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Senior Theses Honors College

Spring 5-5-2016

Causes and Consequences of the Syrian Civil WarChelsea Marie BaltesUniversity of South Carolina - Columbia

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Recommended CitationBaltes, Chelsea Marie, "Causes and Consequences of the Syrian Civil War" (2016). Senior Theses. 105.https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/senior_theses/105

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HistoricalCauses&ModernConsequencesoftheSyrianCivilWar

I. Introductiona. BackgroundonSyriab. ThesisStatement-Thecauseofthecivilwarisnotsimplyonecomponent,but

amultitudeofhistoricalmomentsthathaveleduptothemodernandcurrentonesweseetodayallcombinedtogethercreatingadeteriorationofstabilityinSyria

i. Causes1. FrenchMandates2. ConflictbetweenSyriaandIsrael-SixDaysWar3. SectarianDivides4. UnionBetweenEgypt&Syria5. Hafizal-AsadRisetoPower6. Alawite&SunniHateforOneAnother7. Basharal-AsadSuccessiontopower8. ArabSpring

ii. Consequences1. Lebanon2. Economic3. DemographicChange4. RefugeeMovement

II. Body-Causesa. SectarianDivisions

i. SunniMajorityii. Minorities-Christian,Druze,Alawiiii. Alawi&SunniHateiv. Tribal,Geographic,Religious,EthnicDivisions

b. FrenchMandatesi. PartitionSyriaii. ControlofArmyiii. ImpositionofImperialRule

1. FrenchCulturec. UnionBetweenEgypt&Syria

i. Nasser’sControlii. Ba’thPartyDissentioniii. CitizenCoupsiv. SyrianResignationfromUnion

d. ConflictBetweenSyria&Israeli. SixDaysWarii. GolanHeightsiii. Israel’sWesternAlliesiv. Zionism

e. Hafizal-Asad’sRisetoPoweri. Ba’thPartyBackgroundii. BattleforPowerwithSalahJadid

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iii. Asad’sMilitaryConnections1. RoleinBa’thistMilitaryCommittee

iv. AsadAttacksv. AsadBecomesFirstAlawiPresident

f. AlawiandSunniHatei. ReligiousDifferencesii. FrenchSupportofAlawi

1. FrenchoppressionofSunnig. Basharal-AsadSuccessiontoPower

i. LifePriortoPoliticsii. ClaimofSupportinDemocracyiii. OppressionandDictatorship

1. CivilianDiscontenta. ArabSpring

h. ArabSpringi. Der’a

1. SchoolChildrenGraffitia. Arrest

ii. ProtestsGrowInResponsetoArrests1. RegimeBrutalityAgainstProtestors

a. CiviliansBeginAttackingGovernmentOfficesiii. CivilWarBrakesOut

III. Body-Consequencesa. Lebanon

i. ViolenceSpillsOverIntoNeighboringStates1. Ethno-sectarianNatureofBattle

ii. LebanonExperiencesEconomicGrowthb. Economy

i. SyrianEconomyFailing1. Infrastructure2. Education3. Trade&Investments

c. DemographicChangesi. Intellectuals&EducatedFleeii. WeakeningofCertainSectsPopulationinSyria

d. RefugeeMovementsi. TerroristInfiltrationii. LackofResourcesiii. SeekingPeace&Comfort

IV. Closing

a. MyOpinion-Thecauseofthecivilwarisnotsimplyonecomponent,butamultitudeofhistoricalmomentsthathaveleduptothemodernandcurrentonesweseetodayallcombinedtogethercreatingadeteriorationofstabilityinSyria

b. Reiterationofmainkeypointsorcauses/consequencesofcivilwar

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Abstract

ThisseniorthesisisanindepthanalysisofthehistoricalcausesoftheSyriancivil

war.IarguethatthemaincomponentsleadingtothecivilwarunderBasharal-Asadwere

asfollows;Sectariandivision,Frenchinterventionandmandates,Israeli&Syrianconflict,

Egypt&SyrianUnion,andHafizal-Asad’srisetopower.Myresearchandanalysisprovided

demonstratesthatthesepreviouslymentionedhistoricalstimulihaveallamalgamated

leadingtotheinstabilityunderBasharal-Asadandultimatelythemoderncivilwarwesee

today.Thepaperwillalsoanalyzetheconsequencesofthisinstabilityseeningovernment

andsociety,thesourceofthebrutalcivilwar.Theseconsequencesincludealookat

Lebanonasacasestudy,theeconomybothdomesticallyinSyriaandinternationally,

demographicchanges,andafocusonrefugeemovementsseentoday.Itconcludeswiththe

establishmentthatthecivilwaristheresultofnotjustoneindividualevent,asisoften

arguedinternationally,butratheraconglomerateofdeeplyintertwinedhistorical

moments.

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I. OPENING

TheMiddleEastoftenbringstoone’smindthoughtsofturmoil,instability,strife,and

overallchaos.Aregionoftheworldplaguedbycivilandinternationalwars,ithas

experiencedincreaseddissentionamongcitizens,failinggovernments,andgrowthin

terroriststrongholds.Whatwasonceseenasaproblemforafew,hasgrowntobea

problemformany.Manyoutsideforces,includingtheUnitedStates,feltinterventioncould

aidandalleviatethesituation.InterventionintheMiddleEastthough,hasnowcomeata

heftyprice.WiththeUnitedStates,andmanyothereffectedcountries,facingdomestic

debateconcerningtheissuesathandintheMiddleEastandhowtoproceed,theyaretoo

farintoleavebutareconstantlyriskingthelivesoftheirownpeople.Manyarguethe

UnitedStatesshouldhaveneverinvadedIraqin2003,andthatthiswasthestartof

internationalplayersmeddlingwithforeignaffairsinthisregion.Whilethiscanbedebated

foryearstocome,onethingismuchmoreclear.NotonlywiththeUnitedStates,butall

internationalpowerswhoplayaprominentroleininternationalrelations,thelackof

understandingthedeeplyrootedhistoryofthesecountriesiswheretheyhavegonedirely

wrong.Iaimwiththispapertoprovethatinternationalbeliefinonespecifiedeventasthe

causeofthecivilwardoesnotbringusclosertoasolutionforSyria.

Toevenbegintomakeapositivechangeanddemocratizearegionoftheworldso

differentfromwesternculture,onemustanalyzewhereithasbeenandhowitgottowhere

itcurrentlyis.TheMiddleEastiscomplexlyintertwined,withvehementlydevotedpersons

ofbothreligionandethnicity.Thehistoricaleventsbetweenthesemultitudesofvarious

sects,datessignificantlyfartherbackthanmostothercountries’existence,especiallythe

UnitedStates,thefundamentaloutsidecomponentweseetoday.Whileeachcountryhasa

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differentstorytotell,itisSyriathathasstolenthemodernspotlightanddebatefloor.Syria,

acountrymanyfelttobestableandsecureundertheAsadRegimehascometoppling

downinthepastfiveyearsbyaragingcivilwar.Thiscivilwar,fullofviolentactsagainst

humanityandcivilrights,hasledtoamassexodusofSyrianpeoples.Seekingrefuge

whereverwillacceptthem;therefugeecrisishasbecomeanewfocalpointforpolitical

debateconcerningtheMiddleEast.TerroristgroupshaveseentheSyriancivilwarand

resultingrefugeemovementsasanopportunitytoimposeharmontheirtargetcountries

throughinfiltrationintodifferentcountriesposedasarefugee.Ofcoursetherearemany

terriblesideeffectsoftheSyriancivilwar,howeverthispaperwillfocusonthemosttragic

consequence;refugeemovements.TounderstandhowSyriahasarrivedatthiscataclysmic

point,onemustfirstanalyzeandunderstandthehistoryofthecountry.Thehistorical

eventsthatwillbeanalyzedincludethesectariandivides,Frenchimperialismand

mandates,theIsraeli&Syrianconflict,theunionbetweenEgypt&Syria,Hafizal-Asad’s

risetopower,andthecurrentruleofBasharal-Asad.Thispaperwillanalyzethehistoryof

theSyriancivilwarinawaythatsupportsamultifacetedviewofitshistoricalcauses.It

willalsoexaminethemoderntragicconsequencesbroadlythatweareexperiencingtoday,

andthenspecificallytheresultingrefugeemovement.Itconcludeswiththeestablishment

thatthecivilwaristheresultofnotjustoneindividualevent,asisoftenargued

internationally,butratheraconglomerateofdeeplyintertwinedhistoricalmoments.

II.HISTORY

Theremustbeanunderstandingofthemainhistoricalmomentsthathave

contributedtotheSyrianfailure.AsSyrianexpertJosefOlmertstated,“itsfundamental

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causes,aswellasitscourseandpossibleimplicationsareuniquelyboundwiththepolitical

developmentoftheSyrianstatefromitsveryinception”(SPME).UnderstandingSyria

beginswithananalysisofhowTheMiddleEastevencameintoexistence.Beforeitwas,as

itistoday,modernlyknownas“TheMiddleEast”,itwashistoricallyreferredtoas“the

NearEast”.Theextensivehistoricalbackgroundofsucharegioniswhatplayssucha

deeplyprominentroleinwhereitisattoday.Nootherregionorcountryhasthedepthof

historyquiteliketheMiddleEast;afterall,oneauthordescribesitas“themostancient

regionofhumancivilization”(Mansfield).Tounderstandthecausesofthemoderncivilwar

inSyria,includingtheFrenchruleandmandate,thewarwithIsrael,thevarioussectsand

ethnicgroups,theBa’athparty,andtheAssadRegime,onemustfirstunderstandhowthey

allcameabout.Withthat,letusstartfromthebeginning.

Syriatodayismarkedbyitsdiverseethnicandreligiousgroups.Havingsucha

varietyofpeoples,withthesmallestdifferences,playsnotonlyintoitsrichculture,butits

undertoneforviolence.EvenfromthestartSyriawasrecognizedasaneccentric

populationhavingamixtureofpeoplesandculture.Oneofthefirstrecognizedgroupsto

dominateSyriaforathousandyearsfrom3500B.C.werethenon-Semiticandhighly

civilizedSumeriansfromMesopotamia(Mansfield).ThencametheSemiticAmorites,

nomadsfromcentralArabia,whodefeatedtheSumerians.Afterthat,theBabyloniansinthe

middleofthethirdmillenniumwhowerefollowedbytheEgyptians.TheEgyptians

however,weredrivenoutthroughouthistorybydifferentinvadersincludingtheHittites’

whocompletelyconqueredallofSyriain1450B.C.(Mansfield).Asthesegroupsbeganto

settleandmakeSyriaandPalestinetheirhome,theybecameknownasacollectivewhole

calledtheCanaanitesin1600B.C.Thisgroupwasuniquebecausealthoughtheywere

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knownbyonename,theyweremadeupofmanydifferentpeoplefrommanydifferent

places.Next,in1200B.C.theArmaeansgainedcontrolofDamascus.Astimepassedon,

controlofSyriachangedhandsoften.Throughitallthough,theCanaanitesavoided

violenceandbattlebygettingalongwiththeirconquerorsandmakingcivilizationbetween

thetwopossible.

AsAlexandertheGreatcametoTheMiddleEastandbeganconqueringcitiesand

states,SyriafellintothehandsofSeleucus.SeleucuswasaPersianrulerandfriendof

Alexander’s,whomeventuallyfoundedthecapitalcityofSyria,Antioch.AsRomebecamea

dominantforceintheMiddleEast,GreekrivalsSeleucidandPtolemaicsentSyriaintoa

decline.ThisdeclinewasplayedoutthroughthelocalpowersinSyriawhosawthebattle

andweaknessasachancetoassertthemselvesandclaimwhattheywanted.Thiscreated

moretensionandhostilefeelingsthanwerealreadyoncepresent.Eventually,from29B.C.

toA.D.14theentireMiddleEastregionwasincorporatedintotheRomanEmpire.From

thispointonforawhile,Syriaandseveralothercountriesexperiencedpeaceandorder

throughRomanlaw.TheRomanswerearatherfairconquerorwithmuchofSyria,allowing

locationstoremainautonomoussolongastheydidn’tthreatenanysortofinstabilityinthe

Romanrule.AswewilllaterseeamongsttheminoritiesandSunniinSyria,even

historicallytheurbanpopulationwasmoreeducatedandpartoftheintellectualelite,while

theruralpopulationtendedtobethoseofthelowersocioeconomicclassesconstituting

peasantsandtribesman.

LatercontrolledbytheByzantines,asmallgroupofIslamicfaithfollowerssettheir

sitesonregainingSyriaandEgypt,whichtheysucceededbyunifyingthroughtheir

resentmenttowardsimperialpowers.UponconqueringSyria,thedeathoftheprophet,and

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theassassinationoftheCaliphsuccessor,thefirstcousinoftheProphetwastobethe

successor.However,AliwasdefeatedbytheUmayyads,whichledtothefirstandonly

greatdivisioninIslam:betweentheSunnis,or‘peopleofthesunnah’,whoarethegreat

majority,andtheShiaor‘partisans’ofAli(Mansfield).Thishashadamajoraffectonthe

modernregionweseetodayaseachcountryisdominatedorhasamajoritygroupof

typicallyeitherSunniorShiitecausinggreatdissentionandturmoil.

Syriafromthebeginninghashadacivilizationmarkedbynumerouschangesof

power.Theinstantaweaknessisshownbythegrouporpersonincharge,orthemoment

morethanonegroupfindsynonymousgroundtogoupagainsttheauthority,iswhena

changeinpowerandconfrontationoccurs.Ashostilefeelingstowardsimperialoutside

forcesbecameaunifyingforceagainsttheByzantinepeople,itwouldalsobecomeafactor

inSyrianinteractionwiththeFrench.AsthecollapseoftheOttomanEmpirecametothe

forefront,BritainandFrancetookituponthemselvestodowhattheywantedintheMiddle

East.

III.SECTARIANDIVISIONS

UnderstandingSyrianhistoryshouldbelikebuildingblocks.Tobegin,theremustbe

anunderstandingofthevariousreligiousandethnicgroupsthathaveemergedoverthe

years.Thisisakeyfactortobasicunderstandingbecause,“despiteagreatmeasureof

culturaluniformity,Syria’spresentpopulationischaracterizedbystrongreligiousand

ethnicdiversity”(VanDam).Someofthisdiversitystemsfromthereligiousminorities,

whicharetheAlawis(11.5%),Druzes(3.0%),Isma’ilis(1.5%),andtheGreekOrthodox

Christians(4.7%),whoconstitutethemostimportantcommunityofallChristiansinSyria

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(14.1%)(VanDam).Theothersideofdiversitystemsfromtheethnicbranchofminorities.

TheseprincipleminoritiesaretheKurds(8.5%),Armenians(4.0%),Turcomans(3.0%),

andCircassians(VanDam).AportionoftheminoritiesbelongtotheSunniMuslim

population,allowingthemtoidentifytosomeextentwithamajorityofthepopulation

whileothersfindthemselvesfallingintheminoritycategoryinbothreligionandethnicity.

ItisthusevidentthatSyriaisfilledwithanarrayofreligiousandethnicvariations

contributingtotheirdiversity,andtheirturmoil.AuthorNikolaosVanDam,aspecialiston

Syria,attributestheexistenceofsomanyreligiousandethnicgroupsinSyriatosevenmain

factors.Thefirstfactoris,“Thethreemajormonotheisticreligions,Judaism,Christianity

andIslam,allhavetheiroriginsinthewiderregionofwhichSyriaispart.TheFormationof

sectsanddifferentschoolswithinthesereligionsledtoagreatdiversityoffaiths”(Van

Dam).Inotherwords,theMiddleEastisthesourceofthethreemainumbrellareligions:

Judaism,Christianity,andIslam.Thesmallerbranchesofeachofthesereligiousgroupsthat

haveformedovertheyearsofhistory,eachhavedivertedfromthemaintrainofthoughtin

theirownright.Withslightvariationsinbeliefsandworship,thefactionshavecreatedan

assortmentofnewreligiousfaithsandpracticesallatplayaroundtheworld,andmore

importantlyinSyria.

ThesecondinfluentialfactorthatVanDampointsoutis,“TheFertileCrescent,of

whichSyriaispart,hasinthepastregularlybeenexposedtoconquestbyvarious

populationgroups,suchastheArabs,Kurds,MongolsandTurks,andhasalwaysbeena

centreoftribalandindividualmovement”(VanDam).TheFertileCrescentisanamegiven

toacrescentshapedareaoftheMiddleEastregionthatwasmadeupofIraq,Syria,

Lebanon,Jordan,Israel,andnorthernEgypt.Thissameregionhasalsobeennicknamed

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“TheCradleofCivilization”.Thisregioncanbedeemedanareatypicalofconquestdueto

itsprimeconditionsforagriculturalprosperityincludingthefertilityoftheland.An

exampleofhistoricalevidenceprovingtheattempttoconquerthisareabydifferent

populationgroupsisseenduringthetimeoftheOttomanrulefrom1708-1758,when“the

provinceofDamascuswascaughtinavisebetweendisplacedArab,Turkman,andKurdish

tribesaswellasthegreatmovementofArabtribesfromthesouth,allthreateningthe

wholeoftheFertileCrescent”(Barbir).

Thethirdfactoristhat,“AttimestheMiddleEasthasbeenaplaceofrefugefor

peoplewhowerepersecutedinsurroundingregionsonpoliticalorreligiousgrounds.

GroupsoftheserefugeeswereabletosettleinSyriaoritssurroundings”(VanDam).The

nextfactorwas,“Tribalandnationaldifferencescausedbyallthesedevelopmentsoften

tookonareligiousaspectandcontributedtotheriseofdifferentreligiouscommunities.It

isonlynaturalthatpoliticalandreligiousdiversitiesdevelopedsimultaneouslyaspartof

thisprocess”(VanDam).Theriseofdifferentreligiouscommunitieswasthesourceofthe

nowpluralisticcultureandsocietyapparentinSyria.Religiouspluralismisoftendefinedas

thediversityofreligiousbeliefsystemsco-existinginsociety.Religiousaffiliationsare

stronginthesensethatpeoplechoosebasedonwhichtruthstheybelievetobecorrect.In

thisthoughtprocessitleavesnoroomforacceptanceoftrulyvaryingopinions.Religious

sectsoffertheirownexclusiveclaims,sotospeak.AstheSyriansocietybecamea

conglomerateofpersecutedpeoplefromoutsidetheirborders,thiscultivatedtheriseof

differingopinions,whichultimatelycrossedoverintothepoliticalrealm.Thefifthfactor

wasthat,“Religious,tribalandlinguisticdifferenceshavefrequentlybeenpreservedand

strengthenedasaresultoflocalism,anintenselocalloyaltywhichincertainregionswas

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fosteredbythegeographicalstructure.Thiswasparticularlytrueofthemountainsand

valleysoftheLatakiaregion,andoftheJabalal-Duruz,withitsdifficultaccess”(VanDam).

Thenextfactorwastheroleofdeficientcommunicationsinareasofdifficultaccess

andthelackofastrongcentralauthoritywhichhavebothhelpedtopreservethe

distinctivecharacterandindependenceofreligiousandnationalgroups(VanDam).In

otherwordsifaspecificgroupwishedtoremainoutofstateandgovernmentcontrolthey

wereabletosecureseclusioninordertobeundisturbed.Asaresult,theareasthatthe

governmentdidandcouldextendcontrolovertendedtobeinhabitedbythedominant

religiousandnationalgroups.InthecaseofSyria,thiswastheSunniArabs.Intheirbest

efforttoavoidsubjectiontheminorities,Alawis,Druzes,andIsma’ilis,historicdecisionto

secludethemselves,hassincelefttheirpopulation’sfatesealedinthelessaccessible

regions.Thefinalfactoristhat,“religiousandethnicdiversitieswerealsoencouragedby

thetolerationshownbyIslamtowardsChristiansandJewsaswellastheformalequalityof

nationalgroupsinsideIslam.Ultimately,farreachingassimilationtookplace”(VanDam).

Inconclusion,notonlyweredifferingreligiousandethnicminoritygroupsspreadinglike

wildfireinSyria,theywerespreadinginasocietythatwasdoingnothingtostopitatthe

time.Thispartialacceptance,ortoleration,canbeattributedtothelackofemphasison

nationalismatthetime,whichwouldlatergrowexponentiallycausinggreatriftsamong

thegrowingdiversity.

TheAlawis,Druzes,andIsma’ilis,whichallmakeupthe“compactreligious

minorities”mustbediscussedbasedontheirstrongpoliticalroleinSyrianhistory.Aswas

mentionedpreviously,manyoftheminorityethnicandreligiousgroupssoughtout

seclusiontoabstainfromtheruleoflawofthegovernment.ThiscausedtheAlawistofind

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themselvesparticularlyconcentratedintheLatakiaregionwheretheyconstitutealocal

majorityofabout75%ofallSyrianAlawis(VanDam).Whilemakingupamajorityin

Latakia’sruralpopulationtheyconstitutedaminorityintheurbancoastalcities.Asa

result,rural-urbanandclasscontrastsmoreoftenthannotcoincidedwithsectarian

differences(VanDam).Furthermoretheurbanpopulation,primarilymadeupofSunnis,

becameincreasinglydominantandcontrollingovertheruralpopulation,primarilymade

upofAlawis.Beatendownandpoverty-stricken,distrustandangertowardsSunnisbythe

Alawisgrewstrong.

TheAlawisaretypicallysubdividedintofourmainconfederations.These

confederationsaretheirtribalaffiliations.Thefourmainconfederationsare:the

Khayyatun,Haddadun,MatawirahandKalbiya(VanDam).Perpetuatingthedeeplydiverse

cultureofSyria,“ofthefourAlawitribalconfederationstwoimportantreligiousgroups

havesplitoff;theHaydariyunandtheGhasasinah”(VanDam).TheHaydariyunwhohave

theirownreligiousdifferentiatingunitycontinuedtoupholdtheirtribalties.The

GhasasinahcametotheforefrontfollowingtheFirstWorldWarundertheleadershipof

Sulaymanal-Murhsid.Uponhisdeath,mostofhisfollowersre-associatedandreconnected

tiestotheirformertribes.VillagesandlandintheMiddleEast,specificallySyria,aresplit

upandownedamongsttheeclecticfamiliesofvarioustribes.Thesetribeswerefurther

subdividedandeachsubdivisionhaditsownforemanor“muqaddam”(VanDam).Alawi

tribesalsohadtheirownreligiousleaderwhowasexpectedtoperformthesameduties

withlesspower.Inmanycasesthough,thereligiousleadersweresoinfluentialthatthey

wereabletocompetewiththetriballeaderforpowerandleadershipwithinatribe.Dueto

thelandbeingsplitupaccordingtofamilyties,mostoftenthetribesoftheselandswere

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acquiredthroughinheritance.However,therewereselectinstanceswhereanindividual

becameatriballeaderbasednotonfamilyconnectionsbutbypersonalqualitiesor

influenceinSyrianpowerinstitutionsatanationallevel(VanDam).Thelatter

circumstanceofgainingtriballeadershipallowedtheopportunityforafewpoorAlawi

familiestobeplacedinpowerfulpositions(VanDam).Oneessentialexampleofthisis

PresidentHafizal-Asad.Thisfamilyultimatelybecamethepowerhouseregimethathasled

theoutbreakofcivilwarinSyria.

The“AlawiMountains”astheywerecalled,weresoremoteandunderdeveloped

thatthelowsocio-economicstatusoftheAlawiswastakenadvantageofbytheSunnis

throughinadequatepayfortobaccosales.Relationsbetweenthetwogroupsweresewn

withcontemptandresentment,especiallyaspoorAlawifamiliesbegansellingtheir

daughtersashouseservantsforurbanSunnis(VanDam).However,sincetherisetopower

oftheAsadregimeandBa’thpartyin1963,circumstancesforAlawipeasantshavegreatly

improved.EducationwashighlysoughtafterfortheAlawipeople.Theywereabletoattain

highereducationandmoreweightydegreesbytheirnowpowerfulco-religionistBa’th

party.Raisingtheirstatusasdoctors,lawyers,engineersanduniversityprofessors,“bythe

1990stheAlawipeoplewererivalingandsometimesdisplacingtheSunniandChristian

intelligentsia”(VanDam).SyriaexperiencedatransferofpowerandwasnowunderAlawi

dominatedBa’thistrule(VanDam).OvertimemanyofthepreviouslyconsideredSunni

coastalcitieshadbecomemajorityAlawithroughwhatbecameknownas“Alawisation”

(VanDam).ThistrendalsobecameapparentinthesuburbsofamajorcityinSyria,

Damascus.

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TheSyrianDruzes,liketheAlawis,experiencedseclusionandhighconcentration,

butinal-Suwayda.Theirpercentconcentrationisfargreaterinal-SuwaydathantheAlawis

intheLatakiaregion.TheDruzesintheal-SuwaydaregionhaveancestralrootsinLebanon,

PalestineandtheAlepporegion.Inthisregionthepeopleareevenlydistributedwiththe

urbanandruralareasbothconsistingofprimarilyDruzepeoples.Asaresultofthis,a

differingpointbetweenthetworegionsthatmustbeaddressedis,unlikeintheLatakia

regionwherethetraditionaleliteisamixtureofAlawi,Christians,andSunni;the

traditionaleliteinal-SuwaydaisentirelyDruze(VanDam).Thesetworegionsandtheir

populationsareacrucialcomponenttounderstandinginternalSyrianrelations,something

verycentraltothecivilwar.Thehomogeneouspopulationinal-Suwaydacontributestoits

overallstrongerregionalidentificationandthereforesocialcohesionthanispresentin

Latakiawhereintra-regionaltensionsaregreater(VanDam).Therefore,“Religious-tribal-

feudalrelations,suchasthoseexistingwithintheAlawicommunity,havenotoccurred

amongtheDruzes”(VanDam).WhentheDruzemigratedfromLebanon,Palestine,and

Aleppo,theywereabletodominateandleadintheal-Suwaydaregionforoneoftwo

reasons;either“theynumericallywereamajorityorbecausevillageswerecomposed

almostentirelyofmembersofoneextendedfamily”(VanDam).TheDruzesofthisregion

havebeenmarkedbytheirstrengthtoshowrelativelyconsistentunity.Whenthecentral

OttomangovernmentortheSyriangovernmentinDamascusattemptedtoextendtheir

authorityovertheDruze,theyresistedandremainedundivided.Syriaisacountrywhose

historyisfullofdivision,divisioninreligion,ethnicity,regionalterritory,politics,and

more.Onecanbegintoseehoweasilyandevenlikelydissentionamongthevariousgroups

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is,especiallyinaregionoftheworldthatculturallyholdssodearlyandrecognizesso

firmlythesedifferences.

TheprovinceofHamaisthemajorcenterfortheminoritygroupIsma’ilis.More

specificallytheyarelocatedprimarilyinthedistrictsofMasyafandSalamiyah.Inthe

eleventhcenturymostIsma’ilisfledtothemountainsoftheLatakiaregion.Atthistime

theybegantosettleinthetownsofMasyafandQadmus.ThedivisionoftheLatakiaregion

betweentheIsma’ilisandtheAlawiswasnotwithgoodspirit.TheAlawistendedtobe

hostiletowardstheIsma’iliswhoeventuallymigratedbacktoSalamiyah“aftertheOttoman

Sultan‘Abdal-HamidIIgrantedthempartoftheEmpire’sdomaintherein1845”(Van

Dam).TheIsma’ilislocatedintheAlawimountainshaveremainedpoorovertimewhile

thosewhoreturnedtoSalamiyahadvancedeconomicallyandsocially(VanDam).This

contrastcanbeattributedtothesuppressionanddominationbythemajorityAlawi

populationintheLatakiaregionovertheminoritygroupofIsma’ilis.WhereasinSalamiyah

theIsma’ilisaremoreconcentrated,constitutingamajority,aswellasprotectedbythe

OttomanSultanhavingformallygrantedthemlandthere.ThisallowstheIsma’ilistobe

theirowneliteandtheirownleadersnothavingtoabidebyanothersect’srulesor

subjections.

Historians,reporters,politicians,andvariouscitizensofdifferentcountriesoften

pointtothemostobviousculturaldifferencesintheArabworldasthereasonforits

troublesanddownfall.Sectarianism,regionalism,tribalism,andclassstrugglearesooften

thrownoutbutneveranalyzed.Yes,theyplayanincrediblyimperativerolein

understandingandstudyingSyriaandtheircivilwar.Yet,itisnotassimpleasjustsaying

thosecategories.Afurtheranddeeperunderstandingmustbeattainedtoseethe

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complexitiesbetweenthecategoriesandthepeoplethatfallintothem.Oftentheproblems

arisewhenpeoplefallintovaryingpositionsamongstmorethanoneofthecategories.For

example,affiliatingwithacertainreligionthatdoesn’tmatchupwithyourspecifictribe,

class,orsectarianviews.Thisiswhereconflictarises.Therearecategoriesordivisions,

thenwithinthosetherearesubcategoriesandsubdivisions,allthewaydownthepoleuntil

thereisaplethoraofoffshootswithwhichasingleindividualorgroupcanindentifywith.

Whenthecategoriesoverlap,itmakesit“difficulttodeterminewhichplayaroleina

particularsituation.Intheeventofoverlap,thereisadangerofinterpretingtriballoyalty

asregionaland/orsectarianloyalties,forinstance,orviceversa”(VanDam).Inanother

instance“sectarian,regional,andtribalgroupsmayinturnpartiallyoverlapwithsocio-

economicdifferences”(VanDam).Thiscausesissuesbecauseforstartersareligious

communityusuallyismadeupofallsocio-economicclasses.Ontheflipside,“sectarian

loyaltiescanhaveacatalyzinginfluenceonthetake-offofaclassstruggleifsectarian

contrastscoincidewithsocio-economicdifferences”(VanDam).IncountriesliketheU.S.

thisispraisedtobedifferent.Longedfortobeuniqueandthinkforyourself,followwhat

youbelieve.IntheMiddleEast,inSyria,whereancestralandfamilyviewsandbeliefsareso

prided,wherethecategoriesyouidentifywitharesohighlyexamined,yourdifferencescan

bethedecidingfactorbetweenfriendsorenemies,peaceorviolence.

Aswasseenpreviouslyintheanalysisofthevariousgroupsandsectscreating

divisionamongSyriansasawhole,thereisastrongurban-ruraldivergence.Thereligious

minoritieswerecompactinthecountryside,themostpoverty-orientedareainthecountry

whilethelargerandwealthycitieswerecomposedprimarilyofSunnis.Thisrealitymakes

itnearlyunattainabletoseparatetheanalysisofurbanSunnisandruralreligious

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minoritieswhenstudyingthemanygroupsanddifferencestheSyriaisfloodedwith.Even

greaterthanthat,“itisdifficultifnotimpossibletoisolatesectarian,regional,tribalor

socio-economiccategorieswhentheyshowstrongoverlapandapparentlyforman

inseparablewhole”(VanDam).Thisisanimportantkeynotebecauseitisexactlywhatisat

playandhasbeenatplayforthestruggleforpowerbetweentheAlawis,Druzes,and

Isma’ilisinSyriasince1963.

IV.FRENCHMANDATES

WhileBritainandFrancelaidclaimtodifferentterritoriesacrosstheMiddleEast,

onlyonecountrylookedtoFranceasasupportingforceandthatwasLebanon.Syriaonthe

otherhanddespisedtheideaofFrenchcontrolorinterventionintheircountrytoeventhe

smallestdegree.Infact,mostMiddleEasterncountrieswantedtobeindependentofthe

rulesandlawsimposedbytheallies.Inanattempttore-establishArabsentiments

throughout,EmirFeisalwassentasarepresentativetotheParispeaceconferencewhere

hecalledforreconsiderationofallypresenceandinterventionincountrieslikeSyriaand

Palestine.Feisalarguedthatthedecisionshouldbeuptotheinhabitantsthemselveson

whethertheywantedthisEuropeanimperialhelpornotandshouldbedeterminedby

sendinga“commissionofinquiry”(Mansfield).PresidentWilsonoftheUnitedStates

approvedofthisplanwiththesuggestionthatthecommissionbemadeupofFrench,

British,ItalianandAmericanrepresentatives.TheBritishandFrenchthough,were

obviouslyopposedbecauseitwouldmeantheremovaloftheirstrongholdsandtheir

powersotheywithdrew.UltimatelyitendedupbeingsolelyAmericanswhocarriedout

theinquiry.TheirfindingswerethatthecitizensofSyriaandPalestine“overwhelmingly

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opposedtheproposaltoplacethemundergreat-powermandates”(Mansfield).These

countries,awareoftheirsituationandcurrentstatus,didrecognizetheneedforoutside

helpbuthadrequesteditcomefromtheUnitedStatesorBritain,strictlynotFrance.

Despitethefindingsandthesuggestionsmadebythecommission,thealliescompletely

ignoredit.BritainandFrancechosetoignoreit,forpreviouslymentionedreasons,andthe

UnitedStatesbecausetheywereonthevergeofisolationism.ThoughtheAllieswere

knownasaunifiedfrontintheinternationalarena,theyinternallybegantobattlewith

eachother.TheBritishgovernmentopenedupthatitsawtheFrenchambitionsinSyriaas

excessive(Mansfield).WhentheFrenchproceededforwardwiththeirplansto“garrison

SyriawithFrenchtroops,Britainrefusedtoagree”(Mansfield).OnMarch8,1920the

GeneralSyrianCongressinDamascuspassedaresolutiondeclaringtheindependenceof

SyriaandPalestine.Inresponse,theSupremeCounciloftheLeagueofNationsannounced

itsdecisiononMay5,1920thatSyriawouldbepartitionedintothetwoFrenchMandates

ofLebanonandSyria(Mansfield).Angeredbythedecisions,theArabpeopleofSyria

beggedtheirleaderFeisaltodeclarewaronFrance.Herecognizedtheirill-equipped

militarywouldbenomatchfortheFrenchsoinsteadhegaveyoung,brashofficersthe

clearancetoattackFrenchpositions.InresponsetheFrenchdemandedthattheybe

allowedtooccupyAleppo,Homs,Hama,andtheBekaaplain,whichFeisalaccepted.This

ultimatelyledtotheFrenchcompletelyseizingSyriaandexilingFeisal.

Nowthatthemandateshadbeenapprovedandsolidified,thefirstthingtheFrench

didwastoenlargeLebanonatSyria’sexpenseastomakeLebanonitsMiddleEastern

headquarters(Mansfield).FranceenactedpolicythatplacedFrancophileMaronite

ChristianelementsonMuslimArabpeoples.Francepracticedcompletecontroloversociety

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inSyriasuppressinganysortofbehaviorthatwentagainsttheirculturalviewstheywere

attemptingtoimplement.PartitioningtheOttomanEmpirecamewithviolenceand

fighting,especiallyinSyria.ItalsocreatedfivenewMiddleEasternstates;Syria,Lebanon,

Transjordan,IraqandPalestine,allofwhichwereunderthecontrolofeitherBritainor

France.ThemandateswerebackedandlegitimizedbytheLeagueofNationsandinstilled

forthesakeofkeepingtheirinhabitantsfrombeingreturnedtotheirformermastersas

wellasaformoftrustwherethepowerwasadministeredtotheterritoryunder

supervision(Mansfield).Manysawthisasaniceway,orpoliticallycorrectway,ofmaking

theseterritoriescoloniesoftheBritishandFrench.TheresultoftheFrenchMandatesin

Syriawasonlyabeginningglimpseofseparationanddivision.FrancehadsplitSyriaupin

anattempttoruleitmoreeasilybycreatingdistricts.Thesedistrictswereasfollows;“One

intheAlawitemountainsinthenorth-eastinhabitedmainlybythesub-ShiaAlawitesect,

oneintheJebalDruzeinthesouthwheremostofthepeoplewereDruze,andoneinthe

restofSyriawithDamascusasthecapital”(Mansfield).Itisclearinunderstandingthe

FrenchimpactonSyriawhymoderndaySyriaissodeeplydivided.TheFrenchwerethe

firstkeycomponenttoturmoilandpoorfeelingsamongstvariousgroups.The“processof

politicalradicalizationwasinitiatedduringtheeraoftheFrenchmandate,thelegacyof

whichwasalmostaguaranteeofSyria’spoliticalinstability”(Fildis).

SyriahavingfinallywonitsindependencefromFrancewasleftindisarray.

EverythingtheSyriansearnedwasnotwithoutafightandbattle.Thisisneverapositive

wayforanationtobebornasitleftitonitssideandunpreparedforchallengesthatmay

layaheadafterexhaustingitselfindeterminationofindependencefromFrance.Asauthor

McHugophrasedit,“Syriahadnoalliesandhasbeenaptlydescribedasapoliticalorphan.

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Inaddition,Syriansnowhadtheirownstateandademocracy,butthatdemocracywas

fragile-aswerethestateanditssenseofnationhood”(McHugo).

V.SYRIAN&EGYPTIANUNION

AnotherimportantfactorinthehistoryofSyriaasanexplanationforitsmodernday

strugglesthatmustbelookedatistheunionthattookplacebetweenSyriaandEgypt.The

unioncameasaresultofthe“bifurcationofpowerwhichledtoastalemate,preventing

majorreforms,butalsotosuchintenseconflictthatSyrianpoliticianssoughtsalvationin

unionwithEgypt”(Hinnebusch).ThismergertookplaceofficiallyonFebruary2,1958asa

resultofthegrowingtensionsbetweenthewest,mainlytheUnitedStates,andMiddle

EasterncountrieslikeSyria.Itwasalsoanoutcomeof“theinabilitytomaintainaunited

state”(Olmert).Thistensionwasontheriseanddirectlycorrelatedwiththegrowing

emphasisandrelationshipbetweenSyriaandtheSovietUnion.Astimecontinuedonand

theSovietUnioncontinuedtobackMiddleEasterncountries,specificallythrough

supplyingthemwithmilitaryequipment,theUnitedStatessawadramaticincreasein

threatfromtheSovietcamp.In1957SyriahadaccusedTurkeyofmassingtroopsonits

frontier,whichNasserrespondedtobysendingabodyoftroopstoDamascustoexpress

support(Mansfield).Oldschoolpoliticianstypicallywouldhavepreservedarelationship

withthewestbutunfortunatelyforSyriaanditsgrowinginstability,thepowerlayinthe

handsoftheBa’athparty.

AlthoughitseemedsupportoftheSovietUnionwasbecomingmorewidespread,

SyriabegantofearacommunisttakeoverandsosawdiversionthroughunionwithEgypt.

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WhenthismergerbecamecompleteonFebruary2,1958thepresidentsofthetwo

countriesannouncedthenameoftheirnewterritoryastheUnitedArabRepublic.King

SaudofSyriawasforcedtoresignwhenitbecameevidentthathehadplanstoassassinate

EgyptianPresidentNassertopreventtheunionofSyriaandEgypt(Mansfield).KingSaud’s

brotherFeisaltookover,ashewasknownforbeingmorepro-Egyptian.Thingsquickly

spiraleddownhillforSyriaaspressurefromIraqileaderKarimKassemwasexertedinan

efforttodestroytherelationshipbetweenSyriaandEgypt(Mansfield).Kassemandhis

organizationoverthrewtheregimeinSyria,declaredarepublic,andkilledFeisalandhis

familymembers.ThisnewrepublicofIraqunderKassemdeclareditssupportforEgypt

andNasserandNasserismbecametherulingideologyinSyria.

Thisquicklyspreadingtakeoverofapro-Arabcommunityalongwiththe

destructionofpro-westernsitesintheMiddleEastgavewaytofearandactivateda

responseonthewest’spart.TheUnitedStatesandBritainintervenedwithtroopstotheir

lastfewcamplocationsholdingontotheirthreadofanattachmenttotheMiddleEast.

Whilethiswashappening,Nasserwasheadedforadownfallinhisreign.Hisgoal,heftyand

ambitious,wouldultimatelyfailasthevastlydifferentstatesoftheMiddleEastweretoo

ideologicallydifferentandreligiouslydiversetohavepan-Arabismunitethem.

FeelingsbetweenSyriaandEgyptbecamerockyastheSyrian’srealized,though

theirideologiesweresimilar,theywerestillverydifferent.Ontopofthis,theBa’athparty

demandedpowertoruleinSyriawhileNasserwouldhavenoneofthatunderthe

“umbrellaruleofhisauthorityandprestige”(Mansfield).Thenewpoliticalstructurein

SyriawasshapedaftertheEgyptianoneandalthoughNasserappointedtwoSyrianvice-

presidentsandmanyministerstothegovernment,henevergavethemfullcontrolas

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poweralwaysremainedinhisownhands.Theunionbetweenthetwostatesrapidlyfell

apartforacoupleofreasons.First,theSyriansbegantofeelthattheywerenolonger

partnerswithEgyptratherbeingcompletelywatchedover.Second,theSyriansfeltthe

Egyptiansdidn’tholdahighenergeticpro-Arabrationaleastheydid.Third,Syria,which

hadalwaysbeenbuiltonafreeeconomy,watchedasNasser’ssocialistprincipleswere

imposeduponthem(Mansfield).Next,Syria’sagriculturalsectorsufferedthreeyearsof

consecutivedraughtsbetween1958and1960(Mansfield).Despitehisbestefforts,Nasser,

likemanyothers,failedtostabilizeSyriaandfindaworkinggovernmentforitspeople.On

September28,1961agroupofSyrianarmyofficersrebelled(Mansfield).Thismarkedthe

endoftheunionbetweenthetwoinanefforttocreateaUnitedArabRepublic.Though

Nasserletthemleave,healsostatedthattheywouldalwaysbewelcomebackshouldthey

feelsoinclinedtorejoin.

Theattemptedunionbetweentwosimilarstatesshowsthemessandfailurethat

continuestobeSyria.Itissostructurallyandinternallydamagedandbrokenthatthe

diversepopulationandstrong-sidedviewscreateahostileenvironmentwhereturmoilis

inevitable.Ashistorycontinuesonitisclearthatwitheachpassingevent,Syriaisnearlya

lostcausewhenevenfellowMiddleEasterncountriesarefailingatinterventioninlast

hopesofsavingit.Civilwarisclearlyinthepathahead.

WhatbecameknownastheSeparatistMovementfrom1961-1963provednotonly

toshowaseparationoftheSunnisandminorities,butachangeofpowerinmajorpolitical

rolesaswell.TheMilitaryCommandwaspredominantlyled,withmostauthoritative

positionsbeingheld,bySunnis.ThemilitaryhadastrongholdinDamascus,whichaswe

knowfromearlier,wasamajorSunnicontrolledcity.TheSyrianArmyCommandwas

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madeupoftenmembers,fiveDamasceneSunnis,fourofthefiveotherswereSunni,and

onewasDruze.TheSyrianOfficersCorpsrecognizedthepowerbeingheldbyDamascene

Sunnis,anddemandedthatanon-Damascenecommander-in-chiefbeappointed.Druze

Major-General‘Abdal-KarimZahral-Din,thenfourthinseniority,acceptedthisposition

(VanDam).However,SunniDamasceneal-Nahlawioccupiedthekeymilitarypositionof

deputydirectorofofficers’affairs,apositionthatallowedhimtomoveandcontrolofficers

hewantedtounitshepreferred.Inotherwords,hecouldsethimselfuptobeevenmore

powerfulbymovingcertainofficerstopositionsandunitsthatbestsupportedhim.

Unfortunatelyforhim,henevercouldgainsolidsupportamongstthenon-Damascenes,

whichwouldultimatelyplayakeyroleinthedownfallofhisandhisfellowDamascene

officers.Inalastefforttoholdontohisdwindlingpower,heorchestratedamilitarycoup

thatfailedandresultedinhisandfiveofhisgreatestDamascenemilitarycolleagues

expulsionfromSyria.TherewasaclearseparationbetweentheDamasceneandnon-

Damascenewithinthemilitary.TheHomsMilitaryCongresswastoconveneinanattempt

todiluteanyviolentactionsfromoccurring.However,atthecongress,Damascene

Lieutenant-ColonelMutial-Sammandemandedthatsixnon-Damasceneofficersbe

expelledfromSyriainequalcompositionfortheremovalofal-Nahlawi(VanDam).Quite

theoppositeaffectendeduptakingplace.OverthenextcoupleofyearsDamasceneofficers

andmilitarymemberswereslowlypurgedfromanysortofpoliticallystrategicposition

andwerereplacedwith,asthethenDruzeGeneralZahral-Dinputit,“officerswho

harborednothingbuthatredandaversiontowardsDamascusanditsinhabitants”(Van

Dam).ThemilitarywasdwindlingitsnumbersinSunniandDamascenerepresentationand

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wasgrowingstrongerandstrongerwithminorities,apowerfulhandtoholdforthe

minorities,andapoliticallystrategiconeatthat.

ThemonopolizationofpowerbytheminoritygroupsinSyriadidnotstopthere.It

grewevenstrongerin1963whenamilitarycoupbyBa’thistssucceededinbringingdown

this“separatistregime”andinsteadstrengtheneditsnumbersinminoritiesattheexpense

oftheSunnis.ThiswasadirectresultoftheBa’athmilitaryleaderswhomquicklyputinto

positionsofpowerandleadership,familymembersandfriendsfromtheirownchoosing.

Mostofthesepeoplecalledupthen,weremainlyAlawis,Druzes,andIsma’ilis(VanDam).

Theminoritieswereonlypickingupsteam.Thoughtheyoncehadlivedlivesinthepoor

countrysideofSyria,theywerefindingthemselvesgrowingstrongerasacohesiveunit,

gainingmilitarypower,andthereforepoliticalpower.Arolethatrequiredthemtotread

lightlywiththeirnewfoundpower,soasnottoabuseit,andnottoloseit.

VI.ISRAELI&SYRIANCONFLICT

Thenextimportanthistoricalfocalpointinunderstandingtoday’scivilwarinSyria

isthedebateoverZionismresultinginaSyrianwarwithIsrael.FollowingtheendofWorld

WarOne,thepeacesettlementdeclaredPalestinein1918aJewishstateforrefugeestogo

andsettle.However,PalestinestillconsistedofstrongArabNationalistswhoshowed

disdainfortheirnewneighborsandfrustrationandangerovertheJewishpopulation

receivingtheirland.Uponaskingforreconsiderationoradifferentareatobethe

designatedplaceforJewishrefugeesfollowingtheHolocaust,tensionsbegantoriseasthe

Alliedpowersdeniedtheirrequest.Ultimately,itwasdecidedthatPalestinewouldbesplit

intotwonewstates,onethatwouldbeknownasmoderndayIsrael.Israelwastobethe

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landfortheJewishpopulation;thisallowedthemtocarryoutZionism.Manyinternational

leaderssawthisasaresolutiontotheproblem,butinsteadPalestineArab’sgrewintheir

angerandhateandpulledintheirownallies,whichconsistedofmanycountriesthat

borderedIsrael,includingSyria.Violentrevoltsbegantobreakoutandborderbattlesand

land/territoryownershipbecamethenewtopicofdebateamongsttheMiddleEast(Oren).

ThisiswhateventuallyledtoabattlebetweenIsraelandmuchoftheMiddleEast,though

theywerebackedbyBritainandFrance,andmorespecificallywithSyria.Agreatportionof

discontentbetweenIsraelandSyria,whichalsocontinuestoday,isthestruggleoverthe

GolanHeights.ThispieceoflandwasseenasaprimeterritorialcontroloftheSyriansbut

waspartitionedofftotheIsraelis.Ithassincethenbeenthetopicofgreatdiscussionand

reconsiderationandnowevenbattleoverwithwhomitshouldbelong.Thisunfinished

businessandinabilitytocometoafairandsatisfyingconclusionbetweenthetwocountries

haspittedthemagainstoneanotherhistorically,andstilltoday.

TheArabrevoltof1936-39isarguablywhatpulledinmoreoftheMiddleEastthan

justPalestine.ItisseenasthespreadingtheconflictnolongerbetweenJewsandArabsin

PalestineratherZionismandArabseverywhere(Oren).OnMay14whentheBritish

Mandateended,theregionalbattlebrokeoutagainstIsrael.SyriaandIraqwerethetwo

borderingnationswholedtheinvasion.EgypteventuallyjoinedoutoffearofotherMiddle

Easternstatesgrowingtheirterritoriesintheprocess(Oren).Egypthadalsosigneda

mutualdefenseagreementwithSyriain1966.Unfortunatelyforthem,Syriabecame

quicklydissatisfiedwiththeeffortstodemolishIsraelandZionismandtookitupon

themselvestobetheleaderindoingso.

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Syriantanksrainedthirty-oneshellsonKibbutzAlmagor,killingoneandwounding

twoothersbytheendoftheattack(Oren).ThiswasthestartoftheSyrianefforttomove

fromthedefensivetoattack.ThoughtherewasnoclearunderstandinginwhytheSyrians

hadbecomesoabruptlyviolentanddeterminedonthematter,itisimportanttopointout

thattheBa’athpartyofthetimehadastrongideologicalbeliefintheeliminationofIsrael,

Zionism,andimperialism(Oren).ItshouldalsobenotedthatanotherfactorinSyria’s

involvementwasadirectresultoftheircurrentconflictwithIraqovertheIraqPetroleum

Company.SyriawasupinarmsovertheirpaymentreceivedforallowingIraqioiltoflow

overtheirland.Muchofthisnewlyfoundresentmentonthetopic,clearlystemmedfrom

thefactthattheIPCwasaBritishownedcompanyandwasthereforeanimperialist

presenceintheMiddleEastthatSyriawasdeterminedtoridof.Anotherimportantcatalyst

ofwarbetweenSyriaandIsraelstemmedfromtheSovietUnionpressureandmisleading

informationuponSyria.TheSovietUnionwaspubliclyannouncingthatitwasavoiding

conflictintheArabMiddleEast,thoughitwasactuallypushingSyriatobecomemore

active.TheSovietUnionsawthisastheirchancetoattaintheirlongtimegoalofowningkey

waterwaysintheMiddleEastandisolatingTurkey(Oren).

AllofthesereasonswerekeyplayersinSyria’smovetoattackIsrael,butoneever-

presentissueinSyriawastheultimatecatalyst.Syriasointernallydividedofficersagainst

civilian“doctorswithPresidental-AtassiandforeignministerMakhous,Hafezal-Assad

withsupportoftheairforce,thearmypittedagainstPresidentJadid,andbothgenerals

wereopposedbyIntelligenceChiefAbd’al-Karimal-Jundi(Oren).Explosions,fighting,

attemptedassassinations,wereallbecomingpartofatypicaldayinSyria.Thisinternal

strifeplayedadirecthandintheinternalinsecurityoftheSyrianRegimeleadingthemto

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feeladesperatedesireto“out-Nasser-Nasser”(Oren).Inanattempttodiffusethe

mountingtensiononthebordersspecificallybutbetweenIsraelandSyriaasawhole,a

meetingorconferencewasheldwheretheywereaskedtoupholdtheirpreviouslysigned

agreementtorefrainfromactsofhostility.Bothdeniedtheagreementandeventuallythe

meetingcametoaclosewithfeelingsmorebitterthanwhentheyhadarrivedandless

likelytocometoanysortofagreement.SyriaandIsraelcontinuedattacksoneachother,

andtheyevenbegantomultiplyontheborder.SyriahadbeguntobackPalestineintheir

actsofaggressionagainstIsraelaswell.ItwentsofarthattheUnitedStatesrecognizedand

announcedthattheSyrianswerenotgoingtostopuntilwarbrokeout.Forthat,the

AmericansimploredtheIsraelistodisregardtheirlong-standingoppositiontoretaliations

(Oren).

Warbrokeoutinwhatbecametitledthe“SixDaysWar”.Theshortestwarin

history,theIsraelisbattledagainstmultipleArabstates.Shockingtomany,Israelcame

throughvictoriousandwithoverwhelmingnumbers.Syriawaslaterblamedforhaving

startedawarinwhichtheydidnotreallyparticipatefightingin.Yet,farafterthewarSyria

continuedtodenounceIsraelandZionismandyetperpetuallybattlesitselfwithinitsown

borders.SyriastronglyrejectedapprovalofapeacetreatywithIsraelandopenlysharedits

disapprovaloftheEgyptian-IsraeliPeaceTreaty.ThoughSyriahadSovietbackingand

otherstatesatwarwiththem,theirinternalstrifeandstruggleultimatelyledtotheir

defeatagainstIsraelandtheAllies.Syria’sgreatestlossinthisbattlewithIsraelhowever,

rosefromthelossofterritory:theGolanHeights.TheGolanHeightsisaplateauthatis

borderedbytheSeaofGalilee,HulaValley,YarmoukRiver,MountHernon,andWadi

Raqqad.ItwasoriginallyandareaconsideredpartofSyriabutwasconqueredbythe

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IsraelisduringtheSixDayWar.ThefalloutbetweenIsraelandSyriahascontinuedfor

yearsasaresultofthedisputeoverthispieceofland.Todayithascontributedtothe

SyrianCivilWar,asithasbecomeastrongholdfortheterroristorganizationISIStocarry

outattackacrosstheMiddleEast,infiltraterefugeemovements,andcontributetothe

overallinstabilityandviolenceinSyria.IsraeliPrimeMinisterBenjaminNetanyahu

requestedIsraelbeallowedtoimposeIsraelilawinanattempttohelpoustthepresenceof

terroristactivityduetothefactthatSyriaisincapablebecauseasthePrimeMinisterputit,

“Syriahasdisintegratedbeyondthepointofreunification”.Hisrequestsweredeniedand

ISISandthestruggleforcontroloftheGolanHeightsragesonperpetuatingtheinstability,

violence,andstrifethroughoutSyria.

VII.HAFIZAL-ASAD’SRISETOPOWER

Syria’stumultuouspoliticalandsocialhistoryhasleduptothepointofHafizal-

Asadtakingcommand.Itisclearthatwiththeinabilitytomaintainstabilitywithboth

internalandexternalinfluence,thestruggleforpowerwillcontinuetooccur.UnderFrench

MandateandunitywithEgypt,Syriastillmadeirrationaldecisionsandfoughtagainsthelp

fromanyoneexactlylikethemselves.ThecountryburnedbridgeswithnotonlytheAlliesof

thewestbutalsowithfellowMiddleEasterncountriesaswell,leavingthemtofendfor

themselveswithbadbloodsurroundingthem.Understandingthesectarian,regional,and

tribaldivideofthecountryalsodemonstratesthelackofonecohesiveunittoprogress

forwardinanysortofgroundbreakingdecision-making.Muchofthisstemsfromtheethnic

andreligiousdifferencesthatareseenassogreatadivide,theyareunabletotrusttheir

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ownfellowSyriansfromvariousgroups.Thesefactorsareallwhathaveledustothebattle

forpowerbetweenal-AsadandSalahJadid.

Jadid’spowerstemmedfromhiscontrolonalargeportionofthearmedforcesand

militarythroughinsideconnections.However,ontheflipside,al-Asadwasministerof

defensegivinghimtheupperhandalongwithhisroleastheBa’thistMilitaryCommittee.

DifferenceofopinioninthecountryledtotheArabmilitarydefeatin1967andultimately

totensionsrising.Thetwosidesoftheargumentconsistedoftheideologicalviewof

pursuingasocietybasedonsocialistidealsorasocietybasedonArabnationalistpolicy.

AsadandJadidrepresentedeachofthesepoliticalsidesattheRegionalandNationalBa’th

PartyCongress.Jadidbelievedina“socialisttransformation”withgreaterdependenceon

theSovietUnionandotherCommunistcountries(VanDam).Thisgroupalsorejected

anything“reactionary,rightest,orpro-western”(VanDam).Asadontheothersidebelieved

inanArabnationalistleaningwithfocusonthestrugglewithIsraelanddefeatingthem

(VanDam).JadiddominatedAsadatthecongress,winningmajorityofthesupport,yet

Asadwasnotsatisfiedwiththis.Asadusedhismilitaryconnectionsandtitlestogain

control,support,andultimatelypowerofthearmedforces.ThisthenforcedJadidtogrip

tighterontohiscivilianpartyapparatus.ThiscreatedthebiggestdivideinSyriawesee

today;thearmedforcesandthecivilianapparatusoftheBa’thinSyria.

Asadmadehismoveforcontrolbyabductingthethenchiefofthenationalsecurity

andgeneralintelligenceservicesaswellasahandfulofJadid’sotheraidesandsupporters.

Theconfrontationbetweenthetwoleaderscontinuedtogrowwhenin1970Syrian

politicalleadersmadethedecisiontointerveneintheJordaniancivilwar,whichultimately

failed.TheTenthExtraordinaryNationalCongressoftheBa’thPartywasconvenedin1970

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inanattemptedeffortatfindingasolutiontothepartystruggle.Al-Asadandhissupporters

strategicallypreparedthemselvesforadefenseattackshouldal-Asadbelessfavoredthan

Jadidintheconference.Aswasfeared,Jadidheldoverwhelmingsupportfromthose

membersofthecongress.Asadrespondedinattacksthroughthetakingofcivilianparty

sectionsandcapturingandarrestingprominentleaderslikeJadidfromtheoppositeparty.

ManyotherhighpoliticalmembersfledthecountryfromfearofarrestleavingAsadto

monopolizehisnewfoundpowermarkingthestarttohisnewregimeinNovember1970,

andeventuallytoAsadin1971beingnamedSyria’sfirstAlawipresident(VanDam).The

periodofSunnirulehadcometoanend,andtheHafizal-AsadRegimenowraged.

UnderAsad’srule,heusedhispositionandpowertosuppressanysortofuprising

thatmayhavebeenstirredupinanticipationtoousthim.Oneveryimportantexampleof

thiswasthe1982HamaMassacre.DuringthismassacreSyriansecurityforcesenteredthe

denselypopulatedoldcityofHamainanattempttoseizeweaponspossiblyheldby

Islamistmilitants.Thesituationescalatedasattacksirensragedthroughthenight,

concerningthelocalresidentsandinfluencingthemtoattackthetroopsinthetown.As

armedmilitantsbegantobattlewiththesecurityforcesinabrutalshowdown,Hafizal-

Asad’sbrother“rushedtotheareaandfromtheheightsofthenearbycitadel,rained

artilleryandtankfireintothetown,levelingitsmajorcommercialandresidentialdistricts”

(Lawson).HamawasknownforitsoutbreaksofchallengeagainsttheBa’thRegime.The

1982uprisingchangedperspectivesasitnowbecameknownfor“itsmassivescale,the

broadrangeofsocialforcesthattookpart,thehighdegreeoforganizationevidencedbyits

leaders,andtheruthlessnesswithwhichitwascrushed”(Lawson).Theresultwas

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widespreadasevenmoderateIslamistsscaledbacktheiractivitydrastically.Foradecade,

thecitiesruinswereleftto“standasastarkwarningtootherdissidents”(Lawson).

TounderstandfurtherAsad’sreignandtheparadoxbehindhisrisetopower,we

mustnexttakealookattheBa’thpartyingeneral,furtherleadingtothehatebetweenthe

AlawitesandSunnis.Itbecameaquestionofdiscrepancyasto“howBa’thistofficersfrom

oneminoritysect,theAlawis,emergedasaseeminglydominantclique,mostmanifestafter

1970underHafizal-Asad,wasexplainedbyfactorssuchastheirdisproportionate

recruitmentintothearmyandpartybefore1963andclassandregionaldivisionsamong

themajoritySunniactors”(Hinnebusch).TheBa’thpartywasapoliticalgrouporiginally

knownas“ThePartyoftheArabRenaissance”(Ben-Tzur).Thispartywasfirstestablished

inSyriainthefortiesasapartyoftheurbanpetit-bourgeoisintelligentsia(Ben-Tzur).The

ideologyofthisArabpartywasformulatedafteradoctrinefromthepartyplatformatthe

firstconventionin1947.Thedoctrineofthisconventionwas“ablendofnationalistpan-

Arabradicalismwithamoderatesocialprogramme-agrarianreformandpartial

nationalizationwithoutinfringingindividualpropertyrights,andwithaneutralistpolicy

towardstheglobalstrugglebetweenthecommunistandwesternblocs”(Ben-Tzur).This

SyrianpoliticalpartyhasnotconsistentlybeenactiveinSyriahowever.Therewasaperiod

in1958-59wherethepartyhaddissolvedinSyriabutremainedaliveinotherMiddle

Easterncountries.AfterthreeconferencesinLebanon,theSyrianBa’thpartywasre-

established.

VIII.BA’THPARTY

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In1958SyriaandEgyptweretobeunified.However,beforethisplanwouldbe

carriedout,EgyptianPresidentNasserdemandedallSyrianpoliticalparties,includingthe

Ba’athparty,bedissolvedpriortounification(VanDam).Itwasn’tuntilMay1962thatthe

Ba’athParty’sNationalCommandmadethedecisiontorebuildthepartybastionthathad

onceexistedinSyria.Bythistime,manyoftheformermembersoftheBa’athpartyhad

foundnewpoliticalpartiestoassociatewith.OnMarch8,1963agroupofBa’athistofficers

andothersseizedpowerinSyriathroughamilitarycoup.TheBa’athistmilitaryleaders

eachclaimedsomelevelofnewgovernmentresponsibility,buttherewerenotenough

Ba’athistcivilianstocopewiththeextentofitall.ThoughNasserhaddemandedthe

dissolutionofallpoliticalparties,someBa’athistsinSyriahadsecretlyremainedorganized.

So,followingthecoupof1963thesepartymembersplayedaprominentroleintheSyrian

civilianpartyapparatusthankstotheirclosetieswiththeleadersoftheBa’athistmilitary

partyorganizationwhichheldactualpowerinSyrianow(VanDam).Therehadbeenrules

andregulationssetinplacetolimitthepartysupporters,bythepartythemselves,orrather

aprocesstheyhadtomakeitthroughtobecomeanactivemember.Atthispointintime

though,theyweresolowoncivilianmembers,participation,andsupportthattheypassed

aresolutionallowingallsupporterstobepromotedtoactivemembers(VanDam).

However,thiswastakenadvantageofasmanyleadersoftheBa’athPartyusedittohave

relatives,friends,andacquaintancesaddedtothepartywithoutthemmeetinganyofthe

previouslyestablishedrestrictionsandguidelines,whichtheymightnothaveotherwise.

Thisinturncreatedanextensiveamountofpartyblocswhosememberswereconnected

notbyideologicalprinciplesbutratherbysectarian,regional,ortribalbackgrounds(Van

Dam).Thisdrovefurtherdivision,nowamongstthepartyitself.

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Whatwasoncedivisionbetweenthepartymembersandthosewhowerenon-

membershadnowgrowntodivisionamongthemembers.Itcreatedaseriouspower

struggleinboththecivilianandmilitarypartyorganizationbecauseitunderminedparty

discipline(VanDam).Therivaldivisionswithinthepartywerenotevenseenasdiffering

forideologicalreasonsasmanywouldhaveunderstoodmore.Factionalismwasanother

prominentissueamongsttheBa’athParty,particularlyduringelections.Oneauthorstates

that,“asaresult[ofthefactionalism]somepartymemberswerenotalwaysfreetochoose

theirleaders,andthisinturncausedsomeofthemostcapablememberstobeprevented

fromattainingcommandingpositions”(VanDam).Thecorruptionduringelectionswasfar

reaching.SometimesitwouldbeBa’athistdominatedpowerinstitutionswhointerferedin

electionstopushtheirownpreferredlistofpeopleandsometimesitwasnon-party

memberswhodidwhattheycouldtoswaythevotinginthedirectiontheydesired.Inone

case,thereweresomanyirregularitiesobservedthattheSyrianCommandhadtocallfor

newelections(VanDam).

Whomakesupthemilitaryofacountry,andwhohasinfluenceoverit,arevery

important.TheSyrianarmedforceswerestronglymadeupofminoritiesbeforetheBa’thist

officerstookoverin1963.Thisinfluenceinthearmy,ofminorities,canbeattributedto

politico-historicalandsocio-economicfactors.Oneofthesefactorsdatesbacktowhen

SyriawasunderFrenchMandateandtheyrecruitedAlawis,Druzes,Isma’ilis,Christians,

Kurds,andCircassians,whiletheydiscouragedSunniArab’s(VanDam).SunniArab

landowningcommercialfamilieswerefinewiththisarrangement,astheyfelttheirsons

shouldnotbesentformilitarytrainingtodefendwhattheysawas“FrenchImperial

Interests”(VanDam).Furthermore,themajoritySunniArab’ssawthemilitaryasaplace

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forthoseeconomicallyandsociallybelowthem.Morespecificallythosewhocouldnot

excelinsocietyontheirownorthrougheducation.So,theysawitasaninsulttobeapart

ofthemilitary.Ontheflipside,thoseminoritieswhostruggledtomakeendsmeetsaw

joiningthemilitaryasawaytoboostthemselvesinsocietyandmakeadecentliving.

TheBa’thParty,whichcametopowerin1963,isthecornerstoneoftheriseofthe

Syrianminorities.Thispoliticalgroupcameaboutthroughsocialchannelsthatdefine

whomitsfollowersare.Itwasagroupseekingoutsocialistideals,allowingallindividuals

tobeequaldespitereligious,tribal,orgeographicaffiliations.ItsupportedtheideaofArab

Nationalism,thoughtheSunnisfeltitwasrepresentingeverythingArabNationalism

wasn’t.TheBa’athpartywasfoundedinDamascusin1940byMichel‘Aflaq,aGreek

OrthodoxChristian,andSalahal-DinBitar,aSunniMuslim,bothwhowereteachersand

partofthemiddleclass(VanDam).Asaresultoftheiroccupations,mostofthepeoplethey

recruitedandsoughtouttojointheirpartywerestudentsofhighereducationthatwere

mostoftenmigrantswhohadcometoDamascusforhighereducation.Thoughtherewas

notalaidoutplanofactionthepartybegantospreadamongsttheminoritiesofSyriawith

norhymeorreason.ThestrongshowingofDruzeamongsttheBa’athpartyisoften

attributedtotheleader‘Aflaq’arelationshipwithmanyfamiliesoftheJabal-alDuruz(Van

Dam).Manyofthepeoplewhoconstitutedthegreatestareasofpovertyandruralareas,

arethosewhowerepulledtotheBa’athpartybasedontheirsocialistidealsversusthoseof

thecities,asmentionedbefore,thatweremadeupofthewealthyor“bourgeoisie”.The

Ba’athpartytookuptheideasofArabNationalismaswell.Whilethisangeredmany

Sunnis,whohadbeenthegrouptomostcloselyidentify,theBa’athpartyhadtheirown

understandingandinterpretationofArabNationalism.Tothem,onedidnothavetofull

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identifyasreligiouslyIslamic.Theyneedonlyrecognizethatthisistheculture,the

backgroundwithwhichtheycomefrom;itwastheirArabheritage.Oneoftheleadersand

foundersoftheBa’athpartyevensaidthatChristianArabsforexample,shouldinnoway

feelrestrictedfromalsobeinganArabNationalist(VanDam).Theseviewseconomically

withsocialismbeingamaintooloftheBa’athparty,religiouslywiththeacceptanceof

outsidereligions,andthebeliefthattheseminoritiescouldstillassociatewiththesacred

ArabNationalism,createdgreatdissentionamongtheminoritiesofSyriaandtheymajority

SunniofSyria.Notonlythereligiousdifferencesbutalsothesocial,economic,and

geographicdifferencesmadeitincrediblydifficultforthepartytoattractbothminorities

andSunnis.Thiswasthestartfriction.

ThereweredifferentbranchesoftheBa’athpartybasedonthelocationandcity.

TheDamascusbranchwasverysmall.Theurban-ruraldifferentiationand

Damascene/non-Damascenecontrastwasstronginthisbranch.Rightfullyso,asDamascus

wouldbemadeuppredominantlyofSunnis,themajoritypopulation,andwerehesitantto

jointheBa’athPartyofpredominantlyminorities.TheHamaBranchhadvery,verylittle

support.LocatedinthecityofHama,theBa’athpartywasupagainstaSunnistronghold.

WhilethegeographicdifferenceiswhatcreatedfrictionamongsttheBa’athPartymembers

andnon-membersinDamascus,inHamaitwasbasedmoreonthesectariandifferences.In

April1964,thestrongoppositionoftheBa’athpartywasplayedoutwhenananti-Ba’thist

revoltoccurredbackedbytheMuslimBrotherhood(VanDam).Onecouldqualifytherevolt

asasuccessbasedonthefactthatBa’athPartyactivitiescametoastandstill.

TheBa’athpartyhadflawsofitsowninitscreationandcomingtomilitarypower.

Theleaderswantedtoorganizethepartytobelargerandacohesiveunit,butlike

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elsewhereinSyriaatthetime,itwasabattleforpowereveninternally.Inanefforttogrow

thepartyinsizeandnumber,theleadersbeganrecruitingmoremembers.However,the

membersweregrantedadmissiondespitenotmeetingqualificationsnorhavingsupport

fortheParty’sviews.Instead,membershipwasgrantedtothosewhomtheorganizations

leadersfeltwouldkeepthemmostprotectedintheirpositionsofpower.Beyondthat,those

memberseventuallycametopowerandleadershiproleswithintheorganizationand

begantransformingitintowhatevertheywantedittobecome,overshadowingand

minimizingthosememberswhohadriskedeverythingfortheparty’ssakeincludingtheir

lives.Sectarianpolarizationwasattheforefrontandpavedthewayforsectarian

discrimination.Thesectariandiscriminationbegantotakeformonthepart,shockingly,of

theminorities.TheremovalanddismissalofSunnileadersinthearmedforceswas

shamelessandbrutal.Somuchsothatmainbranchleaderswerebeingdismissedsuchas

theleaderoftheNationalGuardandtheleaderoftheAirForce(VanDam).Thosegiven

preferentialtreatmentforthepositionopeningstendedtobeAlawis,Druzes,Isma’ilisand

Christians,allminorities.Theminoritiesinchargewouldstrategicallyplacethosethey

trusted,fellowminoritymembers,inpositionsofgreaterimportance,whileSunniswould

beplacedinpositionsfarthestawayfrommaincities(VanDam).Theentirearmy

commandstructureanddisciplinewereunderminedbythemanipulationofsectarianties

andloyalties(VanDam).Toattainagrasponhowhostilethesectariandivisionswere,a

BritishConsularreportfromthe1870’sstated,“theyhateeachother…Sunnisboycottthe

Shi’ites…bothresenttheDruze…alldespisetheAlawites”(Olmert).

TheBa’thpartyhasnotexistedwithoutstruggle,similartoSyriaitself.After

agreeingtotheunionwithEgypt,manycitizensofthestatedenouncedthisunion.The

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peoplefeltsoupsetattheEgyptiandominationoverthecommandoftheBa’thpartythata

militarycoupoccurredon28September1961,whichledtothesecessionofSyriafrom

Egypt.StillunsatisfiedwiththeperformanceoftheBa’thparty,manypeasantsaswellas

intellectsconsideredrejoiningEgyptaswellascarryingoutaseriesofattemptedcoupsin

1962.ThefifthBa’thconferenceinLebanon“advocatedanall-embracingArabunion‘ona

newbasisbutwithdueregardtothemistakesoftheformerone’;itwastobeafederative

unionundercollectiveleadership”(Ben-Tzur).ThisnewBa’thpartywasrecreatedfour

yearsafterthedissolutionandinlessthanayearithadregainedcontrolofthecountry

throughamilitarycoupandhadunidentifieditselfwiththeoldpartywhohadagreedto

theunionwithEgypt.

AfteryearsofstrugglewithintheBa’thpartyandshiftingofpower,anewideology

wasformed.The“theoreticalconfusionandideologicalbackwardnessinthepartywasfelt

evenmorekeenlyinviewoftheideologicaldevelopmentsintheotherrevolutionary

regimesoftheArabworld,whichtendedtoemphasizethesocialcommitmentsofthe

nationalrevolution,andofthedevelopmentsinthecommunistworldwhichtendedto

emphasizethenationalcharacterofthetasksalongtheroutetosocialism”(Ben-Tzur).The

changeinpoweraswellasthestructuralandideologicalframeworkproposedbytheold

partyleadership,themilitarygroup,theregionalistsorthecareerists,werenever

supportedinaunifyingmannerwithintheparty.Whatthenformedwastheneo-Ba’th

partyofSyriabasedon“scientific-socialistingredientsandthemilitancyoftheideology”

(Ben-Tzur).ThisultimatelyundertheinfluenceandcreationbyAl-Hafizbecameknownas

“ArabSocialism”.

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ThisstrongArabpartyposesaparadoxthough,asapoorAlawitemantookover

controlandpower.Hafizal-AssadcamefromoneofthepreviouslymentionedpoorAlawi

familiesinthecountryside.Theparadoxthatispresentedishowaminoritygroupandman

couldcometopowerinamajorityandArabpoliticalparty,vastlydifferentfromwhateach

otherbelieved.Tounderstand,itisworthnotingandanalyzingtheAlawigroupindetail.

AlawismwasmadeintoaseparatebranchofreligionfromShi’iIslam.Whereby

Muslimsfaithfulsayingis“thereisnodeitybutGodandMuhammadisHisprophet”,Alawis

believe“ThereisnotdeitybyAli,noveilbutMuhammad,andnobabbutSalman”(Pipes).

TheAlawisthereforerejectIslam’smaintenets,forcingthemtobeconsiderednon-

Muslims(Pipes).ThefargreatestparalleltothebeliefsandtraditionsoftheAlawisis

Christianity.Forthesereasons,“manyobservers-missionariesespecially-havesuspected

theAlawisofasecretChristianproclivity”(Pipes).ThoughwomenintheAlawireligionare

treated“abominably”theyexperiencefargreaterfreedomthantheveiledMuslimwomen

(Pipes).AlawisdoinfactrejectIslam’ssacredlawofShari’a.ThehateoftheSunnisstems

fromthestrongreligiousdiversions,especiallyinthesensethatSunniswereconsidered

theupperclassofSyriaandtheAlawisconsideredofthelowerminoritysimilartothoseof

Christianity.Therefore,“AlawisdonotactlikeSunniMuslims;rather,theyresemble

ChristiansandJewsinpursuingawhollydistinctwayoflife”(Pipes).Giventhatthe

AlawitesarewhomultimatelytakecontrolofthegovernmentandpowerthroughHafizal-

Asad,itisreasonabletounderstandthatthechangeinsocioeconomicroleandreligious

deviationspurtheSunnihatredtowardstheminorityAlawites.Thisunderstandingthen

beginstoexplaintheparadoxbetweentherisetopowerofanAlawitethroughapan-Arab

party.

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ItshouldbenotedthatsincetheFrenchMandates,theAlawitesandSunnishave

cultivatedadeepinternalhateforoneanother.TheAlawitesbenefitedfromthemandate

morethananyotherminoritygroup.TheAlawites“gainedpoliticalautonomyandescaped

Sunnicontrol”(Fildis).TheFrenchevencreatedanAlawitestateknownasthe“stateof

Latakia”,aswellaswerebestowedlegalautonomyfromtheFrench.TheFrench

strongholdsandimperialinfluenceinSyriadidnotstopthereincultivatingthisdeeprift

betweenSunnisandAlawites.Another“majorinstrumentoftheFrenchinfluenceonthe

AlawiteswastheirrecruitmentintotheTroupesSpecialesduLevant,alocalmilitaryforce

formedin1921andalterdevelopedintotheSyrianandLebanesearmedforces”(Fildis).

TheFrenchcontrolofthearmyallowedthemtodividethetroopsaccordingtogroupsoas

tomaintainalowlevelofeach,preventinganyoneofthemfrombecomingsopowerfulthat

theycouldousttheFrenchadministrationandpresenceinSyria.TheFrenchhandpicked

anddesignedtheSyrianArmyalongstrongruralandminorityrepresentation.TheFrench

consideredAlawitesareliableandtrustworthyminorityandsomaintainedabranch

servingundertolocalFrenchofficers.ThepurposeoftheFrencharmyinaimingtopadthe

militarywithruralminoritieswas“becausetheywerefarfromurban-dominantpolitical

ideology,Arabnationalism”(Fildis).TheyfurtherattemptedtoweakentheArabSunnis,

theonegroupcapableofoverturningFrenchSyria.Itisclearintheunderstandingofthe

FrenchinfluenceontheSyrianarmythatanincreasedsparkofdistrustwasimplemented

betweentheSunnisandtheAlawites.TheAlawites,stronglyfavoredbytheFrench,were

givenfarmoreopportunitiesandpowerthanwerethemajoritySunnis.Inaddition,the

FrenchuseofmandatesandimperialinvasiontookcontrolovertheSyrianarmy,molding

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ittotheirexactstandardsandpreferencessotoappeasethosetheysupportedand

minimizethepresenceofthosegroupstheydisliked.

Pan-ArabismandthefundamentalbeliefsandvaluesheldbytheBa’thpartywere

farfromrelatabletotheAlawites.Aswaspreviouslymentioned,thepan-Arabviewwas

heldbysocially,economically,andfinanciallywell-establishedSunnisinSyria.Itis

interestingthereforethatthepeoplewouldelectandthensupportforsolongapoor

minorityAlawiteman,religiouslybelievingineverythingnearlyoppositethatofthosein

supportofpan-Arabism.ThiscontinuedtoangermanySunnispittingthemfurtheragainst

theAlawitepeoples,yetthecontinuitythatAsadputinplaceandtherelativestabilitythat

hemaintainedwereenoughtoearnhimthebackingofeventhoseBa’thpartymembers

whowerereligiouslyorculturallydifferentfromhimself.

AsadwasthefirstleadertoholdontothereinsofpowerinSyriaforanextended

periodoftime.ItisarguedthatAsad’sregimeinSyriaactsinasystemofthreeinterlocking

orbits-Alawi,SyrianandArab(Zisser).TheAlawiorbitwouldbetheinternalcore;the

SyrianorbitwouldbetheoutershellandtheAraborbitwouldbeitssoulsupportingthe

authority(Zisser).TheSyrianregime,composedofthesepertinentlevels,hadbecomea

personallycontrolledregimethroughthesuccessionofroleswithintheAsadfamilyand

Asad’stribalaffiliations.Asadmirroredhisregimestructureandfunctioningtothatofthe

SovietUnionlookinguptocommunistregimerulerslikeNicolaeCeausescuandKimIl

Sung.Syria’sregimehadnowbecometheproductoftheAlawi’srisefrom“humblestatusof

aminoritytopre-eminence”(Zisser).Asad’sregimedependedonthesectariansupportof

theAlawis.Asad’sregimewasalsodeeplyrootedintheSyriancomponentthatstemmed

fromtheBa’athrevolutionin1963andtheneo-Ba’threvolutionof1966,whichdrove

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hometheresultingsocio-economicandpoliticalorderofSyria.Alawidominanceandthe

Asadregimegrewinstrengthandsupportatthetimeastheotherminoritygroups

includingtheChristians,Druze,andIsmailibackeditinanefforttopreservetheirown

security.Asadrulesasadictatorappointingpeopleclosesttohimtothehighestmost

powerfulandauthoritativepositions.Likemostdictators,hedoeswhatneedstobedone

firstandforemosttomaintainhisleadershiprole.Itcanbearguedthatthetwostrongholds

thatnotonlyplacedAsadinapositionofpowerbutalsokepthimtherearehismilitary

connectionwiththearmyandtheBa’thpartywhichattractedmembersofprominentsocial

circles(Zisser).Overall,thelargeminoritynumberinSyria,aslongastheyremainin

supportofAsadandhisregime,anysortofuprisinglikewasseenwiththeIslamicRevoltof

1976-82,willbecrushed.

Sowhythen,despitehiscommunist,dictatorial,oppressiveways,wasAsad

successful?Oneanswerarguesthathegavetheconstituentsanswerstosomedegreewhile

givingthemagovernmentandsocietytoparticipateandbelong(Zisser).Finally,theArab

orbit.ThoughAsadwasyoung,inexperienced,andlackedconfidence,hisstrongideological

tiestoArabismiswhatprovidedhimandhisregimelegitimacyinnotonlytheeyesofhis

fellowSyrianpeople,buttheinternationalarenaandworldasawhole.Inregardstohis

repressiveregimesuccessandabilitytoholdontopowerforsolongandwithinhisfamily,

Asadhadcreatedtwoarmies.Ofthetwoarmies,“onewasmadeupofpraetorianguard

unitsrecruitedfromhiskinandsectthatdefendedtheregime,theothertheprofessional

armythatdefendedthecountry’sborders”(Hinnebusch).Furthermore,Hafizal-Assad’s

abilitytocreatefurtherlegitimacyinhisregimestemmedfromhisabilitytoidentifywhat

oneauthornamedDawishpointedoutasparty,army,bureaucracy,secretpolice

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(Hinnebusch).These“pillarsofpower”arewhatadominantpresidencyrestedonand

allowedtheleader’ssubordinationofandbalancingabovetheseinstitutionsasasolution

toinstability(Hinnebusch).WhatfurtherlegitimizedtheAsadregimewashisabilityto

turnSyriafromalosingplayertoasuccessfulplayerinthedisputeswithIsrael.This

changeingrowthandpowerallowedhimto“promoteahegemonicnationalistdiscourse

andturnSyriaintoakeyregionalpowerinstruggles”(Hinnebusch).

Asad’sregimecanbeviewedashavingtwomaincomponentsstructurally.First

therewastheformalsystemofgovernment.Thissideincludedanexecutiveand

legislature.TheformalstructurehadrootsintheSyrianConstitutionandtheBa’thparty.

Equallyasimportantistheinformalsystemofgovernmentthatcontains“theheadsofthe

securityservicesandseniormilitarycommanders”(Zisser).Thissideofthegovernmental

structureisexpectedto“ensurestabilityinthestateandprotectit”(Zisser).Thepartyand

theciviliangovernmentconstitutetheformalstructuralcomponentthoughthepartytakes

priorityinsocietyandpolitics.TheheadofthepartyisknownastheParty’sSecretary-

GeneralandisheldandmaintainedbyHafizal-Asad.TheSyrianEliteunderAsadwasmade

upofpeoplefromhisownfamily,theAlawibarons,andmemberoftheSunnicommunityin

supportofhisfuturestate(Zisser).Althoughthereisastronglypersonalandsectarian

naturetotheSyrianRegimecreatedbyAsad,hehasgainedrespectandsupportwithinthe

bordersofSyrianandbeyondintheMiddleEastduetohispoliticalandsocialabilityto

establishafunctioningstateandthenmaintainitfarlongerthananyotherattempted

leaderororganization.

Asad’slegacyandregimedidnotcomewithouttrials.WhentheSovietUnion

appointedanewGeneralSecretary,MikhailGorbachev,Syriasawthisasanopportunityto

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increasetheirrelationsandfriendshipwiththecommunistcountry.Inthemeantime,they

hadtheirsitesfirstandforemostondefeatingIsrael.Theywerealsodedicatedtoridding

theMiddleEastofZionismespeciallyinLebanon,“anArabrejectionistfrontagainstthe

Israeli-Egyptian-Americanaxiswasnowestablished”(Zisser),andtheIslamicRevolthad

beensquashed.AsSyria’sconfidenceandstrengthgrew,theybegantoinvestfinanciallyin

improvingtheirmilitaryandweaponries.Thespendinghowever,wasnotlimited.They

begantoincurlargedebtsastheyplungeddeeperanddeeperintounnecessarysecurity

purchases.ThefocusonsecuritycausedneglectinotherrealmsofSyriansocietysuchas

health,education,andwaterssupply,leadingtoafailingsocietyoverall(Zisser).Theresult

ofthesepoorfinancialexpenditures;aneconomiccrisisin1985thatinturnledtothe

beginningofanti-regimesentimentandcriticism(Zisser).Syriagrewmoreandmore

erraticleadingtofurtherfalloutwiththewest,specificallytheUnitedStates.Somuchso

thattheUnitedStatesrefusedtohaveAsadtoWashingtonforhigh-levelmeetingswiththe

President.Syriafullofanti-AmericansentimentpairedwiththeAmericansupportofIsrael

continuedtocreatearockypathbetweenthetwopolaroppositecountries.Asadalso

playedadirectroleinhisdecliningpositionofpowerwithintheregimeascorruption

becameapparentandbroughttotheforefront.ItIarguedthatwhiletheeconomyandhis

peoplestruggledtosurvivefinanciallyhewasmakingdecisionsandactinginwaysto

improvethefinancialpositionsofthoseclosesttohim,andalreadywell-off.This

corruptionwasjustanotherfactorinhibitingthegrowthandprogressionofSyriansociety

andgovernment

IX.BASHARAL-ASAD’SRISETOPOWER

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UponAsad’sdeath,andBasil’s,Basharal-Asadtookpoweratjustage34.Hewas

studyingtobeaneyedoctorinLondonwhenhewascalledhomeafterthedeathofhis

brother(McHugo).Inhisinauguralspeech,Basharnotonlypraisedhisfatherforhis

achievements,buthealsocriticizedfailedSyrianinstitutionsandgovernmentpolicy

(McHugo).FurthermorehetouchedonthepopulartopicofregainingtheGolanHeightsin

exchangeforpeacewithIsrael.Hecalledforlesscorruption,moretransparency.

Surprisingly,andimportantinlaterunderstanding,Bashardiscusseddemocracy.Hespoke

aboutitwithreverenceandrespectwiththepossibilityofasimilargoalforSyria.Though

heacknowledgewhatadifficulttaskthiswouldbe,usingtimeandtalkasapossibleexcuse

shouldthepeoplenotsupportdemocraticreforms.TheDamascusSpringcameoutofthese

discussionsbutwasquicklycrushedwithgreatoppositionandafearofthelossofpower

forBashar.Itdidnottakelongforwordtospreadthatthepoliticalfreedomofthe

DamascusSpringwasactuallyjust“apublicrelationsexercisebytheauthoritiesandlittle

more”(McHugo).

TherisetopowerbyBasharal-AsadwasasuccessionmanySyriansfearedcould

overthrowtheirnewlyfoundstabilityunderHafiz,oncehepassed.Itwasunknown

whether“oppositionwouldmobilizeoncethefearedstrongmandepartedortheregime

evendisintegrateininternecinestruggle”(Hinnebusch).However,thetransferofpower

wasrathersmoothandsuccessful.Thiscouldpotentiallybeattributedtothefactthat

Basharrepresentedtothepeople’sdesireforbothcontinuityandchangethroughhis

abilitytocontinuewhathisfatherhadstartedanddonewhilestillbeingconsidereda

modernizer,helpinghimearnsupportfromtheyoungergenerations.Itmayappeartothe

outsideeyethatthisisareflectionofthesuccessfulinstitutionsthathadbeeninstilledin

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theonceunstablecountry,butaccordingtoauthorLesch,itshowsratherthat“theelites

cametogetherinaconsensus”(Hinnebusch).Withinthreeyearsofcomingtopower

Basharhadreinventedtopoliticalelite,“withaturnoverof60%intopoffices,via

retirement,therebytransferringpowertoanewgeneration”(Hinnebusch).Perhapspartof

Basharal-Asad’scrumblefrompowerintheeyesofthepeoplebeganwhenhebeganto

movehisideologiesandreformsawayfromBa’thistviewsandchoseamoreliberalizing

strategy.However,whilehemadethisriskymodification,hehadnoplanorpreparation

withwherehewouldgowithitandthereforehadtomakesurehischangesweregradual,

avoidinganysortofbacklashandinstability.Politically,Perthesarguesthat“Bashar’s

projectcanbeunderstoodas‘modernizingauthoritarianism’,makingthesystemwork

bettersothatitcouldsurviveanddeliverdevelopment”(Hinnebusch).Basharmadethe

acknowledgementthattheSyriansocietywasnotinaplacetoinstillawesterndemocracy.

Hisgoalswerefirstandforemostaimedatsocialandeconomicmodernizationandthen

followedwithdemocratization.

TounderstandtherolethatBasharal-Asadwasplacedin,onemustreflectonthe

majorhistoricaleventsthathaveledtothispoint.TheBritishandFrenchpartitioningof

Syria,acquisitionofcompleteSyrianindependence,unityandfalloutwithEgypt,constant

battleandturmoilwithIsraelasaresultofthepartitioningofPalestine,allofthesefactors

ontopofhisownfather’simprintonSyria(bothgoodandbad),arecomponentsofthe

societyandculturewithwhichBasharhasauthoritativelyinherited.Whathecandowith

thatwillnotonlybeachallengebutatest.

OnSeptember11,2001OsamabinLaden’sterroristsuicideteamcrashedairliners

intotheU.S.WorldTradeCenters.ThismarkedfurtherMiddleEasterninvolvementbythe

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U.S.inamoredirectwaythaneverbeforeasPresidentBushdeclared“waronterror”.The

terroristgroupthathadcarriedouttheattackswasknownasIslamistmilitantsofal-Qaida.

Syriasawthisasanopportunitytoamendrelationswiththewesterncountryandsoused

theirintelligenceservicestoprovideinformationtotheAmericangovernment.However,

Syriacouldnotdefinitivelycommittobeing“with”theUnitedStatesintheirMiddle

Easternbattles(McHugo).SyriaopposedtheU.S.invasionofIraqin2003becauseIraqwas

amainsourceofincomeforthecountry.Whileothercountriesdecreasedtheirtradeand

relationswithIraqpersupportoftheU.S.Syriafailedtodoso(McHugo).AsAmerican

troopsbegantolinethebordersofSyria,andDamascusbecameacenterforfleeing

citizens,SyriabegantoquestioniftheywerenextontheAmericanradar.Syriamadethe

poordecisionofallowingterroristinfiltrationacrossitsborders,leadingtheU.S.toidentify

themasterroristsponsors,andultimatelyfurtherdamagingwhatlittleprogresshadbeen

madebetweenthetwo.Inaddition,itwasasifSyriasawtheirrelationswiththewestand

theU.S.asirredeemablebecausetheychosetoalignthemselvesandallywiththeterrorist

groupHezbollah.HezbollahincessantlyattackedIsraelfurthercreatingadisparitybetween

thepro-ArabcountryofSyriaandthepro-westerncountryofAmerica.Whatlittleglimpse

ofpossiblepositivechangeinSyriangovernmentwasfeltinBashar’sinauguralspeechwas

nowwipedclean,asitwasclearhewouldfollowinhisfather’sfootsteps.Ashebecame

morecorruptbypowerandwealth,thoughhehadmanyfollowersandsupportersof

varioussectsthroughoutthecountry,Basharwasrapidlyincreasingthegapbetweenthe

wealthyandthepoor(McHugo).WhenBasharal-Asad’seconomicreformsbeganto

dwindleandbecomelesssuccessful,helookedelsewheretocontinuethelegitimizationof

hisregimeand“adoptedahardlinetowardIsraelamidsttheal-Aqsaintifadahandopposed

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theU.S.invasionofIraq;this,inarousingintenseAmericanhostility,souredthe

internationalenvironmentforhiseconomicreforms”(Hinnebusch).TheDamascusSpring,

aliberalizationmeasurethatwasseenaspositiveinregardstoBashar’sregime,werethen

tarnishedwhenhe“reassertedtheauthorityoftheoldregime,includingacrackdownin

2001onpoliticaldiscussiongroupsandtheimprisonmentofprodemocracymilitants”(St

John).Basharal-Asadhadquicklybeguntolosesupportandwasnowspiralingdownward.

HecontinuedtonosediveasheopenedtoIraq,andsupportedthePalestinianintifadaas

waspreviouslymentioned.Furthermore,hisinabilitytomakepeacewithIsraelprevents

SyriafromformingapositiverelationshipbetweenSyriaandtheUnitedStates.Inthe

process,“theIsraeli-Palestinianconflict,U.S.occupationofIraq,andconcernsthatthewar

onterrorismcouldtargetSyriaallreinforcetheintransigenceoftheoldguardinSyrian

politicsandbecomeapretextforobstructingchangeinbothexternalandinternalpolicies”

(StJohn).Asthecitizen’sdiscontentgrewoverthelackofchange,amajormovementinthe

MiddleEastsparkedthefirstoutcrytobeheardanddemandchange.Basharal-Asad

believedSyriawastoostabletohaveanuprisingunderhiswatchandcontrol,perhapsthat

iswhyherespondedwithsuchbrutalitywhentheArabSpringspreadtoSyria.

X.THEARABSPRING

TheArabSpringwasademocraticuprisingthatstartedinTunisiaandspread

amongagroupofMiddleEasterncountries.TheArabSpringwasaresultoffrustrationand

failurethroughouttheMiddleEast.TheArabSpringwasbornoutofa“broadsetofideas

andgrievancesthataremotivating”change(Jones).AsJonesstates,“theArabworld

underperformsallotherregionsoftheworldonvirtuallyallsocial,political,andeconomic

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indices,andhasdoneformanyyears”(Jones).Jonesthenidentifiedthreeimportantfactors

thatwouldincreasethelikelihoodoftheArabSpringspreadingtospecificcountriesand

destabilizingthem.Jonesidentifiesthesethreefactorsaspoverty,lackofeconomic

opportunity,andarepressiveanddislikedregime.Chillingly,thesethreethingsthroughout

thispaperhaveallbeenproventobepresentinSyria.Inaddition,thetechnologicaland

socialinnovationsfomoderntimeshasgiventhe“underemployed,educated,and

frustratedurbanyouththeabilitytocommunicateinrealtimeandtoorganizethemselves

viasocialmedia,revolutionalizingthecollectiveimaginationofwhatispossible”(Jones).

Ultimately,oneofthemainfactorsoftheArabSpringandgeneralinstabilityintheMiddle

Eastasawhole,andSyriaspecifically,comesfromtheinabilityforleadersandregimesto

establishlegitimacy.

AuthorMcHugostatesthat“whattheywantedwashumanrights,democracyand

jobs:threedemandswhichtheysummedupwiththeoneword‘dignity’”(McHugo).The

ArabSpringfirstspreadtoplaceslikeEgypt,Libya,Bahrain,andYemenbeforefinally

reachingSyria.ThisoutbreakofdemocraticcrieswastheeventthatfinallybrokeSyriainto

acivilwar,somethingithadbeenonthevergeoffornearlyitswholehistory.Perhapsit

canbearguedthatitwasavoidablehadviolencenotbeenseenasthesolutionbythe

regime.Unfortunately,thisisnotthecase,anditwasratherinevitable.ItallstartedinSyria

inasoutherntowncalledDer’awhereagroupofyoungschoolchildrenhadbegunwriting

“freedom”andaslogancallingforthefalloftheregime,asgraffitiontheirschoolwalls.

Thismostlikelycamefrominfluencebothwithintheirownhouseholdsofhearingtheir

parent’svoicedopinionsaswellasinsocietyandthemedialearningabouttheotherArab

countrieswhohadcarriedoutsimilarevents.Thechildren,ranginginagefrom9-15,were

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arrestedandtakentoDamascusforinterrogationandtorture(McHugo).Afterpleasfor

releasebythefamilieswereignored,demonstrationbrokeoutcallingforthechildren’s

releaseinDer’a.Thesecurityforcesshowedtheirinsensitivitytobrutalitywhentheyshot

fourpeopledeadatthesedemonstrations.Thisonlyfueledthedemonstratorsandthe

peopleofSyria,increasingtheprotestorturnout.Dar’a’sinvolvementquicklybecame“a

rallyingcryacrossthecountryforwhatbeganasaruralandprovincialdrivenuprising”

(CNN).Theprotestorsbeganattackinggovernmentofficesandbuildingsandthesecurity

forcesbeganattackinghospitalsandinnocents’aswellaslocalBa’thpartyheadquarters.

On23March,thesecurityforcesraidedamosquewhichhadbecomeatemporaryhospital

totreatthosenowbeinginjuredintheongoingdisturbancesandonthisday,15people

werereportedkilledandhundredsinjured(McHugo).Inanattempttopreservehis

authorityandpower,Basharblameditallonaforeignconspiracy(McHugo).Hefurther

claimedthat“stabilityinSyriadependedonits[hisregime]stayinginpower”(Olmert).Yet,

thegovernmentbrutalityagainstprotestorsdidnotletupandthebattlebetweenSyrian

citizensandtheSyriangovernmenthadescalatedintoalloutchaosandcivilwar.Itquickly

spiraledintoamoresectarianbattleasitbecameevidentthatBasharal-Asad’sregime,

Alawite,hadcommittedtheatrociousmassacres.

XI.ANALYSISRESULTS

Todayitishighlydebatedwhathasledtothegruesomeoutbreakofviolenceand

civilwarintheMiddleEastasawholeandSyriaspecifically.Onecountrybelievesand

arguesitisthecolonialandimperialmockrulethattookplacebywesternstates

historically.AsaresultSyriahasneverbeenabletoriditselfofhostilefeelingsfrom

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unwantedintervention.OthersarguethatitisaresultofthebadbloodfromtheSixDays

WarbetweenSyriaandIsraelbecauseIsraelwasultimatelya“friend”oftheU.S,increasing

anti-westernviewsinanalreadystronglypro-Arabregionandcountry.Themostpopularly

arguedreasonfortheSyrianstrugglesandwararethesectariandifferencesandvast

varietyofdifferinggroups.ThelatteristhemostcommonchoiceofblamefromtheUnited

States.Yetstilltheargumentstemstosocioeconomicdivergence.

WhatthesewesternandEuropeancountriesontheoutsidelookinginoften

misunderstand,isthattheSyrianCivilWarisnottheresultofonepointedfinger.Meaning,

theSyriaweseeandexperiencetodayisaSyriashapedandmoldedbyallofthese

influencesandfactorsdeeplyrootedinhistoricalsignificance.TheFrenchMandates,

FrenchandBritishintervention,Israeli-SyrianWar,Syrian-Egyptianunity,andsectarian

dividesallplayaroleintheinstabilityinbothSyriansocietyandgovernment.Theyhave

builtontopofeachother,oneinfluencingtheother,intertwiningthemselvesasintricately

asthehistorytheyresidein.Theinabilityofaleaderorgrouptomaintainpowerand

createanenvironmentsuitableforprogressionhasledtoshort-livedtermsofpowerand

extensivehandoffsofauthoritybetweenmanydifferentpeople.Thesecomponentslaidthe

groundworkforwhatismoremodernlytheAsadRegime.Aleaderwhoprovidedsome

degreeofcontinuityforaperiodoftimecouldbeconsideredthemostsuccessfulSyrian

ruler,securingthepositionofpowertoremaininhisfamily.Assuccessorshaverisenup,

theyinevitablyfollowsuitintheirideologiesandpoliticalpolicies,leadingthemtonever

quiteimpactSyriapositivelyonalong-termscale,normakethechangesordifferences

necessarytosocietyandgovernmentasawhole.

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TheAsadRegimewasmerelyasheetofhopecastoveralandofdeeplyrooted,

extensiveissues.Theseissueshavenevertrulybeenaddressedinalegitimatewayof

findingasolution,ratherafaçadetoalleviatethehereandnow.Literatureemphasizesthe

goalsofmostleaders,especiallythosebasedondictatorialideologies,tendtohaveonegoal

ontheirmind;power.Moreimportantly,theironegoalismaintainingthatpower.TheAsad

familyisnodifferent.Theyhavedonewhattheycanandwanttoinsuretheirroles,

finances,andpowerneverescapetheirgrasp.Asaresult,theunderlyinghistoricaltensions

havealwaysmanagedtofindawaytorisebackup,sendingSyriaspiralingbackdowninto

itsquicksandofabrokensocietalsystem.Thecivilwar,isnotonlyproductofthese

unsolvedbrokenlinkages,butisalsothecurrentstateoffailureweareexperiencingin

modernSyriatoday.

Syria’sstrengthinideologycontributestoalevelofstubbornnessinfixingitsissues.

UnfortunatelytheimageofoutsidehelphasbeensotaintedbypastinteractionsthatSyria

willnotevenconsidertheideaofpeacefulinterventionbyanotherstate.Thefirsttopicthat

shouldbeaddressedisSyriaanditsinternationalrelations.Uponimprovementinthis

realm,Syriacouldpotentiallybemoreopentoassistanceandaidfromthecountriesitso

deeplyloathes,butcouldhelp.ForexamplemendingtheirrelationshipwiththeUnited

Stateswouldnotonlyhelpthisdirectrelationshipbutwouldalsorequirethecomingtoa

jointagreementonthetopicofIsrael,therebyfindingasolutiontotwoprominent

impactfuleventsthathadonceshapedtheminnegativeways,potentiallypavingtheway

foranowpositiveoutcome.SupportfromacountryliketheU.S.wouldallowSyriato

receiveforeignaid,butwouldalsoimprovetheiroverallimageinternationally.TheUnited

Statesistrustedandwell-likedasaretheirfriendsandallies.Manycountriesrightnow

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fearattachingthemselvesinanywaytoSyriasosomesortofpeacefulnegotiationsand

approvalscouldimmediatelyimprovetheirsituation.

Thoughhistorycanneverbeforgotten,andshouldneverbeforgotten,Syria’sbest

interestslieinathird-partyintervention.Startingthere,gettingthecountryonitsfeet,and

mentoringthemtoaplacepromotingprogressionisastrongandaggressivewayto

“attack”theissuesinSyria.Aslongastheycontinuetorageon,theproblemsgrowand

begintospreadbeyondthebordersofthisMiddleEasterncountryaswaspreviously

mentionedasaconsequenceinmanyaspects.Outsideassistancemayalsobeableto

implementamoresuccessfulandflourishingeconomicprogram.Asanotheroneofthe

downfallsinSyria,thewealthytopooreconomicgap(andgrowing),stabilizingthe

economythroughmeansotherthanasocialistsystem,aswashadinthepast,wouldmean

decreasingthisdisparity.Howeverthistacticpresentsachallengeofitsown.Syriahas

alludedto“involvingIsraelinafull-scaledwarifattackedeitherbytheUnitedStates,

NATP,orTurkey”(Olmert).IncapableofattackingIsraelinanimpactfulway,itismorethe

SyrianallyHezbollah,andthemeanstoattainchemicalwarheads,thattheU.S.isskeptical

aboutupsetting.

XII.CONSEQUENCES

TheimpactoftheSyriancivilwarhasbeenwidespread.Ithasshakenthestateof

Lebanon,areligiouslydiversenationthatisonthebrinkofitsownimbalanceinits

sectariandivisionsaswellasthosewhosupportandopposePresidentBasharal-Asad.

MuchofthisstemsfromtheborderingcountryandSyriaanditscivilwar,offshootingand

effectingcountrieslikeLebanon.Tomanyresearcherssurprisethough,theeffectsithas

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hadonLebanonarelessnegativethanothersurroundingcountries.Themerchandise

importsandexportsaswellasserviceexportshadremainedratherstableduringthecivil

war.ThelossofSyriangoodstocompeteinthemarkethasopenedfurtheravenuesfor

Lebanontotakeadvantageofandfinanciallyboosttheirowneconomy.

Stemmingfromtheeconomicimpactisthequestionofregionalresourcessuchas

oil.Simply,priceswillfluctuateduetouncertainty,butisthatall?Regionalunrestand

majorevents,suchastheArabSpring,couldpotentiallycauseoilpricestoskyrocket.While

theGulfStatestendtobemorestableandcanworktostabilizeoilpriceslongterm,thereis

stillthepossibilityofsporadicshorttermsharpincreasesinthepriceofoilastheMiddle

Eastistheoilcapitaloftheworld.

AnotherconsequenceoftheSyriancivilwaristheeconomicdownturnofSyria.

Syria,notthestrongesttradingnationintheMiddleEast,hascreatedsuchbadblood

betweennotonlythemselvesbutalsofellowMiddleEasterncountriesandespecially

westerncountries.ThishascausedmanynationstorestricttradewithSyriaorcuttrade

tiesoffaltogether.Intermsofdomesticeconomythecivilwarhasdestroyedinfrastructure,

preventedchildrenfromgoingtoschool,closedfactories,anddeterredoverallinvestments

andtrade(Cal).Citizensarefacinghighlevelsofunemploymentat57percent,whilein

2013Syria’sGDPdroppedastaggering20.6percent,andin2014theeconomywasso

disruptednoformulacouldevenproduceaccuratestatistics(GlobalEnvision).According

totheEuropeanCouncilonForeignRelations,theSyrianHDIhasfallenbacktowhereit

was38yearsago,meaningthattodaytheaverageSyrianhasthesamelifeexpectancy,

educationandemploymentprospectsasin1977(GlobalEnvision).Inalookatthefuture,if

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thewarweretoend,theUnitedNationsanticipatesthedamagewillbesimilartosome

nationsafterWWII,taking40-50yearstofullyrecover(GlobalEnvision).

SyrianexpertJosefOlmertalsoemphasizesthedemographicchanges,whichareto

beexpectedasaconsequenceoftheSyriancivilwar.InLebanon,“theircivilwarand

aftermathbroughtabouttwoverydistinctchanges,thefirstwasthedramaticweakeningof

theChristianpopulationofthecountry,mostlytheMaronites,butalsootherChristian

sects,andthesecond,wasthebraindrain,asmanywholeftbelongedtothemoreeducated

andskilledelementsofthepopulation”(Olmert).Hegoesontofurtherclaimthiscanbethe

demographicoutcomeweshouldexpectto,sadly,seeinSyria.TheviolenceinSyriahas

alsoshiftedtowardsanethno-sectarianbattle,whichhasprompted,theKurdish

communitytomobilizetoprotectitself(Lawson).The“ethno-sectarianizationofthecivil

war,alongwiththepoliticalmobilizationofalmostallofSyria’sminoritycommunities,has

promptedmembersoftheseethnicandreligiousminoritieswhoresideinneighboring

countriestointervenedirectlyintheconflict”(Lawson).Thegreatestofthesetypesof

involvementcamethroughtheLebaneseShi’ImovementthePartyofGod,knownmore

typicallyasHezbollah.Thisiswherewebegintoseethemosttragicconsequenceofthe

Syriancivilwar,refugeemovements.Muchoftherefugeemovementhasdramatically

increasedinnumbersrecently,astheinstabilitythathasbeenfurtherperpetuatedbythe

civilwarhasopenedthedoorforterroriststolocateandcreateastrongholdinthecountry.

OneoftheseterroristorganizationswhomareactiveinSyriaisISIS.

OneofthemosttragicconsequencesistherefugeemovementfromSyriatonearby

MiddleEasterncountriesinanefforttoattainpeace,security,andanoverallbetterquality

oflife.Whatwasoncelessthan58,000“asylumseekers”inAprilof2015hasdramatically

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risentocloseto89,000inJune(Heisbourg).InJunetherewasnearly190,000Syrian

refugees.FromJanuarytoSeptember2015,75%ofrefugeeswereseekingshelterinGreece

fromTurkey(Heisbourg)and70%ofthesewerenearlyallSyrian.Thismassexodusof

peoplehasconsequenceshowever,forthecountriesthatareapartoftheEUtheyare

arrivingin.Notonlydoesitcreatetensions,overcrowding,lossofjobsforcurrentcitizens,

anddrainfinancestosustaintheabruptlyspikedpopulationnumbersetc.Butitalsobrings

asecuritydynamictoplay,especiallyasitbecomesmoreevidentthattheserefugeegroups

arenowbeinginfiltratedbyterroristgroupssuchasISIS,seekingtousethemasatacticto

employterroristactivityintheopencountries.Overalltheabilitytohouseandprotectthe

displacedmigrantsinthenewcountriesisstrainingthesecountriesbecauseoflimited

numbersofresources.Thisdisplacementis“causinganenormoushumanitariancrisiswith

implicationsforhostcountries,internationalaidagencies,and,ofcourse,forthosewhose

liveshavebeenforeverchanged”(Kirisci&Ferris).ThecivilwarinSyriahasalsohadthe

effectofforcingneighboringcountries’leadersintheMiddleEasttoeitherbackBasharal-

AsadortheSyrianopposition,whattheychoosecanpotentiallyhavetopowertocreate

moreinstabilityandinternationalhostilityinanalreadyfragileregion.

ThecontinuedviolenceandcivilwarinSyria,whichappearstohavenoimminent

end,provides“noprospectfortheirearlyreturnhome”(Heisbourg).Asrefugeesare

increasing,moreandmorecountriesarealsochoosingtoclosetheirdoorsforamultitude

ofvariousreasons.ItwasstatedbySlovakianleaderJaroslawKaczynskithat,“InSlovakia,

wedon’thavemosques,weonlywanttochoosetheChristians”(Heisbourg).Manyregional

concernshaveshiftedinjustafewshortyears.Onemainregionalconcernregardingthe

Syriancivilwaroutbreakwouldbeto“avoidlarge-scalerefugeeflows”(Heisbourg).A

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secondimportanttopicworthaddressingtomanyregionalcountrieswouldbethe

eliminationofISISaswellasprovidingthenon-JihadicomponentoftheSyrianrebellion

withtheabilitytoresistRussianandIranianoperationsinsupportofAsadwhilestill

pursuinghisremovalthroughpoliticalmeasures(Heisbourg).Mostliteratureonthetopic

ofrefugeemovementsassertsitasaconsequenceofcivilwar.Itisinterestingtonotethatit

hasalsobeenarguedtobeapossiblecauseofcivilwar.Onearticleoninternational

organizationsnotes,“thatinternationalmigrationingeneral,andrefugeemigrationin

particular,canhaveimportantsecurityconsequences,whichsuggeststhatrefugeeflows

andpopulationmovementscanspurthespreadofconflictbothbetweenandwithinstate”

(Salehyan&Gleditsch).

XIII.CONCLUSION

ItiseasytofallvictimtothebeliefthatthesolutiontotheSyrianCivilWarissimple

andstraightforward.Itiseasytobelievefixingoneminordetailwillputthecountryasa

wholebackonitsfeet.TheSyrianCivilWarisaresultofmorethanjustcorruptionand

sectariandivisionasismostregularlydepictedinwesternpolitics.Itistheproductofa

longlineofhistoricaleventsthatstartedbyimplantingaseed,andcontinuedtogrowon

eachother,eachonestirringupbadfeelings.TheSyrianCivilWarisanoutbreakofinternal

violencebasedonthehistoricaleventsofFrenchandBritishcolonialrule,French

mandates,Israeli-Syrianwar,EgyptianandSyrianunification,sectariandivisions,andthe

AsadRegime.Allofthesefactorscreatedanenvironmentofpoliticaldistrust,instability,

turmoil,chaos,andultimatelyviolenceaswenowseetoday.Moresimplyput,itisthe

productofaconglomerateofhistoricalimperfections.Althoughtherearemany

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consequencesofthecivilwar,somethathaveyettoevenoccur,oneofthemosttragicis

therefugeemovementtheworldisexperiencingtoday.Nowraisedasamoral,ethical,and

civilissue,therefugeemovementhasbecomeasourceofgreatdebateanddiscomfortin

theinternationalarena.Thequestionofwhatisrightandwhatiswrongisattheforefront

asmanycountriesintervenetodowhattheycan,butevenmorestayquietinavoidance.As

theworldcontinuestosearchforasolution,Ibelievetheanswerliesintheunderstanding

thatthecivilwaristheresultofnotjustoneindividualevent,asisoftenargued

internationally,butratheraconglomerateofdeeplyintertwinedhistoricalmoments.

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