admin cases - iii. a.4. test delegation

7/27/2019 Admin Cases - III. a.4. Test Delegation

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4. TEST DELEGATION

A. Completeness Test

G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922 THE UNITED STATE vs.ANG TANG HO

Facts: The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868, entitled

"An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and

speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary

circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof,

and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of

the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and

regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this

purpose," with one of its salient provisions, Section

1,authorizing the governor-General whenever, for anycause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in

the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with

the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and

emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this

Act. Thus, on August 1, 1919, the Governor-General signed

EO 53, fixing the price of rice. On August 6, 1919, Ang Tang

Ho was caught selling a ganta of rice at the price of eighty

centavos, a price higher than that fixed by EO 53. Defendant

was found guilty and now assails the constitutionality of the

Act 2868 for invalid delegation of legislative powers.

Issue: Won Act 2868 is unconstitutional?

Held: Yes. When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of

the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes

the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell

rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the

sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and

what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was

and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay,

rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix

the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to

grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should

be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be

enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law

should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or

define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary

rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify

or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should

be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was

committed.

A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when

it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and

nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or

other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in

form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but

which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon

the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event

By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the

Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to

make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or

any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative

power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and

within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the

Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the

law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law.

There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other

hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not

a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it

a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the

Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative

power, is unconstitutional and void

G.R. No. 159357 April 28, 2004

Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE

SOCIETY

FACTS: SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the

RTC-Manila against Velarde and together with His Eminence,

Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother

Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as co-

respondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought the

interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically

on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory

judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious

leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging

or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified

candidate.

The subsequent proceedings were recounted in the

challenged Decision in these words:


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"x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the original

period [to file an Answer], a Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently,

Executive Minister Erao Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde, filed

their Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal

L. Sin, filed a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an Answer

within the extended period and similarly prayed for thedismissal of the Petition. All sought the dismissal of the

Petition on the common grounds that it does not state a

cause of action and that there is no justiciable controversy.

They were ordered to submit a pleading by way of

advisement, which was closely followed by another Order

denying all the Motions to Dismiss. Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro.

Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo moved

to reconsider the denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin,

asked for extension to file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli

Soriano complied with the first Order by submitting his

Memorandum. x x x.

"x x x the Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the

Motions for Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro.

Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo, which

raised no new arguments other than those already

considered in the motions to dismiss x x x."9

After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it

had jurisdiction over the Petition, because "in praying for a

determination as to whether the actions imputed to the

respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the

Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only a question of

law."10 It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue

raised in the Petition the separation of church and state

even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the

principle. Through its discourse, the court a quo opined at

some point that the "[e]ndorsement of specific candidates in

an election to any public office is a clear violation of the

separation clause."

After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court

failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision.

Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for

Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by

the lower court.

Hence, this Petition for Review.

Issue: W/N the RTC Decision conformed to the form and

substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules

of Court

HELD: NO. The Constitution commands that "[n]o decision

shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein

clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is

based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration

of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or

denied without stating the basis therefor." The following test

of completeness may be applied. First, the parties should

know their rights and obligations. Second, they should know

how to execute the decision under alternative contingencies.

Third, there should be no need for further proceedings to

dispose of the issues. Fourth, the case should be terminated

by according the proper relief. The "proper relief" usually

depends upon what the parties seek in their pleadings. It may

declare their rights and duties, command the performance of

positive prestations, or order them to abstain from specific

acts. The disposition must also adjudicate costs.

A decision that does not conform to the form and substance

required by the Constitution and the law is void and deemed

legally inexistent. To be valid, decisions should comply with

the form, the procedure and the substantive requirements

laid out in the Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant

circulars/orders of the Supreme Court.

RODOLFO S. BELTRAN vs THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH

Facts: In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine

Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID) released its final report of

a study on the Philippine blood banking system entitled

Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood

Banking System. It was revealed that of the blood units

collected in 1992, 64.4 % were supplied by commercial blood

banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospital-

based blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based blood

banks ; showing that the Philippines heavily relied on

commercial sources of blood. It was further found, among

other things, that blood sold by persons to blood commercial

banks are three times more likely to have any of the four (4)

tested infections or blood transfusion transmissible diseases,


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namely, malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune

Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC.

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of

1994 was then enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act

seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by

promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood

banks in the country. One of the provisions of the said act

was the phasing out of commercial blood banks within 2

years from its effectivity.

Petitioners, comprising the majority of the Board of Directors

of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks assail the

constitutionality of RA 7719 on the ground among others that

it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative

power. According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete

when it was passed by the Legislature, and the latter failed to

fix a standard to which the Secretary of Health must conform

in the performance of his functions. Petitioners also contend

that the two-year extension period that may be granted by

the Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial

blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained the

Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of

legislative power.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719

CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

HELD: In testing whether a statute constitutes an unduedelegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire

whether the statute was complete in all its terms and

provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that

nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body

or any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature. Except

as to matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by rules

and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive

officers and administrative boards, an act of the Legislature,

as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does

not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the

administrative board may be guided in the exercise of thediscretionary powers delegated to it.

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of

1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the

Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the

health of the people and has mandated several measures to

attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of

commercial blood banks in the country. The law has

sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of

the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is,

the promotion of public health by providing a safe and

adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation.

By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority tothe Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised

under and in pursuance of the law.

The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act

No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act.

Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides

that the phase-out period for commercial blood banks shall

be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 based

on the result of a careful study and review of the blood

supply and demand and public safety. This power to

ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which

the Secretary may effect a period of extension for said phase-

out can be delegated by Congress. The true distinction

between the power to make laws and discretion as to its

execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of

power to make the law, which necessarily involves a

discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority

or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in

pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter

no valid objection can be made.

G.R. No. 102782 December 11, 1991

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN

A. MONSANTO, DAN R. CALDERON, and GRANDY N. TRIESTE

vs. THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the

MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG

Private petitioners urged the Supreme Court by asking who

should enforce the decision in the Gonong case, [G.R. No.

91023, promulgated on July 13, 1990, in which the Court held

that the confiscation of the license and license plates of

motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the

sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila

Commission - except for stalled vehicles per conditions laid

down by LOI 43].

This stemmed out when the Metropolitan Manila Authority

issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to

detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/


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unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or

obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."

In its Comment, the MMA defended its ordinance on the

ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred

upon it by EO 392 giving them a rule-making power by

making ordinances/resolutions.

Issue: Whether or not the MMA, through Ordinance No. 11,

has validly exercise a delegated legislative power.

Held: The measure in question is an enactment by one acting

only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts

of the agent must reflect and conform to the will of their

principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case,

we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid

down by the accepted principles governing municipal

corporations. To be valid: 1) must not contravene theConstitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or

oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must

not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be

unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with

public policy.

A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the

measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion

because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent

law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of

license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for trafficviolations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is

nothing in its provisions authorizing the Metropolitan Manila

Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to

impose such sanctions.

The requirement that the municipal enactment must not

violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions

are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of

legislative power from the national legislature (except only

that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to

levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are

mere agents vested with what is called the power of

subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the

local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all

times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the

enactments in question, which are merely local in origin,

cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and

effect of a statute.

B. Sufficient Standard Test

GR. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

Facts: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump

boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they

were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac

Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of Sec 1 of EO 626-A

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such

that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical

condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported

from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef

transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended

shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the

government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and

other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National

Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of

carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the

Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of

carabaos.

The petitioner sued for recovery and the Regional Trial Courtafter considering the merits of the case, sustained the

confiscation of the carabaos.

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is

unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation

of the animals without according the owner a right to be

heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed

by due process. There is also a challenge to the improper

exercise of the legislative power by the former President

under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate

Appellate Court, which upheld the trial court

Issue: Whether or not there is an invalid delegation of

legislative power

Held: We find that the challenged measure is an invalid

exercise of the police power because the method employed


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to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the

purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due

process is violated because the owner of the property

confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and

is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on

the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge theguilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on

judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of

separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid

delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned

therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the

distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

We also mark the questionable manner of the disposition of

the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned

executive order. It is there authorized that the seized

property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and

other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National

Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of

carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the

Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of

carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an

extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it

is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and

abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the

usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still,

the limitations that the said officers must observe when they

make their distribution. There is none. Their options are

apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate

beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall

they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the

answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they

see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there

is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority

that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from

overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore

invalid delegation of legislative powers

For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No.

626-A unconstitutional.

EMMANUEL PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR-GENERAL (GR No. L-

23825; Dec. 24, 1965)

FACTS: The President issued EO Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126

to 129 creating 33 municipalities purportedly under Sec 68 of

the Revised Administrative Code. Herein petitioner, VP of the

Philippines instituted the present civil action to against the

Auditor General to restrain him from passing in audit any

expenditure of public funds in implementation of said publicorders, questioning the validity of the Presidents authority to

issue such Executive Orders.

ISSUE: WON there was valid delegation of the legislative

power to create municipal corporations?

HELD: No. Although Congress may delegate to another

branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in

the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is

essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation

of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must

set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or

implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the

limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable

to which the delegate must conform in the performance of

his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of

policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such

policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the

aforementioned standard, there would be no means to

determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate

has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence,

he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only

to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake

it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to

be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the

principle of separation of powers and the system of checks

and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very

foundation of our Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet

these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the

power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does

not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by

the President.

Even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers,

as it certainly does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised

Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be

deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the

Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and

inconsistent with said statutory enactment. Hence, since


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January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became

effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries

altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress

or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a

majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the

"recommendation of the council of the municipality ormunicipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated. the

statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new

barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create

municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.

G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) vs. THE

HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA

Facts: Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation,

inadequate fiscal allocation for education, increased

emoluments for health workers, and wider coverage for full

value-added tax benefits - these are the reasons why

Republic Act No. 9337 (R.A. No. 9337) was enacted.

R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills

namely, House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill No.

1950.

Because of the conflicting provisions of the proposed bills the

Senate agreed to the request of the House of Representatives

for a committee conference. The Conference Committee on

the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill recommended the

approval of its report, which the Senate and the House of the

Representatives did.

The President signed into law the consolidated House and

Senate versions as Republic Act 9337. Before the law was to

take effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a temporary

restraining order enjoining government from implementing

the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and

prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.

Among others, Petitioners contend that Sections 4, 5, and 6

of R.A. No. 9337 constitute an undue delegation of legislative

power, in violation of Article VI, Section 28(2) of the

Constitution;

Issue: W/N

Held: In the present case, the challenged section of R.A. No.

9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6 which

reads as follows: That the President, upon the

recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective

January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve

percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has beensatisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage ofGross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous

year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2

4/5%); or

(ii) National government deficit as a percentage ofGDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-

half percent (1 %)

In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a

showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the

law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to

be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;41

and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently

determinate and determinable to which the delegate must

conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient

standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its

limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public

agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which

the legislative command is to be effected. Both tests are

intended to prevent a total transference of legislative

authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the

shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially

legislative.

A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of

power to make the laws which necessarily involves a

discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may

not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to

its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the

law, to which no valid objection can be made.

The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislativepower. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts

upon which enforcement and administration of the increase

rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made

the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006,

contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the

entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon

factual matters outside of the control of the executive.


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No discretion would be exercised by the President.

Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the

word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the

word shall connote a mandatory order. Its use in a statute

denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the

idea of discretion. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, itmust be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have

no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.

There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of

the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is

constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its

functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what

job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of

his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the

only way in which the legislative process can go forward.

FOR YOUR READING:

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the

three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance

of and is supreme in matters falling within its own

constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the

doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-

delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim:

potestas delegata non delegari potest which means "what

has been delegated, cannot be delegated."38 This doctrine isbased on the ethical principle that such as delegated power

constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the

delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment

and not through the intervening mind of another.

With respect to the Legislature, Section 1 of Article VI of the

Constitution provides that "the Legislative power shall be

vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of

a Senate and a House of Representatives." The powers which

Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are

strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely

legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been

described as the authority to make a complete lawcomplete

as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall

be applicable and to determine the expediency of its

enactment.40 Thus, the rule is that in order that a court may

be justified in holding a statute unconstitutional as a

delegation of legislative power, it must appear that the power

involved is purely legislative in nature that is, one

appertaining exclusively to the legislative department. It is the

nature of the power, and not the liability of its use or the

manner of its exercise, which determines the validity of its

delegation.

Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation of legislative

powers is subject to the following recognized limitations or

exceptions:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section

28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under

Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE

BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and

BATANGAS CITY MAYOR

G.R. No. 138810, September 29, 2004 (E)

FACTS: In July 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsodenacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to

construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas

City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is

authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates

specified therein, "provided, however, that any increase of

rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang

Panlungsod." Sometime in November 1993, petitioner

increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per

month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a

letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the

approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to

Resolution No. 210.

Petitioner then filed with the RTC (Batangas City, Branch 7) a

petition for injunction alleging that respondent Sangguniang

Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates

charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order

No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)


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has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the

Philippines. The trial court held that the enactment of

Resolution No. 210 by respondent violates the States

deregulation policy as set forth by then NTC Commissioner

Jose Luis A. Alcuaz in his Memorandum dated August 25,

1989. Also, it pointed out that the sole agency of thegovernment which can regulate CATV operation is the NTC,

and that the LGUs cannot exercise regulatory power over it

without appropriate legislation. Unsatisfied, respondents

elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where the latter

reversed and set aside the judgment of the RTC holding that

neither of the respondents has the power to fix the

subscriber rates of CATV operators, such being outside the

scope of the LGUs power. Petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether an LGU may regulate the subscriber rates

charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction.

HELD: NO. While Republic Act No. 7160, the Local

Government Code of 1991, extends to the LGUs the general

power (under cover of the General Welfare Clause) to

perform any act that will benefit their constituents,

nonetheless, it does not authorize them to regulate the CATV

operation. Pursuant to E.O. No. 205, only the NTC has the

authority to regulate the CATV operation, including the fixing

of subscriber rates. It must be noted that Resolution No. 210

is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national

legislature. Necessarily, its act must reflect and conform to

the will of its principal. To test its validity, the particular

requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted

principles governing municipal corporations must be applied.

Resolution No. 210, however, contravenes E.O. No. 205

insofar as it permits respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod to

usurp a power exclusively vested in the NTC, i.e., the power

to fix the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators.

The grant of regulatory power to the NTC is easilyunderstandable. CATV system is not a mere local concern.

The complexities that characterize this new technology

demand that it be regulated by a specialized agency. This is

particularly true in the area of rate-fixing. Rate fixing involves

a series of technical operations. Consequently, on the hands

of the regulatory body lies the ample discretion in the choice

of such rational processes as might be appropriate to the

solution of its highly complicated and technical problems.

Considering that the CATV industry is so technical a field, we

believe that the NTC, a specialized agency, is in a better

position than the LGU, to regulate it.

Speaking for the Court in the leading case of United States vs.

Abendan, Justice Moreland said: "An ordinance enacted by

virtue of the general welfare clause is valid, unless it

contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or

an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against

public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,

discriminating, or in derogation of common right." In De la

Cruz vs. Paraz,we laid the general rule "that ordinances

passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general

welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the

general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not

inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State."

G.R. No. 131082 June 19, 2000

ROMULO, MABANTA, BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE LOS

ANGELES vs. HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND

Facts: petitioner Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and

De Los Angeles (hereafter PETITIONER), a law firm, was

exempted for the period 1 January to 31 December 1995,

from the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage by respondent HDMF

because of a superior retirement plan.

The HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of

Republic Act No. 7742, issued Board Resolution No. 1011,

Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules and

Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended,

Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be

entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage, 3 it must

have a plan providing for both provident/retirement and

housing benefits superior to those provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund.

PETITIONER submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that

the Amendments to the Rules are invalid. In that the

amendments are void insofar as they abolished the

exemption granted by Section 19 of P.D. 1752, as amended.


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The repeal of such exemption involves the exercise of

legislative power, which cannot be delegated to HMDF.

HDMF disapproved PETITIONER's application on the ground

that the requirement that there should be both a provident

retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of the

phrase "and/or," and that the Rules Implementing R.A. No.

7742 did not amend nor repeal Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752

but merely implement the law. The respondent Board was

merely exercising its rule-making power under Section 13 of

P.D. No. 1752. It had the option to use "and" only instead of

"or" in the rules on waiver in order to effectively implement

the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. By choosing "and," the Board has

clarified the confusion brought about by the use of "and/or"

in Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended.

PETITIONER filed a petition for review before the Court of

Appeals but was dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not the board of HDMF exceeded its

delegated power

Held: The controversy lies in the legal signification of the

words "and/or."

It seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law

that Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 intended that an employer

with a provident plan or an employee housing plan superior

to that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If

the law had intended that the employee [sic] should have

both a superior provident plan and a housing plan in order to

qualify for exemption, it would have used the words "and"

instead of "and/or."

Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual

certification of waiver or suspension, that the features of the

plan or plans are superior to the fund or continue to be so.

The law obviously contemplates that the existence of either

plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an

exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of both plans

Guingona, Jr. vs. Hon. Carague

FACTS: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic

appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3

Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise

known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5

Billion, while the appropriations for the Department of

Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is

authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain

Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight

Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by

P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order

to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New

Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act

Strenghthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the

Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising

out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds

For The Purpose.

The petitioners seek the declaration of the

unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177,

and P.D. No. 1967. They assert that there must be

definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation,

otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the

President who determines in advance the amount

appropriated for the debt service.

ISSUE: W/N there was undue delegation of power.

HELD: NO. Ideally, the law must be complete in all its

essential terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature

so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when

it reaches him except enforce it. If there are gaps in the law

that will prevent its enforcement unless they are first filled,

the delegate will then have been given the opportunity to

step in the shoes of the legislature and exercise a discretion

essentially legislative in order to repair the omissions. This is

invalid delegation.

The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are

complete in all their essential terms and conditions and

sufficient standards are indicated therein.

The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended,

Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the

amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to


10/12

enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal,

interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the

loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it

when they shall become due without the need to enact a

separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises.

The purpose of these laws is to enable the government tomake prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to

protect and maintain the credit standing of the country.

Although the subject presidential decrees do not state

specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature

of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless

are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in

the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to

the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate

is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal

banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on

the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of

indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue

of the law, as and when they shall become due. No

uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit

will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the

Treasury.is more than sufficient. To require the existence of

both plans would radically impose a more stringent condition

for waiver which was not clearly envisioned by the basic law.

By removing the disjunctive word "or" in the implementing

rules the respondent Board has exceeded its authority.

It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making

power as provided in Section 51 17 of R.A. No. 7742 and

Section 13 18 of P.D. No. 1752. However, it is well-settled

that rules and regulations, which are the product of a

delegated power to create new and additional legal

provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the

scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to

the administrative agency. 19 It is required that the

regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the

law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with,

the standards prescribed by law.

In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF

required in Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to

the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that

employers should have both provident/retirement and

housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for

exemption from the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19

of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently

abolished that exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it

repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and

subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are

not within the delegated power of the Board. The HDMF

cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a

regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to apply.Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant

or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law

they intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend

the law.

G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997

FRANCISCO S. TATAD vs. THE SECRETARY OF THEDEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE

Facts: The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of

Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the

Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes". R.A. No.

8180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of

the downstream oil industry.

In March 1996, Congress took the audacious step of

deregulating the downstream oil industry. It enacted R.A. No.

8180, entitled the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act

of 1996." Under the deregulated environment, "any person

or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil

and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source,

lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream

oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his

own requirement," subject only to monitoring by the

Department of Energy.

The deregulation process has two phases: the transition

phase and the full deregulation phase.

Sec. 15 of RA 8180 provides:

Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation Pursuant to

section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon

approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of

the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As

far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation


11/12

when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the

world market are declining and when the exchange rate of

the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable . . .

Petitioners urge that the phrases "as far as practicable,"

"decline of crude oil prices in the world market" and "stability

of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar" are ambivalent,

unclear and inconcrete in meaning. They submit that they do

not provide the "determinate or determinable standards"

which can guide the President in his decision to fully

deregulate the downstream oil industry. In addition, they

contend that E.O. No. 392 which advanced the date of full

deregulation is void for it illegally considered the depletion of

the OPSF fund as a factor.

Issue: whether or not section 15 violates the constitutional

prohibition on undue delegation of power

Held: No.

Two tests have been developed to determine whether the

delegation of the power to execute laws does not involve the

abdication of the power to make law itself. We delineated the

metes and bounds of these tests in Eastern Shipping Lines,

Inc. VS. POEA, 22 thus:

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not

there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the

completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the

first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and

conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it

reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to

enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be

adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the

boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the

delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to

prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the

delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the

legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet

area in our constitutional landscape. Citing Hirabayashi v.

United States as authority, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz states

"that even if the law does not expressly pinpoint the

standard, the courts will bend over backward to locate the

same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it can, from

constitutional infirmity."

Tthe attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15 on the

ground of undue delegation of legislative power cannot

prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test

and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress

expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will

start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrenceof any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is

mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it

for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the

question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion

given to the President is to advance the date of full

deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays

down the standard to guide the judgment of the President

he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude

oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining

and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US

dollar is stable.

Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable,"

"declining" and "stable" should have been defined in R.A. No.

8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable

standards. The stubborn submission deserves scant

consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words are

well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable

intelligence. Webster defines "practicable" as meaning

possible to practice or perform, "decline" as meaning to take

a downward direction, and "stable" as meaning firmly

established. 25 The fear of petitioners that these words will

result in the exercise of executive discretion that will run riot

is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the

validity of similar, if not more general standards in other

cases.

G.R. No. L-34674 October 26, 1931

MAURICIO CRUZ vs. STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the

Bureau of Animal Industry

Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155,

which prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign

countries into the Philippine Islands. Respondent contended,

however, that: (1) if Act No. 3155 were declared

unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be

entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052

[restricted importation only for the improvement of breed]


12/12

would automatically become effective and would prohibit the

respondent from giving the permit prayed for.

The petitioner claims that "The lower court erred in not

holding that the power given by Act No. 3155 to the

Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the

prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful

delegation of the legislative powers." Be that as it may, the

trial court sustained the contention of respondent, hence,

this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Act No. 3155 was an unlawful

delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General and

as such unconstitutional.

Held: Act No. 3155 is not unconstitutional. We do not think

that such is the case. In Wilmington and Zanesville Railroad

Co. vs. Commissioners of Clinton County (1 Ohio St., 77, 88)we ruled that: "The true distinction, therefore, is between the

delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily

involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an

authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised

under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;

to the latter no valid objection can be made." No unlawful

delegation of power therefor. Judgment of the lower court is

sustained.

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