahab Media Foundation, published a video of deceased al Qaeda senior leader Abu Yahya al Libi discussing the role of women in jihad. He called for women to be good Muslims in the home and to support their men in battle, and for locals and immigrants to support each other. Several women were killed in the raid, whom the Pentagon described as female combatants. An al Qaeda bulletin described the raid and death of civilians as evidence that the U.S. was not just fighting mujahideen, but Muslim civilians as well.

Reported U.S. airstrikes targeted an al Qaeda training camp in central Idlib province in Syria on February 3. These strikes, if confirmed, would mark the first U.S. airstrike against al Qaeda in Syria since its rebranding as the Tahrir al Sham Assembly. Outlook: Al Qaeda will probably utilize outrage over U.S. policies as both a recruiting call and justification for violence.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesThe Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is re-unifying after May 2014 splits over leadership. The TTP Mehsud faction rejoined the group led by TTP emir Fazlullah. The allegiance of the Mehsud tribe, whose members founded the TTP, will bolster Fazlullah’s legitimacy and strengthen the group. The civilian arm of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) rebranded to emphasize its opposition to the Indian occupation of Kashmir over its Salafi ideology in response to Pakistan’s crackdown on its leadership. LeT leader Hafiz Saeed, who is under house arrest, called for more attacks on the Indian army in Kashmir.

Outlook: The unified TTP will increase its operational tempo. LeT will sustain its operations in Kashmir.

4

| ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe U.S. may act against the al Houthi movement in Yemen as part of a regional strategy to counter Iran. A significant al Houthi faction does not support Iranian control, however, and the al Houthis are not an Iranian proxy. U.S. Central Command deployed the USS Cole to the Gulf of Aden to join the Makin Island Amphibious Readiness Group. The ships will enforce freedom of navigation through the Red Sea. The U.S. may be aligning more closely with the Saudi-led coalition and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government, which does not have a popular support base. Former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the al Houthis’ current partner, remains the most powerful political actor in the north.

Outlook: An aggressive strategy against the al Houthis could drive the group further into the Iranian sphere of influence .

SecurityOperation Golden Spear, an offensive to drive the al Houthi-Saleh movement from Yemen’s Red Sea coast, is progressing slowly. Hadi government forces continued a multi-week fight for control of Mokha, a small but strategically important port city. The Saudi-led coalition expanded airstrikes in al Hudaydah governorate in preparation for the next campaign phase.

Outlook: The frontline will stall in al Hudaydah governorate, where the al Houthi-Saleh faction has popular support.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenThe U.S. raid on an AQAP headquarters in central Yemen on January 29 was intended to kill or capture AQAP emir Qasim al Raymi, according to U.S. officials. Al Raymi, named by U.S. officials as the third most dangerous terrorist in the world, released an audio message taunting U.S. President Donald Trump for the operation on February 4. AQAP forced Emirati-backed counterterrorism forces to withdraw from checkpoints in northern Abyan governorate, creating a more permissive environment for AQAP. Yemeni forces are preparing for an operation to clear AQAP from Abyan.

Outlook: AQAP will expand its support base in northern Abyan but will not attempt to hold territory.

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5

| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

1) 31 JAN: ISIS Wilayat al Bayda attempted to assassinate the Aden Security Deputy.

2) 02 FEB: Al Hizam forces withdrew from northern Abyan.

3) 03 FEB: AQAP claimed to seize a site in northwestern al Bayda.

4) 31 JAN, 03 FEB: USS Makin Island ARG and USS Cole deployed to the Gulf of Aden.

5) 05 FEB: AQAP executed a member of President Hadi’s Presidential Guard in Abyan.

2

3

5

4

1

6

| ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalSomalia will hold presidential elections, decided by a vote by the Somali parliament, on February 8 amid serious concerns over security and corruption. Al Shabaab militants conducted multiple attacks targeting Somali parliamentarians in recent weeks. Elections will take place in Aden Adde International Airport, where AMISOM is headquartered, as a security precaution. Corruption allegations threaten the legitimacy of the Somali Federal Government no matter the outcome of the election. Transparency International ranked Somalia as the most corrupt country in the world in its annual report released on January 25.

Outlook: The new Somali president will face challenges to his legitimacy due to rampant corruption allegations.

Security Severe drought and impending famine conditions threaten security and governance throughout Somalia. The UN warned that the current situation resembles conditions that preceded the 2010-2011 famine, which caused more than a quarter million deaths. The UN placed more than three million people in either “severe” or “crisis” conditions.

Outlook: Insufficient humanitarian response may destabilize the country and allow al Shabaab to resurge.

Al Shabaab Al Shabaab retains its sanctuary in southern Somalia, which AMISOM and Somali National Army operations have not been able to remove. This sanctuary includes parts of Lower Jubba region north of Kismayo through Middle Jubba region into Dinsor district in Bay region. Recent public executions demonstrate the group’s control of terrain. Al Shabaab carried out a public execution in Jamame district in Lower Jubba region on February 5, beheading four men accused of spying for U.S., AMISOM, and Somali security forces. Al Shabaab orchestrated similar public executions in Middle Jubba region on January 10 and Bay region on January 26.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will expand operations in Kismayo city after consolidating control in surrounding areas.

GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

7

| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

1) 01 FEB: Al Shabaab militants attempted to assassinate a MP in Mogadishu.

2) 01 FEB: Al Shabaab militants raided a police camp in northeastern Kenya.

3) 03 FEB: Galmudug security forces killed al Shabaab’s head of finance in Mudug region.

4) 05 JAN: Al Shabaab militants executed four men in Lower Jubba region.

5) 07 FEB: Al Shabaab militants ambushed an AMISOM convoy in Middle Shabelle region.

4

2

3

1

5

8

| ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalRussia is increasing its influence in the Mediterranean and North Africa by positioning itself as a broker in the Libyan civil war. The Russian government struck a military deal with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) and Russia’s preferred partner, in January 2017. Russian officials also invited Fayez al Serraj, the prime minister of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), to meet in Moscow. Russia’s invitation to Serraj, whom Haftar opposes, may be an effort to disrupt the GNA’s growing ties to NATO and the EU. The GNA will allow NATO and EU ships to operate in Libyan waters as part of a counter-migration agreement signed on February 2.

Outlook: Russia will leverage its position in Libya to extend its military sphere of influence into the central Mediterranean.

SecuritySalafi-jihadi groups are positioned for an insurgency against the Libyan National Army (LNA) in eastern Libya as the LNA’s operation to secure Benghazi culminates. The Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC), a coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, clashed with LNA forces in Qanfouda district, Benghazi on February 1-4. The LNA claimed to clear Qanfouda, a longtime militant stronghold, on January 25. The LNA continued airstrikes on Derna city, which is controlled by an al Qaeda-linked militia coalition, and arrested alleged Islamist militants in Ajdabiya city. The kidnapping of political officials increased, signaling a security breakdown in the country’s major urban centers.

Outlook: Salafi-jihadi groups will sustain low-level operations in Benghazi and increase operations in Derna and Ajdabiya.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS’s operations temporarily ceased as the group rebuilds its capabilities following U.S. airstrikes on January 19. Mines planted by ISIS in its defense of Sirte are inhibiting efforts to reconstruct and repopulate the city.

Outlook: ISIS will rebuild its capabilities in northwestern Libya in the near-to-mid term.

WEST AFRICA LIBYA

9

| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA

1) 01 FEB: Militants attacked the security directorate in Bani Walid.

2) 02 FEB: Mines planted by ISIS detonated in Sirte.

3) 02 FEB: The LNA’s air force conducted airstrikes against the MSCD in Derna.

4) 04 FEB: BRSC militants clashed with the LNA in Qanfouda district, Benghazi.

5) 05 FEB: GNA-aligned militias clashed with LNA-aligned militias in Tripoli over control of a bridge.

4

2

3

1

5

10

| ASSESSMENT:

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the MaghrebMaghreb nations are cracking down on Salafi-jihadi cells and foreign fighter networks, which remain military and political threats. Moroccan authorities arrested three members of a suspected ISIS attack cell on February 6. Algerian security forces killed three militants during an ambush in Illizi province, which borders militant safe havens in southwestern Libya and southern Tunisia. Tunisian citizens protested peacefully against the return of militants from conflict zones in Tunis.

Outlook: The return of foreign fighters from Syria, Iraq, and Libya will increase the likelihood of attacks in the Maghreb.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)AQIM is probably helping stoke a Fulani insurgency with Salafi-jihad influence in Mali and Burkina Faso. The Macina Liberation Front (MLF), an AQIM associate with a Fulani base, compelled secular schools to remain closed in central Mopti region in Mali. Ansar al Islam, another Salafi-Jihadi Fulani militant group, started similar efforts to the south of Mali in Burkina Faso. The closure of secular schools delegitimizes the state and lays the groundwork for Salafi-jihadi groups to establish political control. AQIM recently imposed shari’a punishments in Taoudenni, a remote area of northern Mali, demonstrating control of the local population.

Nigeria’s crackdown on civilian support for Boko Haram may destroy a fragile alliance that was crucial for degrading Boko Haram. In Maiduguri, members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), an anti-Boko Haram vigilante group, threatened to abandon their security checkpoints en masse after Nigerian government forces detained several CJTF members on charges of supporting Boko Haram on February 6. The governor of Borno State in northeastern Nigeria called for the arrest of any civilian supporters of Boko Haram on February 3. He then dismissed all local government officials on February 5 after several were found guilty of providing material support to Boko Haram. The rate of successful interdiction operations against Boko Haram increased rapidly after the Nigerian government began funding the CJTF in 2013.

Outlook: The Fulani insurgency may challenge the Malian and Burkinabe authorities in central Mali and northwestern Burkina Faso. Nigeria will ease its crackdown on civilians supporting Boko Haram in order to maintain the loyalty of the CJTF.

WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

11

| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB

1) 01 FEB: The Algerian army killed three militants in Illizi province, Algeria.

2) 05 FEB: The Algerian army destroyed two militant bunkers in Bejaia province, Algeria.

3) 05 FEB: Protesters demonstrated against the return of militants from conflict zones in Tunis.

4) 06 FEB: Moroccan authorities arrested three members of a suspected ISIS cell in al Jadida, Morocco.

2 3

1

4

12

| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL

1) 01 FEB: AQIM enforced shari’a law in Taoudenni, Timbuktu region, Mali.

2) 01 FEB: The Nigerian military seized armored vehicles and anti-aircraft guns in Buk, Borno State, Nigeria. 

3) 04 FEB: Ansar al Islam killed a councilman in Yorsala, Loroum Province, Burkina Faso.

4) 06 FEB: Boko Haram-Barnawi overran Sasawa, Yobe State, Nigeria.

2

3

1

4

13

ACRONYMS

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14

Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569