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Open AcceReviewThe Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a reviewEdward Broughton*

Address: Columbia University, Mailman School of Public Health, 600 W 168th St. New York, NY 10032 USA

Email: Edward Broughton* - eib6@columbia.edu

* Corresponding author

AbstractOn December 3 1984, more than 40 tons of methyl isocyanate gas leaked from a pesticide plant inBhopal, India, immediately killing at least 3,800 people and causing significant morbidity andpremature death for many thousands more. The company involved in what became the worstindustrial accident in history immediately tried to dissociate itself from legal responsibility.Eventually it reached a settlement with the Indian Government through mediation of that country'sSupreme Court and accepted moral responsibility. It paid $470 million in compensation, a relativelysmall amount of based on significant underestimations of the long-term health consequences ofexposure and the number of people exposed. The disaster indicated a need for enforceableinternational standards for environmental safety, preventative strategies to avoid similar accidentsand industrial disaster preparedness.

Since the disaster, India has experienced rapid industrialization. While some positive changes ingovernment policy and behavior of a few industries have taken place, major threats to theenvironment from rapid and poorly regulated industrial growth remain. Widespread environmentaldegradation with significant adverse human health consequences continues to occur throughoutIndia.

December 2004 marked the twentieth anniversary of themassive toxic gas leak from Union Carbide Corporation'schemical plant in Bhopal in the state of Madhya Pradesh,India that killed more than 3,800 people. This reviewexamines the health effects of exposure to the disaster, thelegal response, the lessons learned and whether or notthese are put into practice in India in terms of industrialdevelopment, environmental management and publichealth.

HistoryIn the 1970s, the Indian government initiated policies toencourage foreign companies to invest in local industry.Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) was asked to build aplant for the manufacture of Sevin, a pesticide commonly

used throughout Asia. As part of the deal, India's govern-ment insisted that a significant percentage of the invest-ment come from local shareholders. The governmentitself had a 22% stake in the company's subsidiary, UnionCarbide India Limited (UCIL) [1]. The company built theplant in Bhopal because of its central location and accessto transport infrastructure. The specific site within the citywas zoned for light industrial and commercial use, not forhazardous industry. The plant was initially approved onlyfor formulation of pesticides from component chemicals,such as MIC imported from the parent company, in rela-tively small quantities. However, pressure from competi-tion in the chemical industry led UCIL to implement"backward integration" – the manufacture of raw materi-als and intermediate products for formulation of the final

Published: 10 May 2005

Environmental Health: A Global Access Science Source 2005, 4:6 doi:10.1186/1476-069X-4-6

Received: 21 December 2004Accepted: 10 May 2005

This article is available from: http://www.ehjournal.net/content/4/1/6

© 2005 Broughton; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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product within one facility. This was inherently a moresophisticated and hazardous process [2].

In 1984, the plant was manufacturing Sevin at one quarterof its production capacity due to decreased demand forpesticides. Widespread crop failures and famine on thesubcontinent in the 1980s led to increased indebtednessand decreased capital for farmers to invest in pesticides.Local managers were directed to close the plant and pre-pare it for sale in July 1984 due to decreased profitability[3]. When no ready buyer was found, UCIL made plans todismantle key production units of the facility for ship-ment to another developing country. In the meantime,the facility continued to operate with safety equipmentand procedures far below the standards found in its sisterplant in Institute, West Virginia. The local governmentwas aware of safety problems but was reticent to placeheavy industrial safety and pollution control burdens onthe struggling industry because it feared the economiceffects of the loss of such a large employer [3].

At 11.00 PM on December 2 1984, while most of the onemillion residents of Bhopal slept, an operator at the plantnoticed a small leak of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas andincreasing pressure inside a storage tank. The vent-gasscrubber, a safety device designer to neutralize toxic dis-charge from the MIC system, had been turned off threeweeks prior [3]. Apparently a faulty valve had allowed oneton of water for cleaning internal pipes to mix with fortytons of MIC [1]. A 30 ton refrigeration unit that normallyserved as a safety component to cool the MIC storage tankhad been drained of its coolant for use in another part of

the plant [3]. Pressure and heat from the vigorous exother-mic reaction in the tank continued to build. The gas flaresafety system was out of action and had been for threemonths. At around 1.00 AM, December 3, loud rumblingreverberated around the plant as a safety valve gave waysending a plume of MIC gas into the early morning air [4].Within hours, the streets of Bhopal were littered withhuman corpses and the carcasses of buffaloes, cows, dogsand birds. An estimated 3,800 people died immediately,mostly in the poor slum colony adjacent to the UCC plant[1,5]. Local hospitals were soon overwhelmed with theinjured, a crisis further compounded by a lack of knowl-edge of exactly what gas was involved and what its effectswere [1]. It became one of the worst chemical disasters inhistory and the name Bhopal became synonymous withindustrial catastrophe [5].

Estimates of the number of people killed in the first fewdays by the plume from the UCC plant run as high as10,000, with 15,000 to 20,000 premature deaths report-edly occurring in the subsequent two decades [6]. TheIndian government reported that more than half a millionpeople were exposed to the gas [7]. Several epidemiologi-cal studies conducted soon after the accident showed sig-nificant morbidity and increased mortality in the exposedpopulation. Table 1. summarizes early and late effects onhealth. These data are likely to under-represent the trueextent of adverse health effects because many exposedindividuals left Bhopal immediately following the disas-ter never to return and were therefore lost to follow-up[8].

Table 1: Health effects of the Bhopal methyl isocyanate gas leak exposure [8, 30-32].

Early effects (0–6 months)

Ocular Chemosis, redness, watering, ulcers, photophobiaRespiratory Distress, pulmonary edema, pneumonitis, pneumothorax.Gastrointestinal Persistent diarrhea, anorexia, persistent abdominal pain.Genetic Increased chromosomal abnormalities.Psychological Neuroses, anxiety states, adjustment reactionsNeurobehavioral Impaired audio and visual memory, impaired vigilance attention and

response time, Impaired reasoning and spatial ability, impaired psychomotor coordination.

Late effects (6 months onwards)

Ocular Persistent watering, corneal opacities, chronic conjunctivitisRespiratory Obstructive and restrictive airway disease, decreased lung function.Reproductive Increased pregnancy loss, increased infant mortality, decreased

placental/fetal weightGenetic Increased chromosomal abnormalitiesNeurobehavioral Impaired associate learning, motor speed, precision

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AftermathImmediately after the disaster, UCC began attempts todissociate itself from responsibility for the gas leak. Itsprincipal tactic was to shift culpability to UCIL, stating theplant was wholly built and operated by the Indian subsid-iary. It also fabricated scenarios involving sabotage by pre-viously unknown Sikh extremist groups and disgruntledemployees but this theory was impugned by numerousindependent sources [1].

The toxic plume had barely cleared when, on December 7,the first multi-billion dollar lawsuit was filed by an Amer-ican attorney in a U.S. court. This was the beginning ofyears of legal machinations in which the ethical implica-tions of the tragedy and its affect on Bhopal's people werelargely ignored. In March 1985, the Indian governmentenacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act as a way ofensuring that claims arising from the accident would bedealt with speedily and equitably. The Act made the gov-ernment the sole representative of the victims in legal pro-ceedings both within and outside India. Eventually allcases were taken out of the U.S. legal system under the rul-ing of the presiding American judge and placed entirelyunder Indian jurisdiction much to the detriment of theinjured parties.

In a settlement mediated by the Indian Supreme Court,UCC accepted moral responsibility and agreed to pay$470 million to the Indian government to be distributedto claimants as a full and final settlement. The figure waspartly based on the disputed claim that only 3000 peopledied and 102,000 suffered permanent disabilities [9].Upon announcing this settlement, shares of UCC rose $2per share or 7% in value [1]. Had compensation in Bhopalbeen paid at the same rate that asbestosis victims wherebeing awarded in US courts by defendant including UCC– which mined asbestos from 1963 to 1985 – the liabilitywould have been greater than the $10 billion the com-pany was worth and insured for in 1984 [10]. By the endof October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas TragedyRelief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation hadbeen awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and15,310 survivors of those killed. The average amount tofamilies of the dead was $2,200 [9].

At every turn, UCC has attempted to manipulate, obfus-cate and withhold scientific data to the detriment of vic-tims. Even to this date, the company has not stated exactlywhat was in the toxic cloud that enveloped the city on thatDecember night [8]. When MIC is exposed to 200° heat,it forms degraded MIC that contains the more deadlyhydrogen cyanide (HCN). There was clear evidence thatthe storage tank temperature did reach this level in the dis-aster. The cherry-red color of blood and viscera of somevictims were characteristic of acute cyanide poisoning

[11]. Moreover, many responded well to administrationof sodium thiosulfate, an effective therapy for cyanidepoisoning but not MIC exposure [11]. UCC initially rec-ommended use of sodium thiosulfate but withdrew thestatement later prompting suggestions that it attempted tocover up evidence of HCN in the gas leak. The presence ofHCN was vigorously denied by UCC and was a point ofconjecture among researchers [8,11-13].

As further insult, UCC discontinued operation at its Bho-pal plant following the disaster but failed to clean up theindustrial site completely. The plant continues to leak sev-eral toxic chemicals and heavy metals that have foundtheir way into local aquifers. Dangerously contaminatedwater has now been added to the legacy left by the com-pany for the people of Bhopal [1,14].

Lessons learnedThe events in Bhopal revealed that expanding industriali-zation in developing countries without concurrent evolu-tion in safety regulations could have catastrophicconsequences [4]. The disaster demonstrated that seem-ingly local problems of industrial hazards and toxic con-tamination are often tied to global market dynamics.UCC's Sevin production plant was built in MadhyaPradesh not to avoid environmental regulations in theU.S. but to exploit the large and growing Indian pesticidemarket. However the manner in which the project wasexecuted suggests the existence of a double standard formultinational corporations operating in developingcountries [1]. Enforceable uniform international operat-ing regulations for hazardous industries would have pro-vided a mechanism for significantly improved in safety inBhopal. Even without enforcement, international stand-ards could provide norms for measuring performance ofindividual companies engaged in hazardous activitiessuch as the manufacture of pesticides and other toxicchemicals in India [15]. National governments and inter-national agencies should focus on widely applicable tech-niques for corporate responsibility and accidentprevention as much in the developing world context as inadvanced industrial nations [16]. Specifically, preventionshould include risk reduction in plant location and designand safety legislation [17].

Local governments clearly cannot allow industrial facili-ties to be situated within urban areas, regardless of theevolution of land use over time. Industry and governmentneed to bring proper financial support to local communi-ties so they can provide medical and other necessary serv-ices to reduce morbidity, mortality and material loss inthe case of industrial accidents.

Public health infrastructure was very weak in Bhopal in1984. Tap water was available for only a few hours a day

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and was of very poor quality. With no functioning sewagesystem, untreated human waste was dumped into twonearby lakes, one a source of drinking water. The city hadfour major hospitals but there was a shortage of physi-cians and hospital beds. There was also no mass casualtyemergency response system in place in the city [3]. Exist-ing public health infrastructure needs to be taken intoaccount when hazardous industries choose sites for man-ufacturing plants. Future management of industrial devel-opment requires that appropriate resources be devoted toadvance planning before any disaster occurs [18]. Com-munities that do not possess infrastructure and technicalexpertise to respond adequately to such industrial acci-dents should not be chosen as sites for hazardousindustry.

Since 1984Following the events of December 3 1984 environmentalawareness and activism in India increased significantly.The Environment Protection Act was passed in 1986, cre-ating the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF)and strengthening India's commitment to the environ-ment. Under the new act, the MoEF was given overallresponsibility for administering and enforcing environ-mental laws and policies. It established the importance ofintegrating environmental strategies into all industrialdevelopment plans for the country. However, despitegreater government commitment to protect public health,forests, and wildlife, policies geared to developing thecountry's economy have taken precedence in the last 20years [19].

India has undergone tremendous economic growth in thetwo decades since the Bhopal disaster. Gross domesticproduct (GDP) per capita has increased from $1,000 in1984 to $2,900 in 2004 and it continues to grow at a rateof over 8% per year [20]. Rapid industrial developmenthas contributed greatly to economic growth but there hasbeen significant cost in environmental degradation andincreased public health risks. Since abatement efforts con-sume a large portion of India's GDP, MoEF faces an uphillbattle as it tries to fulfill its mandate of reducing industrialpollution [19]. Heavy reliance on coal-fired power plantsand poor enforcement of vehicle emission laws haveresult from economic concerns taking precedence overenvironmental protection [19].

With the industrial growth since 1984, there has been anincrease in small scale industries (SSIs) that are clusteredabout major urban areas in India. There are generally lessstringent rules for the treatment of waste produced by SSIsdue to less waste generation within each individual indus-try. This has allowed SSIs to dispose of untreated wastewa-ter into drainage systems that flow directly into rivers.New Delhi's Yamuna River is illustrative. Dangerously

high levels of heavy metals such as lead, cobalt, cadmium,chrome, nickel and zinc have been detected in this riverwhich is a major supply of potable water to India's capitalthus posing a potential health risk to the people livingthere and areas downstream [21].

Land pollution due to uncontrolled disposal of industrialsolid and hazardous waste is also a problem throughoutIndia. With rapid industrialization, the generation ofindustrial solid and hazardous waste has increased appre-ciably and the environmental impact is significant [22].

India relaxed its controls on foreign investment in orderto accede to WTO rules and thereby attract an increasingflow of capital. In the process, a number of environmentalregulations are being rolled back as growing foreigninvestments continue to roll in. The Indian experience iscomparable to that of a number of developing countriesthat are experiencing the environmental impacts of struc-tural adjustment. Exploitation and export of naturalresources has accelerated on the subcontinent. Prohibi-tions against locating industrial facilities in ecologicallysensitive zones have been eliminated while conservationzones are being stripped of their status so that pesticide,cement and bauxite mines can be built [23]. Heavy reli-ance on coal-fired power plants and poor enforcement ofvehicle emission laws are other consequences of eco-nomic concerns taking precedence over environmentalprotection [19].

In March 2001, residents of Kodaikanal in southern Indiacaught the Anglo-Dutch company, Unilever, red-handedwhen they discovered a dumpsite with toxic mercury lacedwaste from a thermometer factory run by the company'sIndian subsidiary, Hindustan Lever. The 7.4 ton stockpileof mercury-laden glass was found in torn stacks spillingonto the ground in a scrap metal yard located near aschool. In the fall of 2001, steel from the ruins of theWorld Trade Center was exported to India apparentlywithout first being tested for contamination from asbestosand heavy metals present in the twin tower debris. Otherexamples of poor environmental stewardship and eco-nomic considerations taking precedence over publichealth concerns abound [24].

The Bhopal disaster could have changed the nature of thechemical industry and caused a reexamination of thenecessity to produce such potentially harmful products inthe first place. However the lessons of acute and chroniceffects of exposure to pesticides and their precursors inBhopal has not changed agricultural practice patterns. Anestimated 3 million people per year suffer the conse-quences of pesticide poisoning with most exposure occur-ring in the agricultural developing world. It is reported tobe the cause of at least 22,000 deaths in India each year.

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In the state of Kerala, significant mortality and morbidityhave been reported following exposure to Endosulfan, atoxic pesticide whose use continued for 15 years after theevents of Bhopal [25].

Aggressive marketing of asbestos continues in developingcountries as a result of restrictions being placed on its usein developed nations due to the well-established linkbetween asbestos products and respiratory diseases. Indiahas become a major consumer, using around 100,000tons of asbestos per year, 80% of which is imported withCanada being the largest overseas supplier. Mining, pro-duction and use of asbestos in India is very loosely regu-lated despite the health hazards. Reports have shownmorbidity and mortality from asbestos related disease willcontinue in India without enforcement of a ban or signif-icantly tighter controls [26,27].

UCC has shrunk to one sixth of its size since the Bhopaldisaster in an effort to restructure and divest itself. Bydoing so, the company avoided a hostile takeover, placeda significant portion of UCC's assets out of legal reach ofthe victims and gave its shareholder and top executivesbountiful profits [1]. The company still operates under theownership of Dow Chemicals and still states on its web-site that the Bhopal disaster was "cause by deliberate sab-otage". [28].

Some positive changes were seen following the Bhopaldisaster. The British chemical company, ICI, whose Indiansubsidiary manufactured pesticides, increased attention tohealth, safety and environmental issues following theevents of December 1984. The subsidiary now spends 30–40% of their capital expenditures on environmental-related projects. However, they still do not adhere tostandards as strict as their parent company in the UK. [24].

The US chemical giant DuPont learned its lesson of Bho-pal in a different way. The company attempted for a dec-ade to export a nylon plant from Richmond, VA to Goa,India. In its early negotiations with the Indian govern-ment, DuPont had sought and won a remarkable clause inits investment agreement that absolved it from all liabili-ties in case of an accident. But the people of Goa were notwilling to acquiesce while an important ecological sitewas cleared for a heavy polluting industry. After nearly adecade of protesting by Goa's residents, DuPont wasforced to scuttle plans there. Chennai was the next pro-posed site for the plastics plant. The state governmentthere made significantly greater demand on DuPont forconcessions on public health and environmental protec-tion. Eventually, these plans were also aborted due towhat the company called "financial concerns". [29].

ConclusionThe tragedy of Bhopal continues to be a warning sign atonce ignored and heeded. Bhopal and its aftermath werea warning that the path to industrialization, for develop-ing countries in general and India in particular, is fraughtwith human, environmental and economic perils. Somemoves by the Indian government, including the forma-tion of the MoEF, have served to offer some protection ofthe public's health from the harmful practices of local andmultinational heavy industry and grassroots organiza-tions that have also played a part in opposing rampantdevelopment. The Indian economy is growing at a tre-mendous rate but at significant cost in environmentalhealth and public safety as large and small companiesthroughout the subcontinent continue to pollute. Farmore remains to be done for public health in the contextof industrialization to show that the lessons of the count-less thousands dead in Bhopal have truly been heeded.

Competing interestsThe author(s) declare that they have no competinginterests.

AcknowledgementsJ. Barab, B. Castleman, R Dhara and U Misra reviewed the manuscript and provided useful suggestions.

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