measuring corruption in latam

8/11/2019 Measuring Corruption in LATAM

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MEASURING CORRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA

Introduction

Corruption, according to the World Bank, is one the major challenges facing humanity as a whole (The

World Bank, Governance 2009). It is also considered one of the most important obstacles to economic

growth and social equity, draining scarce resources away from public services and infrastructure projects

creating deep market `imperfections (Payne & Nassar, 2005), perpetuating what some might deem as

convenient inefficiencies [those who benefit from it] ,and preventing population from access to a

transparent system of governance.

The Copenhagen Consensus of 2003 a multidisciplinary effort lead by renown experts who considered

welfare economics to establish the priorities international policy making must tackle in times of scarcity-

(Lomborg, 2004) provides the support for another and more widely known international effort: the UN

Millennium Development goals (ibid), which covers 8 areas, such as the end poverty and hunger, universal

education, child and maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, and global partnership. However, if nations lack

the foundations and mechanisms for development -one of them being control of corruption- then the UN

objectives will, presumably, be harder to reach or take longer. This paper covers the problem of

corruption in Latin America and the importance of measuring it.

Scope.-

Initially this study was expected to include how businesses can avoid getting involved in situations where

illegal payments are required -identifying what the most common ways of corruption are-, but after

further consideration it was apparent that battling corruption has much more to do with the economics

that play in this game, effective incentives to play by the rules, prevention of cases of corruption, and

good enforcement mechanisms. The main focus of this paper will be how to measure corruption in the

Latin American region in terms of monetary lost for the actors involved, and which one of those actors

could and should put more pressure to demand effective controls. The basic analysis methods employed

for this study are observation and statistical interpretation, for which trends, reports, and surveys will be

used.


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Defining corruption

Transparency international and the World Bank have adopted the following broad definition: it is the

abuse of entrusted power for private gain (TI, FAQ, 2009; The World Bank, 2009). This is a pretty general

definition, but it seems to include most forms of corruption, and indicates the participation of at least two

willing actors, usually -but not always- including public officials. According to the Council of Europe, there

is "no precise definition [that] can be found, which applies to all forms, types and degrees of corruption, or

which would be acceptable universally as covering all acts which are considered in every jurisdiction as

contributing to corruption(The World Bank/Kaufmann et al., 2009) (we could replace found for agreed

upon, since as we will see it later- it is a more adequate statement). The point is that, like in most

definitions of corruption, it places the public sector at the center of the phenomenon.

Why is it a perennial problem in Latin America?

There are certain elements shared by many Latin American public administrations that seem to make it so.

Luo Yadong (2002), International Business professor at the University of Miami, groups those elements

into 3 basic categories:

Inadequate laws: It means that the scope of most laws is limited; they do not protect certain

sensitive areas such extractive industries but protect a few interest groups, include many

exceptions and confusing sometimes contradictory- rules. Stakeholders are not well informed

about the law, and existing controls are weak and/or inadequately funded.

Disrespect for the law: Even if the states provide good pieces of legislation, few seem to comply

with them. There are not real mechanisms for enforcing the law. Many businesses, public officials

and general public show irreverence for both the laws and the authorities in charge of their

enforcement.

Impunity: Judicial systems workonly for those who have no influences and no money whatsoever,

but they are more flexible for people close to the government or people in positions of power.

Yadong also identifies 6 essential characteristics of the nature of corruption:

1. Corruption is illegal. Rules -national, regional, or international- are broken in the process.

2. Corruption is intentional. There is a motivation for the parties involved; something valuable to

them to be gained.

3. Corruption is perceptual. People see corruption within their own cultural contexts and assess the

seriousness of the situation accordingly.


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4. Corruption is contextual. It means its dynamic; it can change its shape and form with time,

technology, and social movements.

5. Corruption is power related. At least one of the parties is in a position of power or influence.

6. Corruption is covert, which makes any measurement to be based on perceptions, therefore the

data available contains wide standard errors and low degrees of confidence .or in non-statistical

words, inaccuracies.

Parties involved: the actors.-

Most studies and analysis regarding corruption in the world, (TI, 2009; The World Bank, Governance

Matters, 2009; Attila/NUPI, 2008; The World Bank, 2009, The World Bank Institute/Kaufmann et.al, 2004)

identify the following actors:

Government systems and government officials,

Businesses, (the first two are the leading actors)

Population, in their role as concerned citizens and affected consumers of public services,

International organizations, that supervise that systems provide a plain level field for all actors,

and encourage fair game.

The data reviewed considers the effects of corruption on governments, businesses and the general public

in terms of economic growth (GDP), potential economic growth and potential loss, impact of corruption

on growth, market dynamics, prices, and a few other areas of concern.

Type of data available for Measuring Corruption in LATAM

Most of the data available for this paper is the subjective or perceptive type (Attila/NUPI, 2008, p.7).

Perceptions are not the best way to measure, but in most cases it is the only way (The World Bank /

Kaufmann et.al, Myths and Realities, 2006). The main problem found with subjective data is that it can be

unreliable, induce to measurement errors, and their standard deviations are harder to account for (The

World Bank / Kaufmann et.al, 2006). In this paper we will use a World Banksstudy that accounts for the

standard error variations of several surveys and reports, with the aim to reduce differences among them

to a minimum (Attila/NUPI, ibid).

Why do we care to measure corruption if the WB report is based on surveys? Corruption represents a

leakage of resources (Sampford, 2006). We can observe four important goals of measuring corruption:

international institutions affected by corrupt practices try to keep pressure on all actors involved -or


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allegedly involved- and demand changes; countries and IFIs can tie international aid and cooperation to

improvements of the indexes of governance (Francesco and Gold, 2005); these reports also help

determine country risk, vital for international companies and financial institutions (TI, 2009), and people

are interested to know what their governments are doing to fight this phenomenon in order to reward or

punish them during elections (wherever and whenever they are held).

Which party seems to be most affected?

They are all affected by it (Parker and Cutler, 2009), but at different levels. Investment decisions,

international cooperation funds, and attitudes toward political systems are some stands based in great

part on perceptions (Payne and Nassar, 2005). The paper will cover some hard (or objective) data and

contrast them with some expertsestimates of potential gains/losses, as well as more informal surveys

that asked international business managers what their estimates were about opportunities lost to

dishonest competitors, price increases, etc. However, it is important to remark that the effects are not just

a matter of monetary amounts, but also of opportunities lost, which are much harder to estimate

(WPF/Bensacon, 2003). We will also see a simplified model of the cycle of corruption to try to determine

where it can be cut, which actor(s) has more chances to pressure for changes and succeed, at what stage

of the cycle, and how.

Sensitive industries.-

The U.S. Department of Justice (FCPA, 1998; Parker, 2009) has identified the following areas and industries

as the most prone to corrupt practices:

Telecommunications

Infrastructure

Energy

Agriculture

Service

As we can see, these are industries where big money is involved. A few of the most famous cases of

companies being processed by the U.S. authorities within the frame of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

are Siemmens, a few former Alcatel executives, Willbros, CCI executives -all of them found in Latin

America- and others (Parker, 2009). In some of these investigations, the European Union is collaborating


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and working together with the American authorities to determine responsibilities, prosecute wrong doers

and increase fines (Moran, 2006).

Common corruption practices

The most common types of corruption practices observed (Francesco and Gold, 2005, p.55) not just in

Latin America but all over the world, are:

Briberythat means paying to an authority or person of influence to gain access to a service / contract /

or something the company does not have chances to obtain on its own merits or in due process.

Lubrication paymentsit occurs when companies pay government officials in order to expedite a process

the company expects to receive anyways. Most international conventions deal with the first kind and

leave the second one in a gray area.

Expected Gains and calculations behind corruption.-

According to a study of the University of Texas at Austin (2005), about law and democracy in Latin

America, the reasoning of the parties involved behind a corruption case goes something like this: those

involved in corrupt dealings expect to gain something: money (either directly or indirectly), access to a

contract, avoid or eliminate competition, etc. However, there are also risks involved such transactions: if

they are caught, parties can be fined, executives can go to jail, the corporate image and reputation

deteriorates, sales, shares value and profits might go down, etc.

The logical countermeasure means decreasing opportunities for gain and, at the same time, increasing

penalties for those engaged in corruption and reducing the margin of benefit. The main problem is how to

do it effectively.

Anti-Corruption Legal Framework

Part of the legal framework that applies in Latin America includes:

- The UN Convention against Corruption entered into force in 2005 (Parker et al. 2009). It has 140

signatories and represents the first legally binding international anti-corruption agreement that

prompts all state members to promote preventive measures, criminalize acts of corruption,

improve enforcement mechanisms and supports international cooperation through technical and

financial support. When reviewing the text of the convention, we find that most reservations from

governments focus on the option to settle disputes between 2 or more states in the International


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Court of Justice, and the articles that refer to extradition. That is an area of international law not

developed in this study.

- The OAS Inter-American Convention against corruption approved in 1996 is the first Latin

American regional effort to address the issue of corruption (OAS, 2004). In comparison to the UN

convention, the OAS does account for monitoring and complete compliance assessment systems

(Moran, 2006), but judging by the perception of corruption in Latin America, we could say that its

implementation has been very ineffective.

- The OECDsConvention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials (ibid) came into effect in 1999

and is formedmostly- by developed nations that account for more than 70% of the world trade.

The convention deals almost exclusively with active corruption, that is, when a company

approaches government officials, and not the other way around. The OECD monitors its members

by reviewing local legislations and assessing the effectiveness of their applications. An interesting

aspect of this convention is the narrow definition of the government officials they employ, since it

covers exclusively government officials, but not their families, relatives, or business interest. That

is a big loophole. We could also say that OECD countries use a peer-pressure kind of control to

sanction cases of corruption, but have no real mechanisms of enforcement.

- As for the US, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (ibid) is very current today. It covers US companies

and some foreign ones that issue stocks in the US. The act criminalizes bribery of foreign

government officials, but also presents the same narrow definition the OECD has (US DOJ/FCPA).

Yet, some recent trends show more investigations being underway, more aggressive prosecutions,

larger penalties, parallel international investigations and litigations, and the introduction of the

non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements and voluntary disclosures after audits. We

can expect to hear more about the reach and activities of the FCPA in the world (Moran, 2006).

An interesting aspect of the law is the supplementary literature and series of guidelines available to

international businesses that include much more areas of concern than those in the conventions and local

laws. Some of those guidelines, like the OECD informal guideline for multinational enterprises, do include

the monitoring and responsibility of third parties , lobbies, legal representatives, family and relatives of

government officials as people and agencies of interest (OECD, Anti-corruption guidelines); however these

are just voluntary guidelines to follow and carry no legal force.

Moreover, despite all the rules and laws, we have surveys that show that about 50% of respondents

consider that corruption is still a significant obstacle to doing business in the region (Tillen and Ellis, 2009),


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about 80% say these laws are just not effective, and 70% think they have lost business to competitors who

made illicit payments (ibid). Some surveys show that those whom are subject to the FCPA (US DOJ, 2009),

only 18% said it was effective. Clearly, there is a gap between law and enforcement.

Measuring Corruption against other indexes

One more objective way to measure the importance of corruption control is to find the correlation

between Corruption Indexes and the global competitiveness index, the UN Human Development index,

etc. In statistics, correlation is the relationship between two variables during a period of time, especially

one that shows a close match between the variables' movements (Harvey/Financial Dictionary,

correlation). For correlation to occur, the factors that affect those two variables have to be equivalent or

similar. The presumption is that if richer countries, on average, have less reported corruption and better

functioning governments, then countries with widespread corruption should be poorer and have

inefficient governments. The Global competitiveness Index produced by the World Bank should show a

significant correlation with anti-corruption practices.

Measuring the Impact of Corruption in Latin AmericaGlobal Competitiveness Ranking 2009

2008-2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000

Country/Economy Rank Score Rank Score RankScor

eRan

kScor

eRan

kScor

eRan

kScor

eRan

kScor

eRan

kScor

eRan

kScor

eRan

kScor

e

Argentina 85 3.91 88

3.87 85 3.87 69 4.01 72 3.56 74 3.54 78 63 53 45

Bolivia 120 3.42 118

3.42 105 3.55 97 3.46 101 3.06 98 3.09 85 78 75 58

Brazil 56 4.23 64

4.13 72 3.99 66 4.03 65 3.69 57 4.05 54 46 30 31

Chile 30 4.70 28

4.72 26 4.77 27 4.85 23 4.91 22 5.01 28 20 29 26

Colombia 69 4.05 69

4.05 69 4.04 65 4.04 57 3.84 64 3.84 63 56 56 48

Costa Rica 55 4.25 59

4.23 63 4.11 53 4.25 64 3.72 50 4.12 51 43 50 43

DominicanRepublic 95 3.75 98

3.72 96 3.65 83 3.75 102 3.05 72 3.63 62 52 59

Ecuador 105 3.56 104

3.58 103 3.57 90 3.67 103 3.01 90 3.18 86 73 72 57

El Salvador 77 4.02 79

3.99 67 4.05 61 4.09 56 3.86 53 4.1 48 57 64 51

Guatemala 80 3.96 84

3.94 87 3.86 75 3.91 97 3.12 80 3.38 89 70 69

Honduras 89 3.86 82

3.98 83 3.89 93 3.58 93 3.18 97 3.1 94 76 74

Mexico 60 4.19 60

4.23 52 4.26 58 4.18 55 3.92 48 4.17 47 45 51 42

Nicaragua 115 3.44 120

3.41 111 3.45 95 3.52 99 3.08 95 3.12 90 75 71

Panama 59 4.21 58

4.24 59 4.18 57 4.18 73 3.55 58 4.01 59 50 48

Paraguay 124 3.35 124

3.4 121 3.3 106 3.33 113 2.8 100 2.99 95 72 70

Peru 78 4.01 83

3.95 86 3.87 74 3.94 68 3.66 67 3.78 57 54 63 49

Uruguay 65 4.10 75

4.04 75 3.97 73 3.96 54 3.93 54 4.08 50 42 46

Venezuela 113 3.48 105

3.56 98 3.63 88 3.69 89 3.22 85 3.3 82 68 66 54

Source:World Economic Forum,2009


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The complete version of the Global competitiveness index evaluates what the World Bank calls Quality of

Governance: Rule of Law, Control of corruption, Government Effectiveness, and Regulatory System

(WBI/Kaufmann et. al, 2004; World Economic Forum, 2009). For the purpose of this analysis we will only

see the control of corruption index for a sample of Latin America countries. As the graphic below shows,

Chile, which ranks 30 in the world for the period 2008-2009, leads the region -consistently in time- in its

efforts to fight corruption. Many positions later we have Costa Rica, Brazil and Mexico (the first two

showing big improvements and Mexico a setback); then the rest of the Latin American countries, and at

the bottom of the list, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Paraguay.

Global Competitiveness Graphic - Ranking 2009

Source: The World Bank, 2009

If we now see the results of the quality of governance element considered by the World Bank , namely

CONTROL OF CORRUPTION, we also see Chile leading the region (in this case, the higher the ranking the

better), followed by Uruguay and again Costa Rica close to the top. At the bottom of the ranking we see

again Venezuela, Paraguay and Nicaragua.

Control of Corruption

World Bank 2009

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Argentina

Bolivia

Brazil

Chile

Colombia

Costa Rica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Mexico

Nicaragua

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

Uruguay

Venezuela

Count ry 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008ARGENTINA 47 31 43 44 44 44 42 40

BOLIVIA 35 22 22 23 25 36 39 38

BRAZIL 60 53 60 58 52 53 54 58

CHILE 92 92 86 91 90 91 90 87

COLOMBIA 35 40 43 51 54 54 52 50

COSTA RICA 80 77 75 68 67 66 67 70

CUBA 51 52 49 48 49 50 55 56

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 42 42 36 36 31 32 30 32

ECUADOR 20 12 25 24 20 20 18 23

EL SALVADOR 44 41 50 51 50 56 57 51

GUATEMALA 33 34 31 36 30 25 26 28

HONDURAS 28 25 29 28 31 25 30 21

MEXICO 45 50 53 46 44 46 48 50

NICARAGUA 20 36 41 43 35 28 23 21

PANAMA 39 44 48 49 42 43 47 54

PARAGUAY 5 4 5 8 7 10 14 17

PERU 49 51 55 47 45 50 49 49

URUGUAY 76 79 80 77 80 80 82 84

VENEZUELA 30 9 10 15 15 15 10 9


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Control of Corruption Graphic World Bank 2009

We cannot make a statistical analysis of correlation between these two sets of data because this data does

not follow a comparable trend: one is positive if it goes up, and the other is positive if it goes down. But it

is obvious, at least at the very top and at the very bottom, that the rankings of the Latin American

countries are consistent in time and in trends. Instead of using the World Bank index for control of

corruption, we will have to use Transparency International index, which does follow a comparable

[positive] trend.

These results show the performance of many Latin American states in two areas where perception plays

an important role in determining the rankings.

Correlation Competitiveness and Transparency International Index


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The initial assumption that there is a direct correlation between the control of corruption and

competitiveness is proven statistically wrong. As we can see, there are wide distortions between what TI

perceives and measures as being the trend of a corrupt country and what the UN considers to be a

competitive country. For example, Venezuela shows an upward trend in competitiveness while its

corruption index goes the opposite direction. The same happens with Brazil, the Dominican Republic,

Honduras, and Mexico. In general, there is a negative correlation (high degree of independence) between

these two measured factors for the period 2002-2007 that would lead to the presumption that the weight

given by the UN to corruption in its the competitiveness index is very small.

The next chart shows the existing correlation between the corruption index and GDP per capita. Both

follow the same scoring direction, so the application of statistics is possible. Again, we have to use the

Transparency International index since the World Bank ranks many countries in the same position (it can

distort the data).

Correlation Transparency International Index and GDP Per Capita

Source: Transparency International, 2009; The Swivel: GDP by Country

The assumption used here is that if there is an improvement in the TI index, then GDP will also increase,

and vice versa. However in all cases we see an increase of the GDP independently of the TI Index. Brazil

and Venezuela -for example- show a constant decrease in their TI indexes; however their GDPs have gone

significantly up, which explains the large negative correlation. The opposite can be said about Uruguay,

Paraguay, El Salvador or Guatemala. With such extreme results, it is not surprise that the general


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correlation falls within the smallest range (minus point 5 - 8 negative, close to no correlation between

these two sets of data).

As a side note, we must remember that correlation does not imply causation, just relationship. Other

factors can help explain the wide differences among indexes, such volume of products and services

traded, price fluctuations, high demand from trade partners, weight given to the element of corruption in

an index, etc.

Expected Effects of Improving TI Indexes on GDP

A final chart is based on Graf Lambsdorff (2003) findings that an improvement in a countrys Transparency

International (TI study) corruption score by 1 point increases productivity by 4 % of the GDP and increases

net capital annual inflows by .5%, though these extrapolations must not be taken literally (CATO

Institute/Al-Sadig, 2006). Here we combine current and projected GDP data with what Lambsdorff says: If

LATAM makes the effort to improve its control of corruption index by one point in 2009 and another point

2010, the gains in terms of GDP could reach 158 and 162 billion dollars respectively, which represents

ALMOST the total Chilean economy, and surpasses that of the combined economies of Nicaragua,

Honduras, Jamaica, El Salvador, and Bolivia. But we must admit that even gaining fractions of a point are

difficult if conditions remain the same. The question is how we change those conditions.

Lambsdorff Improving TI Index Effect on GDP


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In the search for valid information regarding the measurement of corruption, we find a wide gap between

perception studies and objective data. However, it is important to mention again that when analyzing an

illegal activity, perceptions from the actors involved and the general population are the only indicators we

have to work with.

These pieces of information give us a good idea of where to look and what the impact of corruption actors

seem to have. For example, businesses that do pay bribes to government officials see a cost increase of

about 10% according to a survey of executives (Tillen and Ellis, 2009). We must also ask ourselves, who

ends up paying the tab? Market imperfections are not just the result of international cartels but of price

increases to cover the cost of bribing(Business & Leadership, 2009). When we see that about 70% of the

surveyed executives consider they have lost businesses to competition involved in corrupt practices

(Transparency International/Enderle, 2002), we can conclude that certain industries, certain groups,

certain monopolies and oligopolies are being protected. To these questions we must add one about how

many jobs are not being created, or what long-term effects do the losing companies have to face. When

some researches calculate that 1 point increase in the corruption index reduces Foreign Direct

Investments inflows for up to 11% (Lambsdorff, 2003), we should ask ourselves how many schools,

hospitals, roads, and sanitation projects are not being built and how many people will ultimately suffer

from the lack of that investment. In the end we all pay the price of corruption.

Cycle of Corporate Corruption

This is a simple model of the cycle of international business corruption most frequently seen in nations

such those is Latin American, where the quality governance is very poor.

ernationalBusiness

orru

ption


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In an environment with lack of controls and accountability, we see how international companies, directly

or through their agents, contact certain government officials to make a DEAL. The deal can be anything:

from access to contracts or information, to building barriers for competitors. Since all these dealings are

made behind doors, people in the exterior do not knowabout it until later when they start to feel the

effects.

Once the bribers and the bribees get together, the deal is reached and starts working, the first effects are:

public service users see more deficiencies, competitors lose access or find it more difficult to gain access

to resources and contracts, IFIS lose control of their funds and investments that are now being used

somewhere else and do not reach the intended population, among others.

These results deepen even further the problem of corruption, deteriorating the countrys image,

perpetuating or imposing new market imperfections, extending inefficiencies to the whole system, and

harming governance and the political structure. In such environment, it is expected that corrupt cases will

sprout and be repeated over and over again.

Where can this cycle be cut?

It is hard for the actors to fight corruption on their own since impunity is the rule and not the exception in

the system; but since they are the most affected by corruption, constant pressure, shared information,

and other coordinated efforts could at least help make public some cases and expose companies to

international and local laws that have jurisdiction over them.

Cycle

ofInternational

nessCorruption


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What does the data available tell us? The data tells us that we have available some serious and well

structured reports about corruption, and others not so structured. Yet, it is important to keep monitoring

causes and effects of international business corruption and see how they impact and change the

mechanisms employed. These reports also help focus the attention of enforcement authorities to certain

areas, certain countries, and certain systems and help to keep pressure on governments, companies, and

individuals. The assumption that economic growth is closely related to the degree of control of corruption

cannot be completely rejected: correlation is just a statistical measure used to demonstrate the degree of

dependence between two variables or sets of data. We have to go after qualitative unstructured

measurements and perceptions to determine the real scope of corruption.

About the third question, in the case of businesses, heavy fines to deter corruption practices must go hand

in hand with awards for not falling into that vicious cycle; a new international standard or recognized

certification effort could lead to favoring these companies over others IF other regular conditions (price,

quality, environment friendliness etc) are equally met. Adding this element into the mix of requirements

could encourage more private sector participation.

In the case of population, effective pressure on their governments might be limited to their political rights

and the quality of information they receive. Elections do not equal full participation in a democratic

process, but those who are able to express their concerns must keep pointing at the problems. NGOs, the

media, and the international community must show support to these efforts to improve governance and

accountability.

Businesses involved in corrupt practices might seem to be protected, as long as enforcement is not

adequately implemented; but for their competitors -all those businesses losing contracts and

opportunities due to behind the doors deals- the prospect of denouncing them must be taken into serious

consideration. The FCPA and OECD are showing signs of more dynamism, but they still have to include

many suggestions that are part of informal guidelines developed by themselves and other organizations,

such as whistleblower protection programs (TI Business Principles for Countering Bribes, 2003; OECD Anti-

Corruption Guidelines for Multinational enterprises, 2004).

For governments and international organizations and institutions, those countries that do not improve

their anti-corruption ranking and which have signed international agreements, should be subject to real

penalties. The problem is that, from an international cooperation point of view, those penalties could

further deteriorate the conditions of the population. In such dilemma, the answer could be found by


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having a closer control and oversight of the projects financed with international funds, and conditioning

other kinds of aid to governance improvements.

In summary, corruption is unsustainable. In the long run, everybody benefits from corruption-free

environments; companies that engage in these illicit practices need to find out their own weaknesses to

survive in markets where corruption is kept to a minimum or it doesnt exist. For the people and mid-level

public managers, economic growth generates better living conditions, reducing the temptation to request

or receive bribes, efficiency goes up, paperwork, time, costs, etc are reduced, and the new efficiencies

liberate valuable human resources that can do more productive tasks. Only those who are used to making

millions from their power positions will miss the old chaos. We would expect severe consequences for

these scoundrels.

Finally, we can spend more time and efforts trying to establish the real magnitude of the problem and put

a monetary value on corruption, but in the mean time no practical solutions are seriously considered. A

problem as big as this need to be dealt with all the tools and mechanisms possible and known at once, and

in order to do that we might as well turn to the basics: reward the good, and punish the bad. No middle

grounds allowed.


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