jülide karakoç “the impact of the kurdish identity on turkey's foreign policy from the...

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The Impact of the Kurdish Identity on Turkey's Foreign Policy from the1980s to 2008Jülide Karakoç

Online publication date: 13 December 2010

To cite this Article Karakoç, Jülide(2010) 'The Impact of the Kurdish Identity on Turkey's Foreign Policy from the 1980s to2008', Middle Eastern Studies, 46: 6, 919 — 942To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2010.520423URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2010.520423

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The Impact of the Kurdish Identity onTurkey’s Foreign Policy from the 1980sto 2008

JULIDE KARAKOC

Kurdish identity, being salient especially with the armed actions of the PKK (PartiyaKarkeren Kurdistan – Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in the 1980s, has become adeterminant agent (actor) in Turkey’s foreign policy. Because of the coexistence ofthe state’s policy rejecting Kurdish identity and the request of the Kurds to maintaintheir identity, the Kurdish question has remained unresolved. By challengingTurkish national identity, it has become a factor which cannot be ignored in theconstruction process of foreign policy.

Until now, the constructivist studies which examine the impact of identity onTurkey’s foreign policy regard Turkish national identity as a main determining agentof foreign policy. In this context, there are in general two tendencies. On the onehand, Turkish national identity is treated as an aggregate concept which has awestern character and as the only principal factor constructing foreign policy.According to this scheme, even if there is sometimes a contest between nationalidentities – which are the western Turkish identity, the nationalist identity and theIslamic identity – this contest does not last long. The western Turkish identity isalways the winner and constructs Turkey’s foreign policy according to its rules.1 Butthis approach, based on Alexander Wendt’s soft constructivism, overlooks differentidentities and risks oversimplification. On the other hand there are some objectionsto this restrictive framework. It is accepted that Turkish national identity needs to beproblematized as a contested space. National identity is not constructed by state-to-state interactions as Wendt says and affected by sub-national identities. However,these contesting sub-national identities are only the Kemalist and the Islamicidentities. This claim is based on the fact that in Turkey there is a lack of a sense ofbelonging to a geographical location.2 In this context again, the Kurdish identity,which always challenges the existence of the Turkish national identity, has no place.

Nevertheless, a closer look at Turkey’s foreign policy reveals a less consistentdesign. Since the 1980s, Kurdish identity has been affecting Turkey’s foreign policyin three different ways. First, it leads to the construction of a collective identity. Andfrom time to time, this identity constitutes the reason for cooperation or disputebetween Turkey and other states. Yet it provides the continuity of relations. Second,as a subject of a human rights question, it causes a negative identification concerningTurkey by western institutions and states. Thus Turkey is faced with problems with

Middle Eastern Studies,Vol. 46, No. 6, 919–942, November 2010

ISSN 0026-3206 Print/1743-7881 Online/10/060919-24 ª 2010 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2010.520423

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the western world of which it declared itself to be a part. Third, Kurdish identity as along-term question changes the Turkish national identity. Dialectically affecting andexciting Turkish nationalist discourse (speech act),3 it becomes an important factorwhich shapes Turkey’s foreign policy and decisions.

As constructivism focuses on the role of ideational factors (such as rules, speechacts and culture), not simply material ones, and handles international relations associal relations, it serves to examine the role of identities in foreign policy. Thisapproach argues that structure (international system) and agents (actors) co-constitute each other. Ideational factors are important in this mutual constitution.4

And socially constructed identities (as agents) influence foreign policy decisions of astate. This approach offers a useful framework for examining the impact of Kurdishidentity on Turkey’s foreign policy.

The concept of collective identity which is constructed around collective demandsand interests is used in this study for understanding Turkey’s relations. This concepthas an important place in Wendt’s soft constructivism. Wendt argues that collectiveidentity does not mean that collective demands replace individual interests. Itincludes an identification along ‘which agents fall between the extremes, motivatedby both egoistic and solidaristic loyalties’. According to him, domestic values canlead to the construction of a social collective identity in a state and states canconstitute collective identities and interests by interaction with other states.5

Nevertheless, he overlooks the role of domestic factors like ethnic identities in theconstruction process of collective identity among states. Yet, ethnic identities can beimportant factors in the construction of a collective identity among states. It ispossible to see this effectiveness in the example of Kurdish identity. I assert thatKurdish identity as a source of a collective identity between Turkey and itsneighbours governs Turkey’s relations.

This study values Nicholas Onuf’s rule-oriented constructivism more than Wendt’ssoft constructivism. There are several reasons for this preference: First, Wendt’sconstructivism accepts only states as agents and does not give a place to other agents.In this framework, construction of a state’s identity is limited to interactions withother states; state represents an aggregate concept and a pre-social given agent.6 Farfrom this mainstream constructivist approach, Onuf’s rule-oriented constructivismviews various identities as agents.7 Thus this approach makes it possible to treatethnic identities like the Kurdish identity. Second, unlike Wendt, Onuf includes rulesin agent–structure relations. Rules become ontological elements as important as agentand structure. Therefore rules function as a kind of canal in this co-constitutionprocess amid agents and structures. Agents are dependent on conditions offered byrules. However, rules may highlight some agents rather than others.8 Third, whileWendt ignores the role of language in the mutual constitutions of agents andstructures, Onuf regards language as an important factor in the social constructionprocess. According to Onuf, agents make rules by means of ‘speech acts’. Heformulates this idea as ‘saying is doing’ and argues that ‘saying’ is an action which hasnormative consequences. And different speech acts construct different rules.9

Given these particularities, rule-oriented constructivism offers many useful toolsfor analyzing the impact of Kurdish identity on Turkey’s foreign policy. RegardingKurdish identity as an important agent in the construction process of foreign policy,I will attempt to demonstrate the ways it is effective in almost every area of Turkey’s

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foreign policy using the concepts such as rules, speech acts, agents, and collectiveidentity.

Kurdish identity leading to the construction of a collective identity has become avery important factor in Turkey’s relations. This collective identity based on Kurdishidentity sometimes unifies Turkey and its neighbours around common interests andsometimes may be an issue of dispute amid the same agents. However, it contributescontinuity of reciprocal relations among agents. It is possible to demonstrate thisargument focusing on Turkey’s relationship with its neighbours and nearenvironment. I will try to examine the impact of this collective identity on Turkey’srelations with its neighbours, in particular Syria, Iran, Iraq, and its repercussions onrelations with other agents.

In relations between Syria and Turkey, the Kurdish problem has never been theprincipal issue for Syria. Nevertheless, Syria preferred to use this issue, which is theprincipal one for Turkey, in bilateral relations. However, Kurdish identity in generalhas become a source of worry in the Middle East region for states having a Kurdishpopulation. Syria has always come into this category. Though supporting the PKK, ithas always participated in meetings related to the Kurdish identity with Turkey andIran.

The first contact between Syria and Turkey’s Kurds took place just after the 12September 1980 military coup in Turkey. As this military regime pressed down onKurdish political movements, many Kurds took refuge in Syria. Turkey reacted tothis situation and demanded surrender of these Kurdish refugees called ‘terrorists’.But Syria did not accept this demand claiming that these people were politicalrefugees, not terrorists.10 Since this period, tension based on different points of viewvis-a-vis Kurdish identity has become the main determinant of bilateral relations. Onthe one hand, Syria continued to support the Kurdish PKK movement until the late1990s, and used this factor as a bargaining tool for other problems with Turkey. Onthe other hand, Turkey has also seen these common problems with Syria as a resultof the relationship between the PKK and Syria. It refused to negotiate otherproblems without Syria breaking relations with the PKK. However, Syria’s supportfor the PKK continued; many PKK congresses were held in Syria.11 Turkey madenumerous unsuccessful visits to Syria in order to try to stop this support.

The Kurdish question has been involved in all other problems between Syria andTurkey. Thus without progress on the PKK issue, it has become impossible to realizenegotiations in any area. The water question between two agents also evolved in sucha context. While Syria used Turkey’s Kurdish question to gain an advantage, Turkeyrefused to negotiate in this matter without movement concerning Syria’s support forthe PKK. Therefore, the water issue and the Kurdish question have becomeinterdependent.

The water issue which took over in the 1980s among Turkey, Syria and Iraq isactive between Syria and Turkey by virtue of Iraq’s war with Iran. Under theinfluence of the Kurdish question, this problem has become not only a technical andeconomic problem but also a political one.12 This dimension was expressed by DenizBaykal, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey in that period. He said that ifSyria continued to be a centre for the PKK, it was useless to expect an augmentation

The Impact of the Kurdish Identity on Turkey’s Foreign Policy 921


of the water level of the River Tigris.13 Thus he reminded Syria of Turkey’sconditions on this matter. On the other hand, in all mutual visits, the two problemswere handled at the same time and in the same context.

This situation also continued in the 1990s when Turkey began to organize regularmeetings with Syria and Iran because of developments relating to Kurdish identity inIraq. During these years, the PKK’s actions were also intensive. Thus, Turkey oftenheld meetings with Syria and Iraq. At one of these meetings, in November 1992,Hikmet Cetin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, asserted that Syria was using a ‘terrorist’organization against the water issue and warned Syria against this stance.14 Inanother meeting of Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey held in Damascus in July 1994,Turkey repeated the conditions regarding the water issue: Syria should not push forprogress on the water issue without withdrawing support for the PKK.15 Never-theless, in 1994, as soon as the PKK expanded its influence to Hatay (a border citybetween Turkey and Syria), Prime Minister Tansu Ciller said that Turkey was readyto sign an agreement with Syria, which proposed giving Syria 500 cubic metres ofwater per second.16 After the meeting in Paris, in July 1994, which brought togetherIraq’s Kurdish groups, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the KurdistanDemocratic Party (KDP), Turkey and Syria met with Iran. In fact, the ‘territorialintegrity of Iraq’ was not cited at this meeting and then these three agents with aKurdish population were worried.

As in the case of relations with Syria, Kurdish identity has been a determiningfactor in Turkey’s relations with Iran. Kurdish identity has always been one of thetwo most important problems (another is an ideological problem) between Iran andTurkey. Even though the latter has been secondary since the death of Khomeini, theKurdish issue always remained the principal question. Because of this problem,Turkey always had to follow Iran’s relations with the USA and the Soviet Union,which were important agents in the construction of regional rules.17

The atmosphere which was constructed by the beginning of PKK actions in 1984has become a major factor in relations between the two states. On the one hand,Turkey began to accuse Iran of not taking enough care to prevent PKK membersfrom using the border. On the other hand, Iran was concerned by Turkey’s operationsin Northern Iraq and therefore cooperated with Iraq’s Kurds in retaliation.Nevertheless, despite these disagreements, the two states, under the influence of acollective identity based on Kurdish identity, could sign a security agreement in 1984in which Iran promised non-authorization of the PKK in Iranian territory.18 Ingeneral, Iran has remained faithful to this agreement. But Kurdish identity continuedto be a cause of disagreement until the early 2000s between the two agents, while atthe same time being a reason for the continuity of bilateral relations.

Following the onset of the Gulf War in August 1990, Kurdish identity becamemore prominent than at any other time. In the construction process of regional rules,Kurdish identity became a determining agent by virtue of some developments at theend of the war, such as the revolt of Iraq’s Kurds against the Iraqi government, theintervention of the Iraqi military, the Kurds’ difficult situation and ‘OperationProvide Comfort’ organized by the USA and its allies to provide a safe region forIraq’s Kurds, with the unwilling participation of Turkey. All these developmentsworried Iran. This was because political and military interventions endangered Iran’srules concerning Kurdish identity.19 Iran met with Syria and Turkey to hinder the

922 J. Karakoc


foundation of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. In spite of other problems amongthem, they signed a series of protocols with Iraq related to this issue.20 Whereas Iranparticipated in tripartite meetings related to Kurdish identity with Syria and Iraqfrom the beginning of the Gulf War, Iran began to feel anxious about Turkey’srelationship with the USA. Furthermore, Turkey’s military intervention in NorthernIraq also disturbed Iran. These meetings and protocols which unified them did notstop Iran supporting the PKK. Meanwhile, this support did not impede Turkey frommeeting with Iran over the Kurdish question. This situation can be appraised as aconsequence of collective identity.

As far as relations with Iraq are concerned, Turkey–Iraq negotiations were heavilyinfluenced by Kurdish identity from the 1980s until 2003. Iraq and Turkey havealways been the states which are the most vulnerable agents of Kurdish identity inthe region. They had always cooperated on this issue and never had major mutualproblems. The impact of collective identity between the two neighbours had alwaysbeen positive until Iraq’s invasion. Between 1980 and 1988, Iraq had to deal with itssouthern border because of its war with Iran. Hence Iraq authorized Turkey’sintervention in Northern Iraq by reaching an agreement for 1983 until 1988. After1988 Turkey continued its military operations without Iraq’s agreement. Iraq reactedstrongly to these operations, which violated its territorial integrity.21 Nevertheless, inspite of these problems, bilateral relations continued until the USA’s occupation ofIraq: Turkey and Iraq reached agreement on the PKK issue and met with Syria andIran to sustain Iraq’s territorial integrity. As can be seen in the following pages, itwas after 2003 that this balance in relations changed.

However, this well-balanced relationship was not the case with other neighbouringstates. Iran and Syria had long supported the PKK against Turkey. This situationled Greece to cooperate with them on this matter. Greece, having several problemswith Turkey (such as the Aegean Sea, and the Cyprus issue), had begun to signcooperation agreements with these Middle Eastern countries. Thus it aimed toobtain advantages regarding problems with Turkey. In this context, besidesconstructing a kind of collective identity with these states, Greece also supported(materially and logistically) the PKK movement.

Support for the PKK by neighbouring states such as Greece, Iran and Syria hadtwo consequences with regard to Turkey’s foreign policy: on the one hand, thissituation of conflict with its neighbours led Turkey to cooperate with Israel. In thiscontext, in February 1996, Turkey signed an agreement which included militaryeducation and cooperation. Furthermore the agreement projected cooperationagainst terrorism, and the education of Turkish personnel by Israeli intelligence unitson the borders of Syria, Iran and Iraq which had PKK camps or a relationship withthe PKK. Therefore, by means of this agreement, Turkey aimed to profit from theexperience of Israel, which constructed a safety zone in the south of Lebanon, andthereby gain effective force against the PKK camps.22 In August 1996, anotheragreement was realized between the two states in spite of a coalition governmentcalled Refahyol which had Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan advocating the ruleof Islamic identity in foreign policy. This point refers to the fact that Kurdishidentity can affect Turkey’s foreign relations more than any other identity. By thisagreement, modernization of Turkey’s F-4 phantom planes was agreed and the planwas to force Syria to step back from its support for the PKK. In April 1997, Turhan



Tayan, Minister of Defence, visited Israel. In the negotiations, it is explicitly statedthat the agreements made between Turkey and Israel were against ‘Iran and Syriawhich support terrorists’. Tayan asserted that the terrorists threatening Israel andTurkey took shelter in Syria and that Iran supported the PKK and Hamas. Heconcluded that Israel and Turkey were in a close relationship and were sharingintelligence.23 Furthermore, starting from 1998, common military exercises havebeen executed, sometimes with the participation of the USA.

Israeli–Turkish cooperation on the PKK issue was confirmed by various sources:firstly, at the end of December 1996, Cemil Bayık, the commandant of the PKK’smilitary wing – ARGK (Artesa Rızgariya Gele Kurdistan – People’s Liberation Armyof Kurdistan) – put forward the view that one of the main targets of Israeli–Turkishcooperation was the PKK. He explained that Israel provided weapons and securitymaterials for the Turkey–Iraq border. Furthermore, he claimed that Israel helpedTurkey in its grand operation, realized in March 1995.24 Secondly, Israeli PrimeMinister Benjamin Netanyahu explained in his speech, in May 1997, that Israelsupported Turkey on the PKK issue.25 Thirdly, in December 1999 Cevik Bir, retiredformer Chief of the General Staff, in his speech at the Washington Institute for NearEastern Affairs, asserted that the crisis between Syria and Turkey in 1998 over thePKK issue was resolved in favour of Turkey thanks to Israeli–Turkish cooperation.26

On the other hand, this situation of conflict between Turkey and regional statesover the Kurdish question pushed Turkey to negotiate with Russia for its energyneeds (in particular natural gas). Turkey chose Russia because Russia, having fewerKurds in its territory and being far from the conflict region, was considered a safesupplier for energy importation.27 With this perception, on the one hand, Turkeygave importance to cooperation with Russia and made efforts to sign agreements onthis matter. On the other hand, Turkey had to follow Russia’s relations with otheragents. Given these worries, in December 1997 Turkey came to an agreement called‘Mavi Akım’ with Russia, planned to end in 2001 with 16 milliard cubic metres ofgas importation over 25 years.28 Nevertheless, this project was influenced bydevelopments related to the Kurdish question: Russia’s support for the PKK was anobstacle to the economic partnership. Yet this support was because of Turkey’ssupport for the Chechens with whom Russia was fighting.29 In 1999, Prime MinisterBulent Ecevit visited Russia to negotiate the ‘Mavi Akım’ project. He signed aprotocol with Russia for cooperation against the Chechens and the PKK. It wasafter this agreement, in July 2000, that the draft of the project was confirmed by theGrand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT). These agreements made Turkey toodependent on Russia for energy.30 In August 2008, Russia’s intervention in Georgiacalled into question the perception that Russia offered a secure energy source forTurkey. Moreover, the news implying Russia’s contact with Iraq’s Kurds in themedia concerned Turkey. However, it revealed one fact: unless the Kurdish questionis resolved by Turkey, Kurdish identity will always be a determinant in Russia–Turkey relations.

Returning to Turkey’s relations with Syria, Iraq and Iran since the late 1990s, it ispossible to see the efficacy of Kurdish identity, but in a slightly different context. Inthis period, the USA, as a determining agent in the Middle East, revealed its

924 J. Karakoc


intention to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime and construct a Kurdish state inIraq. Since the USA wanted to obtain Turkey’s support in this matter, it began toassist Turkey with the PKK issue. Even though Turkey continued to meet with Syriaand Iran regarding ‘Iraq’s territorial integrity’, it accepted this support by agreeingwith the USA. Hence Turkey obtained the ability to force the states, by means ofspeech acts, to cease supporting the PKK.

In September 1998, the Chief of the Land Forces Command of Turkey, AtillaAtes, in his speech in Hatay, laid out Turkey’s rules concerning Turkey–Syriarelations. He stated that Turkey would not tolerate Syria’s attitude vis-a-vis thePKK.31 Then, Chief of the General Staff Huseyin Kıvrıko�glu expressed the view thatthere was an undeclared war between Syria and Turkey. Therefore, Turkey’sattitude, supported by the USA, forced Syria to withdraw and the PKK leaderAbdullah Ocalan was deported from Syria.32

Following these developments, and a sign of Ocalan’s upcoming capture,negotiations between Syria and Turkey which would conclude the Adana Agreementbegan. In Adana, two states signed a protocol indicating bilateral engagements. Theprotocol text marked by the Kurdish question included that Syria had banned allPKK actions in its territory. After this agreement, relations between the two partiesimproved. In June 2000, with Besar Esad’s presidency, several agreements oneconomic and security cooperation were signed between them. There had also beenpositive developments on other issues between the two countries. In this positiveatmosphere, Turkey decided to include Syrian experts in the GAP’s (Guneydo�guAnadolu Projesi – South Eastern Anatolia Project) international trainingprogrammes. Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Faruk El Sara declared that eventhe Hatay issue between Syria and Turkey could be resolved.33 Nevertheless, the onlydifficulty in relations occurred again because of the Kurdish question. In January2002, there had been intelligence reports that Syria ignored the PKK’s activities andthus the revival of the PKK in Syria was possible, which caused a little tension inrelations.34 Yet with Syria’s determined stand against the PKK the problem wasovercome.

However, Kurdish identity continued to influence this relationship with Syria andothers. Developments after Iraq’s occupation in March 2003 contributed saliency toKurdish identity. In this context, the Kurdistan Regional Government wasestablished and Iraq’s new president was a Kurd, Celal Talabani. The influence ofKurdish identity over bilateral relations has thereby continued. In 2004, there weremutual visits which were marked by Kurdish identity. The two parties strained todevelop a common attitude vis-a-vis developments in Iraq. Syria continued to pressthe PKK in its territory and said all the time that Syria was with Turkey.35

Ocalan’s capture did not immediately influence Turkey’s relations with Iran. Thiscould be explained by two factors. First of all, the PKK organized severaldemonstrations protesting against Ocalan’s capture in Iran. Secondly, Iran could notmanage to control its border, thus the PKK benefited from this situation by crossinginto Turkey.36 However, collective identity functioned well: in January 2000, the twostates realized an agreement which included the setting up of a common study groupfor reviewing regional and international developments. Yet Turkey’s complaintsabout Iran regarding the PKK issue continued. President Ahmet Necdet Sezervisited Iran in June 2002 and asserted that Turkey’s main problem with Iran was its



support for the PKK.37 Since this period there have been few problems with Iran. Inparticular, after the constitution of the Kurdish armed organization PJAK (PartiyaJiyana Azadiya Kurdistane – Party for Free Life in Kurdistan), which is seen as theIran branch of the PKK, relations between Turkey and Iran very much improved.The PJAK, defending federal democracy in Iran, has begun to conflict with Iran. Inthe media, these conflicts have been declared as ‘conflicts with the PKK’.

The PJAK has been a cooperative factor supporting collective identity betweenIran and Turkey. Therefore, Iran’s attitude towards the PJAK has been importantfor Turkey. In this context, Iran’s operations against the PJAK have pleased Turkey.In July 2004, the two states decided to conduct common military operations againstthe PKK and the PJAK and to share intelligence.38 This positive framework wassupported by the President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s visit to Turkey inAugust 2008. During this visit, the two parties signed a cooperation agreementagainst terrorism, organized crime, and illegal drug trafficking.39 Even though thesegood relations do not please the USA, struggling for hegemony of its rules, Iran–Turkey relations continue to be influenced by Kurdish identity.

As already noted, developments after Iraq’s occupation contributed to Kurdishidentity becoming a significant agent in the region. The USA’s plans to establish aKurdish state and the Kurdistan Regional Government relations with other regionalagents had begun to harm Turkey’s relations based on collective identity. Turkeymade some efforts to prevent these developments. In this context, it put forward theidea of a meeting called the ‘Initiative of Iraq’s Neighbours’ in January 2003, twomonths before Iraq’s occupation by the USA. And in spite of the USA’s opposition,the first meeting was held on 23 January in Istanbul with the participation of Iran,Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.40 And since then many meetings have beenheld. In these meetings, in general, the participating states explained their purpose asprotecting Iraq’s independence and territorial integrity. They confirmed that stabilityneeds to be provided in Iraq. All parties were invited to fight against every kind ofterrorist activity in Iraq. Nevertheless, these meetings were considered interference inIraq’s internal affairs and prompted protest from the Iraqi government. Therefore, inhis inaugural speech of the Baghdad meeting in March 2007, Iraq’s Prime Minister,Nuri El Maliki, warned neighbouring states about interference in Iraq’s domesticaffairs by supporting certain groups in Iraq.41 These meetings also caused reactionsfrom the USA. Given these reactions, starting from the fifth meeting held in Egypt,Iraq, the United Nations Security Council’s permanent members, the EuropeanCommission, the Organization of Islamic Conference and the Arab League wereincluded in the ‘Initiative of Iraq’s Neighbours’.42 In November 2007, during theperiod when Turkey’s military was conducting operations in Northern Iraq, thesecond meeting of this enlarged version was held in Istanbul. At this meeting, Iraq’sterritorial integrity was particularly emphasized. However, the meeting continued todiscuss Turkey’s PKK issue rather than the situation in Iraq. Prime Minister RecepTayyip Erdo�gan, in the inaugural speech of the meeting, put forward the need forimmediate precautions against terrorism.43

Turkey’s efforts to repair the damaged collective identity continued in the contextof these meetings. Nonetheless, Turkey had so far been unable to get the result itwanted from the enlarged meetings. The variety of participants and the differentpoints of view impeded the construction of an effective framework. Though

926 J. Karakoc


participants seemed to agree with the protection of Iraq’s territorial integrity, theyattached importance to the different parties and groups in Iraq. Turkey’s worriesabout Kurdish identity are not shared by all of the other agents: Saudi Arabia andKuwait are worried about any repercussions of the Sunni–Shiite conflict on theircountries; Jordan is worried about radical Islamist groups in Iraq.44

Turkey’s ethnic-based politics in Northern Iraq over Turkmens and Kirkukdamage its relations with the Iraqi central government and the Kurdistan RegionalGovernment. Because of the unstable situation after the occupation and efforts atstabilization in the country, its neighbours’ politics have become an important issuefor Iraq. In this context, Turkey’s politics towards Iraq and some groups in Iraq alsoare an important factor which influences relations.

In such a situation, Turkey has chosen to ignore the issue of Kurdish identity andto follow a Turkmen-oriented politics. Turkey’s attitude stems from its Kurdishquestion, because Turkey worries about the possibility of its own Kurds’ orientationtowards Iraqi Kurdistan. Hence Turkey has begun to use the Turkmens in its politicstowards Iraq, as Turkey wants to be a determining agent in the construction of newrules following the Gulf War of 1991. This strategy was put into practice for the firsttime during the meetings called the ‘Ankara Process’. Turkey included the Turkmensas an agent in this framework. This attempt by Turkey caused reaction from theKDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party).45 Nevertheless, Turkey continued a policy thatis supported by and based on the Iraqi Turkmen Front which represents only a partyof Iraq’s Turkmens and aims to unify all Turkmens in Iraq.46 Therefore, Turkey’sspeech acts began to include negative statements towards Kurdish identity in Iraq,but a discourse in favour of Turkmens has continued.

Given this policy, Kirkuk as a place where the Turkmen population lives has alsobecome an issue in Turkey’s foreign policy with regard to its government and status.In this context, Turkey opposes Kirkuk’s participation in the Kurdistan RegionalGovernment and wants it to be given a special status. Moreover, Turkey wantsKirkuk to have equal representation for Arabs and Kurds.47 Turkey’s demandscaused reaction from the Iraqi central government and the Kurdistan RegionalGovernment. Turkey’s policy of refusing contact with the Kurds in Iraq resulted innegative developments between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Turkey.The crisis of January 2007 occurred in this framework. The crisis started when theIraq National Petroleum Enterprise (SOMO) wanted Turkish firms to apply to theKurdistan Regional Government to renew their contracts. Turkey reacted byopposing these rules: the only interlocutor for Turkey in Iraq is the Iraqi centralgovernment, not the Kurds. It is in this context that Minister of State KursatTuzmen reminded them of Turkey’s rule and expressed the view that Turkeyrecognizes an undivided Iraq. In response to this, the Baghdad government assertedthat good commercial relations with Iraq depend on the construction of dialoguewith the Kurdish President of Iraq, Celal Talabani, and the Kurdish President of theKurdistan Regional Government, Mesud Barzani.48 Though this crisis was resolvedby a mutual security guarantee, it is evident that such a policy always has potential tocause a new crisis.

On the other hand, in June 2008, the Vice-President of the Iraqi Parliament, ArifTayfur, claimed that Turkey, by means of its Iraqi Special Representative MuratOzcelik, interfered in Iraq’s internal affairs. Tayfur claimed that Ozcelik, calling



attention to the Kirkuk issue, explicitly opposed the Kurdish position and worked toconvince the deputies of the Kurdistan Parliament with respect to this issue. Inconclusion, Turkey’s ethnic-based policy in favour of Iraq’s Turkmens becamecontradictory regarding its policy towards the Kurds.

Western Turkish national identity is not the sole determinant of Turkey’s foreignpolicy as other constructivist studies maintain. If that were the case, a nationalidentity called ‘western’ would not have been a problem with western states andinstitutions. The following context reveals that Turkey has many problems withwestern agents. I argue that this situation cannot be understood without acceptingKurdish identity as a determining agent of Turkey’s foreign policy.

With a ‘westernization’ target in the foreign policy area, Turkey entered the 1980swith the 12 September military coup. Meanwhile, human rights became veryimportant for western states and a framework of international law was constitutedby the United Nations, the Council of Europe and regional institutions. Within theframework of the 12 September three-year military regime, Kurdish organizations,as other leftist organizations, were shut down and their members jailed. In prison, allkinds of ill-treatment were meted out to the Kurds, whose existence was not evenrecognized. At that period, the Kurdish question became a live issue in the EuropeanParliament (EP). In 1985, the EP took a decision against Turkey.49 Consequently,Kurdish identity has influenced Turkey’s identification process. On the one hand,against this background Turkey’s relations with western states and institutions havedeveloped in a negative context. Human rights organizations have begun to includethe Kurdish question on the agenda. On the other hand, it produced theestablishment of many organizations based on the Kurdish question. Thus Turkey’srelations with western states and institutions remained problematic.

Since the 1990s, Turkey’s conflictive relations with Kurdish identity have becomemore significant in the context of the violation of human rights. Two developmentsaffected this. First, international institutions such as the EP and the ParliamentaryAssembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) gave importance to Kurdish identity andmade several decisions on the Kurdish question. Second, with the collapse of theEastern Bloc and the hegemony of the capitalist system by means of its superstructure(besides its infrastructure), western states accepted the Charter of Paris, also declaringhuman rights a principle of international order, in the context of the Organization forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Consequently, Turkey, reducing theKurdish question to a struggle with the PKK and accused of many human rightsviolations, began to have trouble with western states and institutions.

In 1987, just before the application to the European Union for membership, as atactical step, Turkey accepted the individual right of application to the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights (ECHR). However, with this step, since the 1990s, Turkey’sKurds have applied many times to the ECHR. Until now, there have been manycases regarding the Kurdish question in Turkey and many judgments have beendelivered against Turkey. Actions leading to the condemnation of Turkey in theECHR are in general based within three contexts. First, SSC (State Security Court –Devlet Guvenlik Mahkemeleri) decisions based on actions or speeches ‘against theindivisible integrity of territory and nation’ are interpreted as a violation of human

928 J. Karakoc


rights by the ECHR. Second, the human rights violations of prefects and otherofficials by their actions, exempt from juridical control in the context of the state ofemergency, also played an important role in the decisions of the ECHR condemningTurkey. In fact, since 1987, Turkey’s south-east has always been governed by a stateof emergency. Third, the Anti-Terror Law (ATL – Terorle Mucadele Kanunu), whichcame into force in 1991, having a wide definition of ‘terror’, enables every kind ofstatement to be reconsidered in this context.50 In particular Article 8 of this law hasoften been used for condemnation of statements concerning the Kurdish question.This article interdicts every activity, whatever its intention, under the pretext ofharming the national and territorial integrity of Turkey. In 1995, because ofinternational pressure, this article was narrowed and thus interdiction was reducedto oral and written propaganda against Turkey’s territorial and national integrity. Inaddition, prison sentences in this context became convertible to a monetarypenalty.51 Even though Article 8 of the ATL was abolished in July 2003, problems inthe context of the ATL continue to be an issue in the ECHR.

Turkey’s problematic relationship with Kurdish identity also creates problems inrelations with the EU, to which Turkey applied for membership. Turkey’s politicstowards Kurdish identity led to a negative identification of Turkey by the EU.However, a similar negative identification has come into question by somenationalist sectors of Turkey as the EU wants Turkey to recognize Kurdish identitythrough political and cultural rights. In particular, those, such as military andnationalist agents, which are not favourable towards giving rights to the Kurdsdefine the EU as an outside agent aiming to divide Turkey.

In the reports of the European Commission on Turkey’s progress towardsaccession, published since December 1999, when Turkey’s candidature was accepted,the Kurdish question has played a prominent role. The Kurdish question is inparticular considered under the separate rubric of ‘Human Rights and Protection ofMinorities’. In general, Turkey is criticized because of disrespect for the CopenhagenPolitical Criteria and its disrespect is in general based on Kurdish identity problems.It is evident that the Kurdish question is handled in particular as an issue of politicalrepresentation and cultural rights.52

First, with regard to the political representation problem of Kurdish identity in theGNAT (Turkiye BuyukMilletMeclisi –GrandNational Assembly of Turkey) and in thecontext of the political party system, Turkey’s political and legal structure comes intoquestion as a critical issue. On the one hand, the 10 per cent threshold is cited as anobstacle to Kurds accessing the GNAT. On the other hand, closure of the Kurdishpolitical parties or their being under threat of closure is interpreted as a problematicsituation for Turkey’s adhesion to the EU. The first conflict was seen in the 1990s, whenthe closure of HEP (Halkın Emek Partisi – People’s Labour Party) was declared in July1993 by the Turkish Constitutional Court owing to swearing oaths of allegiance inKurdish in the GNAT. After this development, the Kurds continued their politicalactivities within another political party the DEP (Demokrasi Partisi – Democracy Party/Democratic Labour Party). Nevertheless, in March 1994, immunity for Kurdishdeputies was lifted and arrests began. Therefore, given these measures against theKurds,Turkey experienced one of the biggest foreign policy crises of the 1990s.

The EP and the PACE, in April 1994, made the decision to demand that Turkeyrelease the DEP deputies immediately. However, the DEP deputies had been tried by



the SSC from August 1994 and were condemned to a 15-year prison term inDecember 1994.53 The EP reacted by emphasizing its incompatibility with a pluraldemocracy. The EP explained that work of the Joint Parliamentary Committee wassuspended until a positive development was reached. Furthermore, in December1994, it took a decision proposing suspension of custom union negotiations withTurkey. Therefore, as a reaction to Turkey’s measures, due to the Kurdish identityissue, the EU made a decision that came close to cancelling the customs union whichTurkey had made such efforts to achieve.

The crisis was overcome by Turkey’s efforts. In July 1995, Turkey accepted anamendment to the constitution which brought slight changes such as permitting thedeputies of the closed party to keep their status and granting the right of audiencewith the head of the closed party. Nevertheless, since 1998, the situation of the DEPdeputies, the lack of organizational freedom and the representational problems ofthe Kurds have been expressed in every progress report on Turkey’s candidature.Furthermore, in the reports, Turkey’s minority approach, based on the LausanneTreaty (1923) recognizing only three non-Muslim communities as minorities, iscriticized by putting forward the idea that the Kurds should be recognized in theconstitution as a national, racial or ethnic minority. In fact, it is claimed that thissituation creates a system in which the Kurds’ political demands are impeded andthus contributes to the rule of the PKK in the Kurdish region. Specifically, in the1999 progress report, there is criticism that the pro-Kurdish HADEP (HalkınDemokrasi Partisi – People’s Democracy Party) with half the votes in seven cities ofthe south-east did not enter the GNAT because of the national threshold of 10 percent for political party representation.54 As in the 2001 report, the disappearance oftwo officials of the HADEP was cited;55 the 2002 report, by reminding of thecontinued closure by the courts of the HADEP and the Kurdish HAK-PAR (Hak veOzgurlukler Partisi – Rights and Freedom Party), indicated that the closure ofpolitical parties should not be so easy.56 The 2007 report included the accession ofKurdish deputies to the GNAT and their unification under the DTP (DemokratikToplum Partisi – Democratic Society Party) as a positive development.57 However,recently the DTP’s closure became an issue indicated in the 2008 report. In fact, inNovember 2007, a closure case was opened against the DTP, under the pretext that ithad become a centre of activities against the ‘indivisibility of national and territorialintegrity of the state’ indicated in Article 68/4 of the constitution. In this context, notonly the closure of the DTP, but also the abolition of deputies’ status and a five-yearpolitical interdiction for 221 DTP members was demanded.58

In November 2007, the DTP’s closure case came into question in a meetingbetween the European Union Troika and Turkey. Olli Rehn, Member of theEuropean Commission Responsible for Enlargement, emphasizing the necessity for acivil solution to the Kurdish question, explained that they wanted the DTP to beincluded in the GNAT.59 Furthermore, in October 2008, the President of the PACE,Luis Maria De Puig, stated that party closure should be seen as an exceptionalsanction. De Puig added that Turkey should adopt a new democratic constitutionguaranteeing human rights.60

Second, the cultural rights dimension constitutes another point of the Kurdishquestion indicated in the progress reports. Every progress report emphasizes thatTurkey should recognize Kurdish identity by granting Kurds their cultural rights. In

930 J. Karakoc


this framework, broadcast and education rights in Kurdish are particularly cited. Inthe 1998 report, Articles 7 and 8 of the ATL and Articles 158, 159, 311 and 312 of theCriminal Code based on ‘indivisibility of national and territorial integrity of thestate’ were considered a barrier for publications with regard to the Kurdish question,by leading to a narrow interpretation.61 In the 1999 report, the lack of means ofKurdish citizens for using and sustaining their language and cultural traditions wasemphasized by considering it a violation of the two agreements of the EuropeanCouncil. Even though the abolition of ‘language forbidden by law’ was interpreted asa positive development, the continuity of the difficulties concerning the use ofKurdish remained a problematic issue in the report.62 The amendments made inAugust 2002 with ‘the third reform package’ were considered a positive developmentallowing broadcasts in different languages. Nevertheless, the existence of Article 42which bans education in languages other than Turkish was criticized.63 Conse-quently, some progress was welcomed in the report but these changes were judgedinefficient. The 2003 report indicates that in spite of the four reform packages sinceAugust 2002, Kurds faced difficulties in practice.64 The amendment realized inJanuary 2004, permitting television channels other than TRT (Turkiye RadyoTelevizyon Kurumu – Turkish Radio–Television Corporation) to broadcast inKurdish, had positive repercussions on progress reports; but the time restrictions forTV broadcasting and the difficulties in practice were criticized.65

The first positive interpretations of Turkey’s progress were made in the 2005report. In fact, Prime Minister Erdo�gan’s meeting with several Kurdish intellectualsin Diyarbakir created a positive atmosphere with regard to the Kurdish question.Erdo�gan’s statement of ‘the Kurdish issue’ and his emphasis on the need to resolvethe Kurdish question through democratic means were interpreted as signs of hispossible policies regarding Kurdish identity.66 Thus, Turkey’s recognition of theexistence of the Kurdish question is considered to be a committed step which couldlead to the resolution of the Kurdish question. However, the 2006 progress reportcriticized that Erdo�gan’s commitments in Diyarbakir were not put into practice.67

With regard to the 2007 progress report, the time restrictions on Kurdishbroadcasting and the lack of educational possibilities in Kurdish were emphasizedas negative points in cultural rights areas. The HAK-PAR’s pending closure case forhaving spoken Kurdish at the party’s general congress was criticized as an exampleof restrictions on the usage of Kurdish in practice.68 In the last progress reportpublished in 2008, similar problems were reported. In particular, the ATL andArticle 215, 216 and 217 of the Criminal Code were considered as means ofrestriction on freedom of expression. The April 2008 amendment to Article 301 ofthe Criminal Code concerning freedom of expression was cited. With thisamendment, the upper limit of penalty time diminished, but the permission of theMinistry of Justice was required to open the case. The latter arrangement wascriticized because of the fact that it allowed political influence on the judgmentprocess.69

The Kurdish question was not a determinant in relations with the USA as inrelations with the European Union. In fact, until the late 1990s, owing to rules of theCold War period, the most important issue for the USA had been the existence ofagents supporting the western side against the Eastern Bloc. In this context,considering Turkey’s membership of NATO as sufficient, the USA ignored Turkey’s



violation of human rights. In the early 1990s the USA’s interest in Kurdish identitywas restricted to Iraq’s Kurds70 because of the fact that the USA wanted to oustSaddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and for this they needed the support of Iraq’sKurdish groups.

However, since the 1990s, the USA’s policy and rules regarding Kurdish identityhave been handled in Congress. In this context, Turkey’s problematic relations withKurdish identity also came into question. The points of view expressed in thisframework have paved the way for a negative view of Turkey.

Until the late 1980s, Iraq’s Kurds have been in question in Congress rather thanTurkey’s Kurds. But since 1989, Turkey’s Kurds also have been handled inCongressional meetings as victims of human rights violations by Turkey. Turkey’smethod of dealing with the Kurdish question has been severely criticized. Meanwhile,the measures based on the ATL and the state of emergency are regarded as violationsof human rights. International human rights associations and the USA Ministry ofForeign Affairs in their Turkey reports supported this negative framework.Therefore, the deep difference between the US government’s attitude towardsIraq’s Kurds and Turkey’s Kurds is criticized by Congress members. In fact, theUSA government’s policy of constituting good relationships with Iraq’s Kurds hasavoided Turkey’s Kurds. As Kurds suffer from violations of basic human rights,the USA continues its relations with Turkey, without pressing Turkey to stop theviolations.

The negative view of Congress towards Turkey influenced the USA’s military andeconomic aid and sale of weapons to Turkey. With regard to aid, Turkey began tohave trouble with the USA in 1994. In fact, the Congress records of March 1994included opinions claiming that Turkey was violating the most basic human rightstowards Kurds in the South East region. Further, because of the measures within theframework of the state of emergency since 1987 in eight cities in the South Eastregion, the legal rights of Kurdish citizens were violated on behalf of the ‘struggleagainst terrorism’. Since 1992, developments such as the killing of 70 members of theKurdish political party DEP, the bombing of 30 party branches, the arrest of morethan 300 DEP candidates during elections, DEP deputies’ arrests due to theirspeeches after elections were all given as examples of Turkey’s negative attitudetowards the Kurdish identity. Therefore Congress called for the USA government toapply sanctions to Turkey.71 Consequently, Congress’ efforts to construct new rulesfor relations with Turkey succeeded and in July 1994 aid to Turkey by the USAgovernment become conditional. This aid remained dependent on its observation ofinternational law and on developments in the area of human rights. Furthermore,the speech acts cited in Congress also influenced the sale of weapons to Turkey,which because of its armed struggle against the PKK has been highly dependent onpurchases of weapons from the USA since the 1990s. In 1995 Congress, supported byhuman rights associations, prevented the sale of Cobra attack helicopters to Turkey.Nevertheless, thanks to USA government support, Turkey had only 10 of 50helicopters. In December 1997, the sale of helicopters was conditional on Turkey’sprogress in human rights areas. In October 2000, Congress reacted strongly to plansto sell 145 Bell-Textron attack helicopters to Turkey. In this context, it wasemphasized that the Cobra helicopters previously sold to Turkey were used againstKurds.72

932 J. Karakoc


Kurdish identity as a victim of human rights violations also comes into question inthe agendas of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs which appeared asagents for influencing the reconstruction process of rules have become determinantin the construction process of foreign policies of states. In such a context, differentNGOs have begun to influence Turkey’s relations with regard to Kurdish identity.There are two kinds of NGOs in this framework. On the one hand, there areassociations which are not directly established based on Kurdish identity. Theseassociations, having the target of Turkey’s membership of the EU, give place to theKurdish question with regard to the Copenhagen Political Criteria. In this context,TUS_IAD (Turk Sanayicileri ve _Isadamları Derne�gi – Turkish Industrialists’ andBusinessmen’s Association) for Turkey’s accession to the EU comes into prominence.TUS_IAD prepares the reports concerning Turkey’s path to the EU. The 1997TUS_IAD report, prepared by Prof. Bulent Tanor, is important in this context becauseit handles the Kurdish question as a multi-dimensional problem, while emphasizingits identity dimension. By analyzing every article of laws denying Kurdish identity, heindicated the need for an amendment.73 TUS_IAD continues to publish reports on thisissue. Therefore, TUS_IAD, by giving a voice to the Kurdish question in its speechacts, aims to orient Turkey’s foreign policy according to its targets.

On the other hand, there are NGOs directly based on the problems of Kurdishidentity. These organizations emphasize the importance of Kurdish identity in therealization of Turkey’s foreign policy targets. Thereby they attempt to force aresolution of the Kurdish question by democratic means. Furthermore, theychallenge governments by pointing out the problems with other states for obtainingsome advantages in favour of Kurdish identity. In this context, the Kurdish HumanRight Project (KHRP) established in 1992 became a prominent agent through itsactivities. It aims to uphold the human rights of Kurds. In this respect, it followsKurds’ cases in the EHRC and encourages them to sue against violation of theirrights.74 It prepares reports on the situation of human rights in Turkey and offersthem to international organizations such as the OSCE. It also records situationscontrary to the UN human rights agreements. Since 2003, the annual reports calledthe ‘Impact Report’ appraising the situation of human rights in Kurdish regionshave been prepared by the KHRP and books have been published on the subject.

The KHRP is aware of the moves against Turkey’s policy concerning the water issuewith Syria and Iraq. Specifically, the KHRP prepares reports indicating that Turkeyviolates the water rights of Syria and Iraq by means of the GAP. As Iraq and Syriaclaim, the construction of dams is considered to cause diminution of the water quality ofthe Euphrates and the Tigris Rivers. In addition, it is proposed that GAP, which affectsKurds’ life in the region, should be run with the participation of the Kurds.

The KHRP also campaigned against the Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan (BTC) Pipelineproject promoted by Turkey. In this campaign, first of all, it claimed that theproposed line of the project was not safe. Secondly, the Kurdish population had notbeen informed about the plan for the BTC pipeline to pass through the Kurdishregion. This situation was considered a violation of the World Bank criteria bythreatening the human rights of Kurds.75 The KHRP invited the member states ofthe EU and in particular the British government to stop this project by means of itsreports. Consequently, even though the KHRP did not succeed in stopping pipelineconstruction (it was opened in July 2006), the petroleum companies included in the



project began to discuss the safety of the line. Thus Turkey had to give guarantees tothese companies about the amount of oil carried by the pipeline.76

Turkey’s EU candidacy also constitutes an important activity area for the KHRP.It prepares reports and publishes books concerning Turkey’s Kurdish question andviolations of human rights. By handling the situation in Turkey in the context of theCopenhagen Political Criteria, it proposes some policies in regard to relations withTurkey. For instance, in the report of April 2002, considering Kurds as a minority, itdemanded that Turkey allow Kurds their cultural rights based on the LausanneTreaty. Furthermore, the necessary steps for adoption to the Copenhagen Criteriawere indicated.77

Since the 1980s, Kurdish institutes established in some Western Europe countriesand the USA have also become important agents with regard to the Kurdishquestion and Turkey’s foreign policy. The institutes see their mission as theconstruction of a consciousness in Kurds regarding their cultural identity andexplaining Kurdish identity problems to the public in western countries. In thisrespect, the institutes organize conferences, campaigns and publish reports, articlesand books concerning the Kurdish question. After Turkey’s candidature is accepted,Turkey’s problem of adaptation to the Copenhagen Criteria will be handled bycomparing its situation with other states. In this context, the conference entitled‘Kurds: Human Rights and Cultural Identity’ organized by the Paris KurdishInstitute in cooperation with the French Freedoms Foundation chaired by DanielleMitterrand on 14–15 October 1989 was important as a first far-reachinginternational conference concerning the Kurdish question.78 At the end of theconference, some decisions were taken with regard to the Kurdish question such asthe founding of an international committee to follow the situation of Kurdish humanrights, the construction of a Kurdish organization participating in internationalorganizations as an observer, and supporting Kurdish participation in internationalinstitutions like the EP and the European Council. In the releases published after theconference, the UN, European states and institutions were asked to force Turkey torecognize Kurds’ right to self-determination.79 The signature campaign of March1994 was also an important activity of the institute. The campaign invited Turkey toresolve the Kurdish question.80 The signed text was offered to Boutros Ghali, theUN Secretary-General. Finally, in May 2008, the Paris and the Washington KurdishInstitutes organized a common signature campaign. In the petition published in theleading newspapers of the USA and Europe, the demands as regards democratic andpeaceful resolution of the Kurdish question are listed. Furthermore, emphasizing thenegative situation of Turkey as a candidate of the EU, politicians such as Tony Blair,Marti Ahtisaari, Felipe Gonzales and Bernard Koucher, who were involved in theresolution efforts with the Catalans, Basques, and in Kosovo, were invited to resolveTurkey’s Kurdish question.81 Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted harshlyto this campaign, restating Turkey’s rules vis-a-vis Kurdish identity.82

The Kurdish question, as an unsolved problem, caused changes in Turkish nationalidentity. In fact, the Kurdish question, being increasingly salient, nourished Turkishnationalist discourse and thus affected Turkey’s foreign policy decisions by givingthem a nationalist character.

934 J. Karakoc


The 12 September military regime used the idea of the ‘Turkish Islam Synthesis’,which was first launched by a nationalist right-wing association, Aydınlar Oca�gı,during 1970s, against leftist and Kurdish movements. According to this idea,Turkish and Islamic cultures are two main determinants of national culture. AndTurkey is a country surrounded by the cultural attack of interior and exteriorenemies. In this context, Islam is considered the most appropriate religion for Turksto protect their identity. Furthermore, the experience of the Ottoman Empire isreconsidered as proof of the claim that the integrity and the permanence of the statecannot be protected in a plural society. Finally, this approach argues that in acontinuously changing world it is necessary not only to protect the national identitybut also reconstruct it with creativity.83

This discourse was compatible with the dominant rules in the 1980s. In fact, theGreen Belt project of the USA which aimed to construct a line of ‘moderate’ Islamaround the USSR offers a supporting context for the Turkish Islam synthesis.Therefore, the 12 September regime found a proper context to apply its approachand efforts to redefine Turkish national identity began.

Nevertheless, Kurdish identity has presented a challenge in this context, bystruggling against the dominance of the Turkish national identity. Since the 1990s,this struggle has been supported by international rules of the period. In fact, theglobalization process led to the prominence of identities. Therefore, Turkish identitywent through a crisis and the reconstruction of identity came into question. Twotendencies were put forward for overcoming the crisis. On the one hand, PresidentTurgut Ozal wanted to include Kurdish identity in the construction process ofTurkish national identity. In this respect, he conducted negotiations directly withIraqi Kurdish leaders and indirectly with the PKK leader Ocalan. On the other hand,Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel and the military bureaucracy opposed to Ozal’sapproach wanted to continue excluding the Kurdish identity. But the sudden death ofOzal led to the latter group becoming dominant. Therefore, new foreign policy wasapplied. Turkey tilted towards the new Turkish Republics which gained independenceafter the dissolution of the USSR. In this context, the efforts for the redefinition of‘Turkishness’ by including the ‘Turkish World’ came into question.84 With regard tothe realization of this target, the government cooperated with Fethullah Gulen’scommunity, one of the most important defenders of the Turkish–Islam synthesis.‘Turkishness’, which is a distinguishing factor in Gulen’s approach,85 was intended tobe used as a unifying factor between Turkey and the Turkic Republics.

From 1991 to 1993, the PKK was very active as an agent. As a consequence ofthis, Turkish nationalism was also at a heightened level. Turkish and Islamicidentities of new independent states were welcomed passionately under the influenceof Turkish media speculation. This enthusiasm also covered the GNAT andtherefore many meetings were held concerning relations with the ‘Turkish world’. Inone of these meetings, the foundation of a ministry responsible for the outside Turkswas even proposed. Consequently, Turkey maintained a firm relationship with thesecountries. Turkish cultural centres and Turkish schools were opened in many ofthem. In the context of mutual visits, around 140 treaties were signed.86 Moreover, inJanuary 1992, by a decision of the Cabinet, the Turkish International Cooperationand Development Agency was founded in Ankara. The aim was explained inspeeches by Prime Minister Demirel in February 1992. In fact, he expressed the view



that ‘a Turkish world from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China’ was beingconstructed in the post-Soviet period.87

Since 1992, Turkey has been organizing meetings of the ‘Summit of Presidents ofTurkish Speaking States’. In the last meeting held in November 2007, Prime MinisterErdo�gan suggested constructing a ‘commonwealth of Turkish language states’.According to Erdo�gan, it would be possible to provide coordination among thesestates in the area of foreign policy.88

However, this policy was constructed based on an opposition to Kurds. In March1992, before the celebrations of Newroz, intensive propaganda emphasized thatNewroz was a Turkish festival. During Newroz celebrations there were conflictsbetween Kurds and the police.89 Since then Turkey has been celebrating Newroz as aTurkish world festival with official ceremonies.

Turkey’s foreign policy dominated by the idea of ‘Turkishness’ led to firmrelations with Azerbaijan, so much so that Turkey has been the only state supportingit permanently. Thus Turkey became a part of Azerbaijan’s problems with Armenia.Azerbaijan’s embargo on Armenia is supported by Turkey and this attitude wascriticized by NATO, Russia, USA, Iran and other western states.90

Today, Turkey’s relations with Armenia are also directed by this nationalism.However, the slogans shouted (‘We are all Hrant! We are all Armenians!) at thefuneral ceremony of murdered Armenian journalist Hrant Dink have become aturning point in relations between Turkey and Armenia.91 It was after this event thatArmenian President Serj Sarkisyan invited President of Turkey, Abdullah Gul, toErivan to watch the Turkey–Armenia World Cup football match. In September 2008,President Gul conducted Turkey’s first official visit to Armenia in spite of thereactions of Azerbaijan.92 However, in October 2008 this positive atmosphere wasinterrupted by the PKK’s Aktutun operation against Turkey. Under the influence ofrising Turkish nationalism, Turkey did not make any statements or take any actionsconcerning Armenia. Everything seemed to be frozen in the context of bilateralrelations. It was only after the appeasement of nationalism that Turkey–Armeniarelations have come into question again. In November 2008, Turkey’s Minister ofForeign Affairs, Ali Babacan, met with his Armenian colleague Edvard Nalbatyan inIstanbul. At the end of the meeting, they expressed agreement regarding thenormalization of bilateral relations.93

Turkey’s speech acts emphasizing ‘Turkishness’ also worried the RussianFederation. In this context, affected by rising nationalism, Turkey’s direct andindirect support for the Chechens in 1994 became an important issue in theirrelations. Russia reacted to Turkey by supporting the Kurds and explained that aninternational conference handling the Kurdish question would be held soon. Then inJanuary 1995 Russia met Kurdish representatives for the establishment of a ‘KurdishParliament in Exile’ in Russia. Moreover, in Moscow, a ‘Kurdish House’ was opened.All of these actions by Russia forced Turkey to sign a protocol against terrorism withRussia.94 The bilateral meetings on the Chechens and the PKK continued.

Kurdish identity paves the way for the reproduction of Turkish nationalism bycivil and military institutions. In fact, Kurdish identity, as a subject of an unsolvedquestion, keeps alive the perception of threats to the permanence of the Turkishstate. Therefore, some civil associations and military bureaucracy, handling Turkey’srelations in the context of concern over this ‘division’, aim to orient foreign policy.

936 J. Karakoc


The nationalist think tank organizations in general want to be involved in theconstruction of a Turkish national identity based on the fiction of a homogeneousnation. Around the intention of redefining Turkish identity by including a largegeography, they want to construct rules for Turkey’s foreign policy. They imposetheir own rules by means of publications and activities. In this context, ASAM(Avrasya Stratejik Arastırmalar Merkezi – Eurasian Center for Strategic Research) isactive. Founded in 1999, ASAM indicates that its aim is to construct a nationalsecurity culture in Turkey.95 Many academics with publications in all areas offoreign policy are included in the institution in an attempt to orient foreign policy. Inthese publications, there is an effort to form foreign policy around the anxiety of‘Turkey’s division’, emphasizing Kurdish identity as the main threat. In this respect,Turkey’s candidacy for the EU is handled in a negative context, as the CopenhagenCriteria necessitates giving some rights to Kurds. Further it is claimed that Kurds’demands are beyond the Copenhagen Criteria.96

Another association in this context is TUSAM (Turkiye Ulusal GuvenlikStratejileri Arastırma Merkezi – Turkish Center for National Security StrategyResearch), which also tries to orient Turkey’s foreign policy, based on an oppositionto Kurds. Through publications, seminars, and conferences around the theme ofTurkey’s national security, Kurdish identity is emphasized as a factor damagingnational security. The Kurdish question being considered a terror problem, relationswith other states are handled according to their attitude to the Kurdish PKKmovement. In this context, the Kurdistan Regional Government and its Kurdishleaders are defined as unreliable agents.97 Western states are also considered asagents attempting to divide Turkey’s territory by contributing to the foundation ofthe PKK. It is claimed that the EU aims to divide Turkey under the pretext of globaldemocracy.98 Nevertheless, TUSAM, strongly opposed to giving some rights ofKurdish identity, passionately supports the recognition of wide political rights forTurks in Bulgaria. Moreover, it also supports Bulgaria’s membership of the EU,which would provide large political and cultural rights to Turks.99 Againparadoxically, Turkmens in Northern Iraq are supported while a distant relationshipis maintained with Iraq’s Kurds.100

Finally, Turk Ocakları also can be cited as an association constructing itsdiscourses against the EU and the USA based on Kurdish identity. The principal aimof this association is the redefinition of Turkish identity by including a ‘Turkishworld’. The publications of the association assert that the EU plans to extract andconstruct another nation from Turkey.101 In this respect, as relations with theCentral Asian states and the Turkish Republics are confirmed, western countries areconsidered harmful agents intending to divide Turkey.102

The adoption of military struggle against the Kurdish question led to militarybureaucracy becoming an important agent both domestically and in foreign policy.The military bureaucracy composed of the Turkish General Staff and the SecretariatGeneral of the National Security Council plays a crucial role in the constructionprocess of foreign policy rules. The military bureaucracy realizes this effectiveness byits speech acts or by pressuring decision makers. These powers were given to themilitary bureaucracy in the context of the constitution and governmentalregulations. The reason for these powers is based on the necessary protection ofthe ‘indivisible integrity of territory and nation’ and of ‘national security’. Within



this framework, Kurdish identity as a separatist agent is emphasized and the militarybureaucracy thereby underscores Turkish nationalism over Kurdish identity.103

Consequently, they draw a nationalist character for foreign policy.The military bureaucracy has some instruments for influencing foreign policy. On

the one hand, it imposes a policy by means of the National Security Council (MilliGuvenlik Kurulu – NSC). Composed of military members and representatives ofgovernment, the NSC is a product of the 12 September constitution. One of theNSC’s tasks is to decide the necessary precautions for the protection of the‘indivisible integrity of territory and nation’.104 In July 2003, a reform packageadopted in Parliament reduced the NSC’s executive tasks to recommendatoryones.105 Nevertheless, in practice, the NSC, by means of the National Security PolicyDocument (Milli Guvenlik Siyaseti Belgesi – NSPD) and press releases, continues toinfluence foreign policy. The NSPD is a document prepared by the NSC every fiveyears.106 Including necessary precautions and policies regarding national security,this document is so important that once confirmed by the Cabinet it can change thewhole agenda of government. Since the 1990s, the PKK has been considered a‘separatist terrorist movement’ and has been top of the ‘threat list’ in the NSPD.107

The Kurds secured its first place on the list even during the ‘28 February Process’which was applied against the ‘reactionist’ activities at the time of the Refahyolgovernment. In this period, both the Kurdish question (defined as ‘separatist terror’)and Islamic fundamentalism (defined as ‘irtica’ – a reactionary ideology ormovement aiming to return to a religious regime) have been the principal topic inthe political agenda of the NSPD. Therefore, it is proposed to put in place economicand political sanctions against Syria and Iran which are supposed to support thePKK movement. Furthermore, these two states were threatened by the use of force.In January 1999, separatist and fundamentalist movements were equally consideredas principal threats and it was advised to reinforce relations with the TurkishRepublics. The NSC, by means of press releases, also tries to determine foreignpolicy. Within the framework of these press releases, Turkey’s relations arereconsidered according to the ‘separatist terrorist’ threat. A particular foreign policyis defined and imposed by the government.108

The subject of the Kurdish question refers to ‘necessary precautions in the SouthEast of Turkey’ or ‘interior and exterior facts’ without citing ‘Kurdish identity’.For instance, in a press release of 1992, there have been concrete policypropositions for different countries which were classified as foes or friendsaccording to their attitude towards Kurdish identity. Again, it has been proposedto strengthen relations with Turkish Republics which supposedly have a commonculture with Turkey. The declaration of a ‘Kurdish federal state’ in 1992 has beenseen as a threat. In the 1990s, the internationalization of the Kurdish question wasinterpreted as a principal threat and hence the necessary precautions against itoccupied the whole agenda.109

After the capture of Ocalan, developments concerning Kurdish identity have beentreated in press releases. The demands for education in ‘a language other than theofficial language’, without citing Kurdish, have been called a harmful activityoriented by the PKK. The reforms in the EU membership agenda have been rejectedby reason of the reforms they have implied about Kurdish identity. In a 2002 pressrelease, these reforms were qualified as a real danger to the integrity of the nation.110

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In press releases published after the occupation of Iraq in March 2003, the continuityof Iraq’s territorial integrity was defined as a priority for Turkey. In this respect,collaboration with the USA against the PKK has been emphasized. The lastpublished press release in 2008 underlined the need for precautions against thesupporters of the PKK and maintaining of Iraq’s territorial integrity.111

In conclusion, even if military bureaucracy does not govern directly via a militarycoup, it determines the rules of foreign relations thanks to speech acts. The speech actsformulated by the military bureaucracy regarding the Kurdish question are adeterminant in the construction of foreign policy. When governments try to apply acertain policy that conflicts with the requirements of military bureaucracy, the militarybureaucrats immediately reminds them of their rules. Sometimes, this intervention bythe military bureaucracy can reach the point where some institutions and countries arethreatened. In this context, the EU and some states which supposedly support Kurdishidentity constitute the red light for Turkey’s foreign policy.

Notes

1. Y. Bozda�glıoglu, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity (London: Routledge, 2003), pp.5–7.

2. H. Kosebalaban, ‘Torn Identities and Foreign Policy’, Insight Turkey, Vol.10 (2008), pp.7–10.

3. The concept of ‘speech act’, differently from the concept of ‘discourse’, refers to a rule constructive

power. Hence Onuf puts forward that agents make rules by means of speech acts.

4. A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),

pp.1–5; N. Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations

(Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1989).

5. A. Wendt, ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’, American Political Science

Review, Vol.88 (1994), p.387.

6. S. Smith, ‘Foreign Policy is What States Make of It: Social Construction and International Relations

Theory’, in V. Kubalkova (ed.), Foreign Policy in A Constructed World (New York: M.E. Sharpe,

2001), p.52.

7. N. Onuf, ‘Constructivism, A User’s Manual’, in V. Kubalkova et al. (eds.), International Relations in

A Constructed World (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p.60.

8. Ibid., p.59.

9. Ibid., pp.59–66.

10. ‘Common Issues Affecting Turkey’s Relations with Iraq, Iran, and Syria’, Ankara Papers, Vol.8

(2003), pp.53–8.

11. See M.M. Gunter, The Kurds and the Future of Turkey (New York: St. Martin’s, 1997), pp.46–53.

12. M. Eder and A. Carko�glu, ‘Su _Ihtilafı: Fırat-Dicle Havzası’, in B. Rubin and K. Kirisci (eds.),

Gunumuzde Turkiye’nin Dıs Politikası (_Istanbul: Bo�gazici Universitesi, 2002), p.352.

13. O. Tur, ‘Turkiye-Suriye _Iliskileri: Su Sorunu’, in M. Benli Altunısık, Turkiye ve Ortado�gu, Tarih,Kimlik, Guvenlik (_Istanbul: Boyut, 1999), pp.105–6.

14. Ibid., p.118.

15. R. Olson, ‘The Kurdish Question and Turkey’s Foreign Policy Toward Syria, Iran, Russia and Iraq

Since the Gulf War’, in R. Olson (ed.), The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, Its Impact on

Turkey and the Middle East (Kentucky: Kentucky University Press, 1996), pp.86–7.

16. Hurriyet, 11 Feb. 1995.

17. G. Cetinsaya, ‘Tarihsel Perspektifte Turkiye–_Iran _Iliskileri ve Nukleer Sorun’, _Iran Dosyası (Ankara:

SETA, 2006), pp.3–4.

18. R. Olson, Turkiye– _Iran _Iliskileri, 1979–2004: Devrim, _Ideoloji, Savas, Darbeler ve Jeopolitik (Ankara:

Babil, 2005), p.13.

19. A. Akdevelio�glu and O. Kurkcuo�glu, ‘_Iran’la _Iliskiler’, in B. Oran (ed.), Turkiye’nin Dıs Politikası,

Cilt II: 1980–2001 (_Istanbul: _Iletisim, 2002), pp.584–5.

20. Olson, Turkiye– _Iran _Iliskileri, 1979–2004, pp.21–2.

21. See B. Oran, Kalkık Horoz, Cekic Guc ve Kurt Devleti (_Istanbul: Bilgi, 1998), pp.273–7.



22. S. Minesian, ‘The Turkish–Israeli Military and Political Cooperation and Regional Security Issues’,

Iran and Caucasus, Vol.7 (2003), p.311; H. Yavuz, ‘Turkish–Israeli Relations Through the Lens of

the Turkish Identity Debate’, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.27 (1997), p.29.

23. Hurriyet, 5 May 1997.

24. R. Olson, Turkey’s Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel, and Russia, 1991–2000, The Kurdish and Islamist

Questions (California: Mazda, 2001), p.126.

25. G.A. Burris, ‘Turkey and Israel: Speed Bumps’, Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2003), p.76.

26. G.E. Gruen, ‘Recent Developments in Turkish–Israeli Relations’, American Foreign Policy Interests,

Vol.24 (2002), p.312.

27. See A. Tekin and I. Walterova, ‘Turkey’s Geopolitical Role: The Energy Angle’, Middle East Policy,

Vol.XIV (2007), p.91.

28. E. Tellal, ‘Rusya’yla _Iliskiler’, in Oran (ed.), Turk Dıs Politikası, Cilt II: 1980–2001, p.548.

29. L.K. Yanık, ‘Allies or Partners? An Appraisal of Turkey’s Ties to Russia, 1991–2007’, East European

Quarterly, Vol.XLI (2007), pp.354–5.

30. N. Uslu, ‘The Russian, Caucasian and Central Asian Aspects of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post

Cold War Period’, Alternatives, Vol.2 (2003), p.180.

31. Turkish Daily News, 26 Sept. 1998.

32. Turkish Daily News, 1 Oct. 1998.

33. ‘El Sara: Hatay Sorunu Giderilebilir’, http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/61887.asp (6 Feb. 2000).

34. ‘PKK Suriye’de Yeniden Canlanıyor’, http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/129473.asp (12 Jan.

2002).

35. S. Bar, ‘Bashar’s Syria: The Regime and Its Strategic Worldview’, Comparative Strategy, Vol.25

(2006), p.417.

36. Cetinsaya, ‘Tarihsel Perspektifte Turkiye–_Iran _Iliskileri ve Nukleer Sorun’, pp.14–15.

37. Radikal, 17 June 2002.

38. ‘_Iran: Turkiye’yle _Isbirli�gi Surecek’, http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/277889.asp (12 July 2004).

39. ‘Turkiye–_Iran Arasında _Isbirli�gi Anlasmaları’, http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/456285.asp (15 Aug.

2008).

40. ‘Irak’a Komsu Ulkeler Girisimi Nasıl Basladı?’, CNN Turk, http://www.cnnturk.com/2007/dunya/

11/02/iraka.komsu.ulkeler.girisimi.nasil.basladi/402105.0/index. html (2 Nov. 2007).

41. ‘Irak’ın Komsuları Toplandı’, BBC Turkish, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2007/03/

070310_iraq_conference.shtml (10 March 2007).

42. ‘Genisletilmis Irak’a Komsu Ulkeler Toplantısı Basladı’, http://dunyabulteni.net/news_detail.

php?id¼26750&uniq_id¼12022774946 (3 Nov. 2007).

43. ‘Genisletilmis Irak’a Komsu Ulkeler Toplantısı Sonuc Bildirisi Yayımlandı’, Milliyet, 3 Nov. 2007.

44. See S.G. Ayman, ‘Bir Guvenlik Sorunsalı Olarak Turk–Amerikan _Iliskilerinde Irak Cıkmazı’, in S.G.

Ayman (ed.), Irak Cıkmazı: Turkiye Acısından Temel Parametreler (_Istanbul: Bo�gazici Universitesi-

TUS_IAD, 2008), pp.71–2.

45. _I. Uzgel, ‘So�guk Savas Sonrasında Turkiye–ABD _Iliskilerinde Bolgesel _Isbirli�gi Alanları’, in Oran

(ed.), Turk Dıs Politikası, Cilt II: 1980–2001, p.265.

46. Cetinsaya, ‘Tarihsel Perspektifte Turkiye–_Iran _Iliskileri ve Nukleer Sorun’, p.44.

47. Ibid., s.25.

48. Radikal, 3 Feb. 2007.

49. G. Alpkaya, ‘_Insan Hakları Konusu’, in Oran (ed.), Turk Dıs Politikası, Cilt II: 1980–2001, p.197.

50. Ibid., p.529.

51. F. _Ilkiz, ‘Yeniden Terorle Mucadele Kanunu Tasarısı’, http://www.bianet.org/bianet/kategori/

bianet/76650/yeniden-terorle-mucadele-kanunu-tasarisi (26 March 2006).

52. For the reports of European Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession, see http://

ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidatecountries/turkey/key_documents_en.htm.

53. See Alpkaya, ‘_Insan Hakları Konusu’, pp.533–4.

54. See ‘The 1999 Progress Report’, pp.8–9.

55. See ‘The 2001 Progress Report’, p.29.



58. ‘DTP’ye Kapatma Davası’, BBC Turkish, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2007/11/

071116_dtp_prosecutor.shtml (10 Sept. 2008).

940 J. Karakoc


59. ‘AB’yle Troyka Bulusması’, BBC Turkish, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2007/11/071

120_turkey_eu.shtml (10 Aug. 2008).

60. ‘Avrupa’dan DTP Cıkısı: Kapatma _Ihtimalinden Endise Duyuyoruz, Zaman, 4 Oct. 2008.



63. See ‘The 2002 Regular Report’, pp.41–2.







70. M. Gunter, ‘United States Foreign Policy Toward The Kurds’, in L.I. Meho (ed.), The Kurdish

Question in U.S. Foreign Policy, A Documentary Sourcebook (London: Praeger, 2004), p.4.

71. Meho (ed.), The Kurdish Question in U.S. Foreign Policy, pp.252–3.

72. Ibid., pp.404–5.

73. B. Tanor, Turkiye’de Demokratiklesme Perspektifleri (_Istanbul: TUS_IAD, 1997), pp.145–52.

74. See Kurdish Human Rights Project, http://www.khrp.org/content/view/15/29/ (10 Sept. 2008).

75. See http://www.khrp.org/component/page,shop.product_details/flypage,shop.flypage/product_id,

102/category_id,10/manufacturer_id,0/option,com_virtuemart/Itemid,36/ (14 Sept. 2008)

76. Z. Do�gan and D. Zarakolu, ‘Turk Dıs Politikasında Etnik Orgutlerin Yeri’, in S.C. Mazlum and

E. Do�gan (eds.) Sivil Toplum ve Dıs Politika (_Istanbul: Ba�glam, 2006), p.131.

77. K. Yıldız and K. Duzgoren, AB Yolunda Turkiye (_Istanbul: Bumerang-KHRP, 2002), http://

www.khrp.org/documents/turkish/korayduzgoren.doc (14 Sept. 2008).

78. R. Ballı, Kurt Dosyası (_Istanbul: Cem, 1991), pp.592–593.

79. See Institut Kurde de Paris, http://www.institutkurde.org/institut/ddhomme.php (20 Aug. 2008).

80. Ibid.

81. Taraf, 5 June 2008.

82. See ‘Kurt Sorunu _Ilanı Dısislerini Kızdırdı’, CNN Turk, 22 May 2008.

83. B. Guvenc et al., Turk _Islam Sentezi Dosyası (_Istanbul: Sarmal, 1991), pp.50–52.

84. Y. Taskın, ‘Milliyetci Sivil Toplum Kuruluslarının Turk Kimli�gini Turk Dunyası Olce�ginde Yeniden

Tanımlama Cabaları ve Dıs Politika Gundemine Etkileri’, in Mazlum and Do�gan (eds.), Sivil Toplum

ve Dıs Politika, p.182.

85. See E. Ozdalga, ‘The Hidden Arab: A Critical Reading of the Notion of ‘‘Turkish Islam’’’, Middle

Eastern Studies, Vol.42 (2006), pp.551–2.

86. M. Aydın, ‘Kafkasya ve Orta Asya’yla _Iliskiler’, in Oran (ed.), Turk Dıs Politikası, Cilt II: 1980–

2001, pp.370–80.

87. Ibid., p.388.

88. ‘Turkce Konusan Devletler Toplulu�gu Kuralım’, Zaman, 18 Nov. 2007.

89. _I.G. _Imset, PKK, Ayrılıkcı Siddetin 20 Yılı (Ankara: Turkish Daily News, 1993), p.345.

90. Aydın, ‘Kafkasya ve Orta Asya’yla _Iliskiler’, p.400.

91. B. Oran, ‘Tutmayın O Zaman Turkiye’yi’, Radikal _Iki, 14 Sept. 2008.

92. ‘Azerilere Gore Erivan Ziyareti Hata Olur’, http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/458034.asp (2 Sept.

2008).

93. ‘Babacan: Ermenistan’la _Iliskiler Normallesmeli’, http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/467032.asp (24

Nov. 2008).

94. R. Olson, ‘Turkish and Russian Foreign Policies, 1991–1997: The Kurdish and Chechnya Questions’,

Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol.18 (1998), pp.212–13.

95. See http://www.asam.org.tr/tr/misyon.asp (12 Sept. 2008).

96. See G. Aktan, ‘Kurt Sorunu’, Radikal, 16 June 2004.

97. See D. Daverde, ‘Barzani’ye Guvenilmez’, Cumhuriyet Strateji, 20 Oct. 2008.

98. For an example, see N. Macit, ‘Etnisite ve Siyasi Boluculuk’, Cumhuriyet Strateji, 24 Dec. 2007.

99. For an example, see G.K. Yasın, ‘Bulgaristan Siyasetinde Turkler’, Cumhuriyet Strateji, 13 June

2005.

100. In this context, the articles published in ‘Cumhuriyet Strateji’ (a TUSAM publication) and in the

internet site of TUSAM can be seen.



101. ‘AB’nin Kurtce E�gitim ve TV Dayatması’, Press Release, 4 Dec. 2000, http://www.turkocagi.org.tr/

modules.php?name¼Makale&pa¼showpage&pid¼65 (20 Oct. 2008).

102. See N. Gurgur, ‘Etnik Fitnenin Anatomisi’, http://www.turkocagi.org.tr/modules.php?name¼Basyazi&file¼article&sid¼102 (26 Oct. 2008); O. Yeniceri, ‘Kuresellesme icin AB’ye Teslim Olmak’,

http://www.turkocagi.org.tr/modules.php?name¼Makale&pa¼showpage&pid¼3 (27 Oct. 2008).

103. See Tanıl Bora, ‘Ordu ve Milliyetcilik’, in A. _Insel and A. Bayramo�glu (eds.), Bir Zumre, Bir Parti,

Turkiye’de Ordu (_Istanbul: Birikim, 2004), pp.163–78.

104. See Article 118 of Turkish Contitution.

105. A. Bayramo�glu, ‘Asker ve Siyaset’, in A. _Insel and A. Bayramo�glu (eds.), Bir Zumre, Bir Parti,

Turkiye’de Ordu, pp.109–10.

106. G. Ozcan, ‘Turkiye Dıs Politikasında Olusum Sureci’, in F. Sonmezo�glu (ed.), Turk Dıs Politikasının

Analizi (_Istanbul: Der, 2004), p.856.

107. Bayramo�glu, ‘Asker ve Siyaset’, pp.89–90.

108. Ozcan, ‘Turkiye Dıs Politikasında Olusum Sureci’, pp.856–7.

109. See MGK Genel Sekreterli�gi, ‘MGK toplantılarının basın bildirileri’, http://www.mgk.gov.tr (1 Oct.

2008).

110. See http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2002/29ocak2002.html (2 Oct. 2008).

111. See http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildirileri2008.htm (29 Oct. 2008).

942 J. Karakoc


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