1. 1. AEIS CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT July 8, 2015
2. 2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS 2 1 3 1. Al Shabaab is on the offensive against AMISOM and Somali National Army troops. It seized ten towns in Lower Shabelle region following the withdrawal of AMISOM troops from the locations. 2. AQIM is resurging in northern Mali. It claimed the 02 JUL ambush near Timbuktu, Mali, that killed five UN peacekeepers and injured nine others. 3. The Iranian regime is taking steps to strengthen Irans economy and make it resistant to Western sanctions as it pushes for sanctions relief in the ongoing nuclear talks. 2
3. 3. ASSESSMENT: al Qaeda Network Al Qaeda may be moving into cyber warfare as well. Al Qaeda Electronic, a pro-al Qaeda hacking group, announced the appointments of Qatada al Sainawi as the deputy leader and Moaaz al Tikriti as the head of fundraising for the group. Al Sainawi previously served as spokesman for the group, while al Tikriti was a fighter with al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Al Qaeda Electronic has been active lately, having defaced 22 British websites on 03 JUL and several Russian, Norwegian, and Vietnamese websites between 25 and 29 JUN. Outlook: Al Qaeda Electronic will likely continue its recent surge in hacking activity, in an effort to establish its presence on the internet. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates Bangladeshi security forces arrested 12 militants affiliated with al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) during raids in different parts of Dhaka. The security forces also arrested Mainul Islam, the chief of AQIS Bangladesh and his top adviser, Zafar Amin, during the raids. Police seized a large number of weapons and explosives from the arrested militants. Pakistani police recovered ISIS propaganda, maps of London and documents threatening Pakistans army from three militants arrested in Peshawar. Of the arrested, two are Afghan nationals, while the other is Pakistani. It is suspected that these militants could have been planning an attack in London on the 10th anniversary of the 07 JUL 2005 London bombings, which killed about 52 civilians and injured over 700 more. Pakistani military launched the final phase of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the offensive against militancy, in Shawal Valley. Outlook: The Pakistani government will continue its attacks against militancy in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). 3 AL QAEDA
4. 4. ASSESSMENT: Political Yemeni stakeholders continue to seek a political solution to the ongoing crisis. Representatives from President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadis government and the al Houthi movement stated that they expect a draft humanitarian ceasefire agreement that will last through Eid al Fitr, the last day of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, after meetings with UN Special Envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and in Sanaa, Yemen. The ceasefire conditions are still being negotiated, though Hadis government stated that it seeks full implementation of UNSCR 2216, which calls for complete al Houthi disarmament. Outlook: A brief humanitarian ceasefire may be agreed to given the rapidly deteriorating conditions in Yemen, although the insistence on full implementation of UNSCR 2216 will continue to be an obstacle in negotiations. Security The al Houthi movement appears to be overstretched and is struggling to maintain control of territory. Local popular resistance fighters repelled an al Houthi attack in al Dhaleh governorate, and popular resistance fighters have been contesting the al Houthi presence in Taiz, Yemens third-largest city. During a peak in the fighting there, approximately 1,200 prisoners broke out of the central prison. The al Houthi-run state media described the escapees as dangerous criminals and alleged there were al Qaeda suspects among them. Outlook: The al Houthis may be willing to withdraw from certain areas in south Yemen as part of a humanitarian ceasefire. A ceasefire would also be an opportunity for both sides to replenish supplies and reposition. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen ISIS Wilayat Sanaa is conducting a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign in Yemens capital in addition to sustaining IED attacks. Wilayat Sanaa detonated a VBIED near a military hospital in Shuaub district in Sanaa on June 29, the third such attack claimed by Wilayat Sanaa since the beginning of Ramadan. Outlook: ISIS Wilayat Sanaa will continue its VBIED campaign to provoke a response from the al Houthis in Yemens capital. 4 YEMENGULF OF ADEN
5. 5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: YEMENGULF OF ADEN 5 1) 30 JUN: ISIS Wilayat Sanaa detonated a VBIED near a military hospital in Shuaub district in Sanaa. 2) 01 JUL: Popular resistance fighters repelled an al Houthi attack north of Dhaleh city. 3) 06 JUL: Popular resistance fighters secured a key position in Radfan district along the road to al Anad, Lahij. 4) 05 JUL: Reported U.S. airstrike killed 4 AQAP members in al Mukalla, Hadramawt. 1 4 2 3
6. 6. ASSESSMENT: Political The breakaway region of Puntlands administration remains unwilling to settle its border dispute with the new central state of Galmudug, despite international and local calls for reconciliation. Puntland Information Minister Mohamed Hassan Soo-adde announced that his administration would not be attending talks proposed by Galmudug President Abdikarin Hussein. Puntland supported the moderate Islamist group Ahlu Sunna wa al Jamaas claim that the new Galmudug state was not legitimate. Outlook: Tensions between the newly formed state of Galmudug and local splinter groups, including Ahlu Sunna wa al Jamaa and local clans, and the Puntland administration are likely to continue as the federalization process moves forward. Al Shabaab is likely to use these tensions to its advantage as the group moves on Mogadishu. Security Security forces throughout East Africa remain on high alert for possible terrorist attacks as the Islamic holy month of Ramadan nears its end on July 17. Kenyan officials arrested two Ugandans in Nairobi they believe to be recruiters for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Meanwhile, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army officials announced a plan to increase security in the key areas of Kismayo, Baidoa, Beledweyne, Adado, and Mogadishu. Outlook: Regional security forces will continue to remain on high alert as the possibility for a large-scale al Shabaab attack during the final days of Ramadan and as information about potential ISIS cells in East Africa is uncovered. Al Shabaab Al Shabaab made significant territorial gains in the past week. The group seized ten towns in the Lower Shabelle region between July 2 and July 5 from which AMISOM had previously withdrawn for tactical reasons. Al Shabaab was also linked to several low-profile assassination attempts, including a car bomb that injured a Somali intelligence officer and the ambush of Turkish officials in Mogadishu. Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue its campaign against AMISOM military bases in the Lower Shabelle region and will continue to attempt high-profile assassinations of foreign officials before the end of Ramadan. HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN 6
7. 7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: 77777 1 2 3 4 7 1) 01 JUL: AMISOM withdrew from bases in Buufow, Yaq-bari Weyne, Awdheegle, and Qoryole, Lower Shabelle. 2) 03 05 JUL: Al Shabaab seized ten towns deserted by AMISOM and SNA in Lower Shabelle. 3) 03 JUL: Unidentified gunmen ambushed a vehicle containing Turkish officials in Lido Beach, Mogadishu. 4) 05 JUL: Al Shabaab seized Jalalaqsi, Hiraan region, after clashing with SNA. GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
8. 8. ASSESSMENT: Political Updates from the UN-led peace negotiations in Sakhirat, Morocco, have ceased following protests and demonstrations from General National Congress (GNC) President Sahmain over Draft 5s political rebalance in favor of the House of Representatives. However, the continuing publication of endorsements from a wide variety of Libyan factions and political actors supports the notion that the talks are not over. Outlook: Increasing political pressure from both international and domestic groups will force the GNC to remain at the negotiating table and accept necessary compromises, partly due to the revelations that ISISs presence is growing in northwest Libya and that ISIS Wilayat Tarablus is capable of attacks in Misrata. Security A resumption in large-scale fighting throughout Benghazi has supplanted the threat of gunmen from Derna, and the prospect of a new military front in Derna is a secondary concern to the Libyan National Army (LNA). Resources will be refocused on the crucial territories of Laithi, Sabra, and Buhdeima in Benghazi to reinforce the LNA against future operations by the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council. Outlook: The shift in the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Councils posture from a defensive to an offensive one reflects a change in tactical and/or strategic thinking. It is unclear if the Buhdeima assault on 04 JUL is simply an anomaly or the beginning of a new operation to break the military stalemate in Benghazi. Ansar al Sharia Libya and ISIS in Libya ISIS-affiliated forces in Derna remain on the defense. They conducted three vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks on the same day, but have not regained control of the city. ISIS Wilayat Tarabluss 06 JUL bombing of Misratas air force base indicates growing capabilities and an attempt to weaken ISISs opponents in Libya. Additionally, ISIS forces have been moving into new villages outside of Sirte on the main roads along the coast. Outlook: ISIS groups in Libya appear to be creating conditions on the ground to support ISISs expansion from Sirte and attempting to maintain some positions near Derna. 8 LIBYAWEST AFRICA
9. 9. ASSESSMENT: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) AQIM demonstrated that it has regained its ability to carry out asymmetrical attacks in northern Mali since the French intervention in 2013. It claimed credit for an attack in Timbuktu, Mali that killed six MINUSMA peacekeepers, which was the groups first attack against peacekeepers in Mali since May. Separately, low-level fighters continue to splinter from AQIM. Algeria dismantled a large terrorist cell comprised of former AQIM members who now support ISIS. Outlook: AQIM will continue to operate in Mali and take advantage of the more permissive environment now that the French have largely withdrawn. AQIM will also look to counter ISIS support through increased operations and recruitment. Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia) Tunisia began a heavy security crackdown in response to the June 26 Sousse attack. President Essebsi declared a state of emergency in effect from July 4 though August 2, giving the executive and security branches more power and autonomy. This may lead to increased concerns and protests from citizens concerned about the possible evolution of a police state. Five terrorist cells were dismantled in two days after the declaration, showing the immediate effect of these increased powers. Outlook: The expansion of government and military power will likely continue as President Essebsi looks to ensure citizens safety during Ramadan, but many will protest these new measures due to their similarity to the laws of the Ben Ali regime. Such restrictions may create a valuable recruiting tool for terrorist groups. Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) Ansar al Din continues to expand its influence in southern Mali, and bordering countries are growing increasingly concerned over potential spill over. The Ivory Coast deployed troops to the Malian border and conducted security operations with the Malian army in response to a threat from Ansar al Din to expand operations in Mali and extend its influence into the Ivory Coast and Mauritania. Ansar al Din also confirmed coordination with the Massina Liberation Movement (MLM) and referred to the MLM as one of its katibas. This may indicate that Ansar al Din has fully incorporated the MLM into its network. Separately, Mauritanian security forces dismantled a dormant ISIS cell in Nouakchott, Mauritania. Security forces reported that former members of this cell also participated in fighting in Syria and Iraq, indicating that communication likely occurred between the Mauritanian cell and ISIS fighters in other areas. Outlook: Ansar al Din is likely to continue using local militia groups to solidify its position in southern Mali. 9 MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA
10. 10. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: 10 LIBYAWEST AFRICA 10101010101010 1 2 3 4 1) 01 JUL: ISIS forces continued expansion efforts in Sirte, occupying the neighborhood of al Sawawa without resistance. 2) 03 JUL: ISIS conducted 3 SVBIED attacks throughout Derna, targeting both Mujahideen Shura Council and civilian targets. 3) 04 JUL: Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council militants besieged LNA forces in Buhdeima, Benghazi. 4) 06 JUL: ISIS infiltrated Misrata AFB and destroyed 4 jets.
11. 11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: MAGHREBWEST AFRICA 1) 30 JUN: Algerian authorities dismantled an 18- member ISIS cell in Tizi Ouzou, Algeria. 2) 30 JUN - 02 JUL: Tunisian authorities arrested numerous suspects in connection to the 26 JUN Sousse attack. 3) 02 - 05 JUL: Tunisian authorities dismantled six terrorist cells in various cities. Two were directly linked to ISIS and one to Ansar al Sharia Tunisia. 1 3 2 11
12. 12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: SAHELWEST AFRICA 1) 01 JUL: Mauritanian security forces dismantled a dormant ISIS cell in Nouakchott, Mauritania. 2) 02 JUL: AQIM militants attacked a MINSUMA convoy outside of Timbuktu, Mali, killing 6 peacekeepers. 3) 05 JUL: French Special Forces killed AQIM leader Mohammed Aly Ag Wadoussene in an operation in Kidal, Mali. 2 1 12 3
13. 13. ASSESSMENT: Nuclear Talks President Hassan Rouhani warned, If the opposite side ignores the [possible nuclear] agreement we will go back to the old path faster than they [the West] could imagine, in a July 1 address. The old path likely refers to previous uranium enrichment levels. In July 5 comments, Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Pourdastan stated, the U.S. might make a deal with us within the framework of the [P5+1]we should never see this as a positive gesture on the part of our enemy. This articulation of distrust demonstrates that a possible nuclear agreement will not significantly improve existing strained relations between the U.S. and Iran. The negotiations continued past the extended July 7 deadline, as EU Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini stated on July 7 that the talks will continue for the next few days. Outlook: These comments indicate that Iran will pursue its nuclear programs full potential should a possible P5+1 nuclear deal be breached. Economy Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei outlined provisions of the 6th five-year national development plan, in a letter to President Hassan Rouhani on July 1. Khamenei identified the resistance economy doctrinehis plan to make the Iranian economy strong and resistant to Western sanctions and global financial crisesas a pillar of the 6th five-year plan. The plan called for enhanced deterrence capabilities, with an emphasis on boosting the countrys cyber infrastructure, and instructed the government to allocate five percent of the public budget for defense expenditures. Expediency Discernment Council (EDC) Secretary Mohsen Rezaei, meanwhile, stated If [we] are not able to reach a [nuclear] dealthe sanctions will continue, but we will certainly decide to change our economic policy... Outlook: The Iranian regime will continue to integrate the resistance economy doctrine into its economic planning as it weighs the implications of a potential nuclear deal. 13 IRAN
14. 14. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN 1430 JUNE 06 JULY 2015 30 JUN: The P5+1 and Iran extended nuclear negotiations to July 7. 30 JUN: Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Akbar Salehi said that many technical issues have already been resolved during the nuclear talks in Vienna. 30 JUN: IRGC Qods Force Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani attended a commemoration for Iranian fighters killed in Syria. 01 JUL: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei announced the provisions for the Islamic Republics 6th five-year development plan. 01 JUL: President Hassan Rouhani warned the P5+1 that Iran will go back to the old path [Irans previous levels of uranium enrichment] if Western powers do not uphold their commitments under the final nuclear deal. 02 JUL: President Hassan Rouhani met with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano in Tehran. 02 JUL: Expediency Discernment Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei claimed if [we] are not able to reach a [nuclear] dealthe sanctions will continue, but we will certainly decide to change our economic policy. 02 JUL: Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari announced that the Fatah submarine is continuing field testing. 04 JUL: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that Irans scientific progress should not slow down and described university professors as commanders of the soft war against the West. 04 JUL: The Supreme Leaders Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati stated Iran, Syria, and Iraq, which are on the front line of resistance, are jointly fighting terrorism. 04 JUL: Khatam al Anbia Air Defense Base Commander Brig. Gen. Farzad Esmaili unveiled a long-range Ghadir radar installation near Ahvaz city in southwestern Khuzestan province. 06 JUL: The foreign ministers of the P5+1 and Iran, along with EU Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini, met in Vienna. 06 JUL: President Hassan Rouhani received an official invitation from Russian President Vladimir Putin to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit on July 12 and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Summit on July 11.
15. 15. ACRONYMS 15 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T) Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA) Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA) Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Kataib Hezbollah (KH) Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) Libyan National Army (LNA) Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) North Waziristan (NWA) Pakistani Military (PakMil) Possible military dimensions (PMD) Somalia National Army (SNA) South Waziristan (SWA) Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
16. 16. AEIS CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT Katherine Zimmerman senior al Qaeda analyst katherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576 Alexis Knutsen al Qaeda analyst alexis.knutsen@aei.org (202) 888-6570 Paul Bucala Iran analyst paul.bucala@aei.org (202) 888-6573 Heather Malacaria program manager heather.malacaria@aei.org (202) 888-6575 Marie Donovan Iran analyst marie.donovan@aei.org (202) 888-6572 Mehrdad Moarefian Iran analyst mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org (202) 888-6574 For more information about AEIs Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org. Frederick W. Kagan director fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569 16