AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT May 24, 2016

TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. The Afghan Taliban appointed Haibatullah Akhundzada as emir after a U.S. airstrike killed Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri will likely pledge allegiance to the new Taliban emir.

2. ISIS is conducting explosive attack campaigns targeting Yemeni security forces and recruiting stations in Aden and al Mukalla, Hadramawt.

3. ISIS is deploying militants to northwestern Libya where it may be reconstituting attack cells focused on Tunisia or Tripoli, Libya.

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ASSESSMENT:

al Qaeda NetworkA U.S. airstrike killed Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan on May 21. The Taliban confirmed Mullah Mansour’s death and named Mullah Mansour’s deputy and former Taliban chief justice Haibatullah Akhundzada as the new Taliban emir. The succession crisis in summer 2015, when Mullah Mansour became the leader, led to a rift in the Afghan Taliban that ISIS has exploited. Sirajuddin Haqqani, a deputy leader of the Taliban and a potential candidate to have succeeded Mullah Mansour, will keep his position as deputy Taliban leader and will likely retain the same amount of influence under Akhundzada as under Mullah Mansour. A second potential candidate to have succeeded Mullah Mansour, the late leader Mullah Omar’s son Mullah Yaqoob, was promoted to deputy leader and may be positioning to lead the movement in the future. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri had pledged bayat to Mullah Mansour as the Taliban emir and will likely pledge bayat to Akhundzada in order to sustain continuity and unity of effort in the global Salafi-jihadi movement. There is the remote possibility that Zawahiri does not pledge bayat to Akhundzada and instead further dedicates resources to al Qaeda’s efforts to build an emirate in Syria.

Outlook: Mullah Mansour’s death may create an operational pause in Taliban activities in Afghanistan as the new emir consolidates his authority. It is unlikely to affect the al Qaeda network’s operations in a significant way.

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AL QAEDA

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe UN-led Kuwait talks are stalled due to disagreements over the agenda. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s delegation suspended participation in negotiations and demanded the al Houthi and General People’s Congress (GPC) delegation agree to the agenda, especially the terms of UNSCR 2216, which calls for the al Houthi-Saleh forces to disarm and withdraw from seized territory. Hadi’s delegation resumed participation after assurance from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani that an agreement remains contingent on UNSCR 2216 implementation.

Outlook: Both sides remain incentivized to continue the Kuwait talks process, but are unlikely to make concessions in talks.

SecurityViolence increased across frontlines in central and southern Yemen as both sides escalated in retaliation for ceasefire violations. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired at least one ballistic missile toward Saudi Arabia in apparent retaliation for coalition airstrikes in Amran governorate and moved reinforcements, including ballistic missiles, toward the Taiz-Lahij border. They may seek to contest parts of south Yemen. Yemeni government forces clashed with al Houthi-Saleh forces in Hajjah governorate.

Outlook: Clashes will continue along frontlines, though large offensives are unlikely absent a full collapse of talks in Kuwait.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenISIS is sustaining an explosive attack campaign in Aden against security forces and recruits, which it expanded to al Mukalla, Hadramawt. An ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan video may be a prelude to increased attacks in Aden. Assessed ISIS militants detonated an IED at an al Houthi exhibition at Sana’a University, the first such reported attack in the capital since December 2015. Separately, AQAP is messaging strength despite recent withdrawals from populated centers. AQAP senior commander Khaled Batarfi highlighted the group’s sustained capability to target high-profile officials.

Outlook: ISIS will continue its campaign of paired suicide attacks on government targets in Aden. ISIS’s campaign, despite its publicity, is unlikely to undermine AQAP’s strength, which lies in its relationships with the population.

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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalSomali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud approved the 2016 election model by decree after the U.S. and the UN expressed concern over the possibility of delayed elections. The election model does not have full support among Somalia’s political factions, which had delayed its approval in the Somali parliament. The current government’s mandate expires in August 2016.

Outlook: President Mohamud’s approval of the election model by decree will likely alienate some Somali factions that have described the proposed model as unfair.

SecurityKenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta threatened to withdraw the Kenyan contingent operating under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which would create a security vacuum in southern Somalia and challenge the AMISOM mission. The EU passed a 20 percent budget cut to AMISOM, resulting in salary reductions for troops. Kenya has repeatedly sought increased financial support for its contributions to AMISOM, citing the cost of the logistical line across the Kenyan-Somali border. Separately, Kenyan police cracked down violently on protesters against Kenya’s electoral commission. Widespread political instability as the 2017 elections approach could draw Kenyan security forces away from counterterrorism operations.

Outlook: Kenya is unlikely to withdraw its contingent fully from Somalia because there would no longer be a buffer force between al Shabaab and Kenyan territory.

Al ShabaabAl Shabaab support cells in Tanzania may have begun supporting ISIS. Masked men carrying a reported ISIS flag killed an imam and two worshippers at a mosque in Mwanza region, Tanzania on May 19, possibly in an effort to kidnap young congregants. A different group of militants pledged allegiance to ISIS in a video, possibly filmed in northern Tanzania.

Outlook: ISIS will not dedicate significant resources to East Africa, but may recognize an East African wilayat to capitalize on pre-existing support, drive new recruitment, and compete with al Qaeda.

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe Libyan National Army (LNA) and its backers will continue to obstruct the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) despite international pressure. U.S. and EU sanctions on anti-GNA politicians have failed to alter their positions, and the UAE and Egypt continue to support the LNA. LNA commander Gen. Khalifa Haftar continues to position his force as Libya’s only viable counter-ISIS actor and is now seeking to circumvent the UN arms embargo without participating in the GNA.

Outlook: Sanctions will not force anti-GNA actors to endorse the unity government as long as they retain international support.

SecurityThe Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), a coalition of federalist and tribal militias that controls the bulk of the hydrocarbon infrastructure in eastern Libya, is re-establishing its control over those facilities following LNA encroachment into the region under the guise of counter-ISIS operations. GNA-aligned Misratan militias recaptured critical terrain from ISIS west of Sirte, but do not have adequate forces to attack Sirte without international support. Outlook: Competition for control of oil infrastructure will undermine counter-ISIS operations, as Libyan factions prioritize securing their political and economic interests.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS is deploying militants to northwestern Libya where it may be reconstituting attack cells. The group’s primary fighting force in Sirte deployed advanced bomb-making and campaign planning capabilities to disrupt a planned offensive on its western flank. ISIS may also possess man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADs), which, if operational, it may be used to target Misratan warplanes and possibly Western medical airlifts. Reports indicate a possible schism between ISIS’s foreign fighters and Libyan militants, a known vulnerability for the group. ISIS appears to have cracked down on defectors, however.

Outlook: ISIS will conduct explosive attacks in Tripoli and in the vicinity of Abugrein to fix local militias and safeguard Sirte. It may conduct a cross-border attack into Tunisia during the Ramadan season.

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LIBYAWEST AFRICA

ASSESSMENT:

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)Disruptions by Algerian security forces likely hindered AQIM operations in the short term, but the group will regroup and adapt to use more effective tactics for future attacks. AQIM was likely planning a coordinated attack in northern Algeria. Algerian security forces killed more than one dozen militants in the past week, including the emir of AQIM’s al Farouq brigade. AQIM militants planning to conduct attacks in the Bouira city center clashed with Algerian police at a checkpoint in Bouira, indicating that the nearby forested region is likely an AQIM support zone. The two groups may have collaborated on the planned attack.

Outlook: AQIM will attempt coordinated attacks in Bouira or Tizi Ouzou, despite recent disruptions by Algerian security forces, in an effort to reactivate its network in northern Algeria.

Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)ISIS continues to penetrate AQIM’s historical areas of operation in Tunisia. Tunisian security forces killed the leader of Jund al Khalifa (Soldiers of the Caliphate) in Kasserine, western Tunisia, two days after an assessed ISIS IED attack injured one soldier in the governorate. The presence of leadership may indicate that ISIS is confident in its ability to recruit and operate in western Tunisia and that it maintains a relatively secure base in the region from which it can conduct attacks throughout Tunisia and collaborate with militants in Algeria.

Outlook: ISIS will attack security forces in western Tunisia in an effort to co-opt Uqba Ibn Nafa’a militants.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din is demonstrating its vitality to drive recruitment. The Macina Liberation Front (MLF), an Ansar al Din affiliate that operates in central Mali, released its debut video, indicating an intentional allocation of resources by Ansar al Din to support the group’s public messaging. Ansar al Din also conducted a complex attack on a MINUSMA convoy that demonstrated both advanced planning capabilities and insight into MINUSMA’s movements.

Outlook: AQIM affiliates will focus recruitment on disillusioned local tribes in Mali in order to build an increasingly resilient organization and bolster support for attacks on pro-government forces..

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MAGHREB AND SAHEL

WEST AFRICA

ACRONYMS

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African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Pakistani Military (PakMil)Possible military dimensions (PMD)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

Katherine Zimmermansenior al Qaeda analystkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569

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