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DSL Spectrum Management Dr. Jianwei Huang Department of Electrical Engineering Princeton University Guest Lecture of ELE539A March 2007 Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 1 / 26

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  • DSL Spectrum Management

    Dr. Jianwei Huang

    Department of Electrical EngineeringPrinceton University

    Guest Lecture of ELE539AMarch 2007

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 1 / 26

  • Acknowledgements

    Collaborations: Raphael Cendrillon, Mung Chiang, Marc Moonen

    Sponsorships: Alcatel, NSF

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 2 / 26

  • Digitial Subscriber Line (DSL) Networks

    Wireline communications networks based telephone copper lines

    Cost-effective broadband access network

    More than 160 million users world-wide

    Speed is the bottleneck

    crosstalk

    TX

    TX RX

    RXCO

    RT

    (Remote Terminal)

    (Central Office) Customer

    Customer

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 3 / 26

  • Digitial Subscriber Line (DSL) Networks

    Wireline communications networks based telephone copper lines

    Cost-effective broadband access network

    More than 160 million users world-wide

    Speed is the bottleneck

    crosstalk

    TX

    TX RX

    RXCO

    RT

    (Remote Terminal)

    (Central Office) Customer

    Customer

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 3 / 26

  • How DSL Works?

    Copper line can support signal transmissions over a large bandwidth

    Voice transmission: up to 3.4 KHz

    DSL transmissions: up to 30 MHzI Multi-carrier transmissions: Discrete Multitone Modulation

    Frequency (KHz)0 3.4

    Voice DSL

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 4 / 26

  • Network and Channel Model

    crosstalk

    TX

    TX RX

    RXCO

    RT

    (Remote Terminal)

    (Central Office) Customer

    Customer

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 5 / 26

    Mathematical model: multi-user multi-carrier interference channel

    Each telephone line is a user (transmitter-receiver pair)

    Generate mutual crosstalks over multiple frequency tones

  • Network and Channel Model

    crosstalk

    TX

    TX RX

    RXCO

    RT

    (Remote Terminal)

    (Central Office) Customer

    Customer

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 5 / 26

    Physical model: mixed CO/RT case

    Channel attenuates with distance

    Central Office (CO) connect customers who are reasonably close

    Remote Terminal (RT) connect customers who are farther away

  • Network and Channel Model

    crosstalk

    TX

    TX RX

    RXCO

    RT

    (Remote Terminal)

    (Central Office) Customer

    Customer

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 5 / 26

    Frequency-Dependent Channel

    Direct channel gain decreases with frequency

    Crosstalk channel gain increases with frequency

    Lead to near-far problemI RT generates strong crosstalk to CO line, especially in high tonesI CO generates little crosstalk to RT in all tones

  • Network and Channel Model

    crosstalk

    TX

    TX RX

    RXCO

    RT

    (Remote Terminal)

    (Central Office) Customer

    Customer

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 5 / 26

    Frequency-Dependent Channel

    Direct channel gain decreases with frequency

    Crosstalk channel gain increases with frequency

    Lead to near-far problemI RT generates strong crosstalk to CO line, especially in high tonesI CO generates little crosstalk to RT in all tones

  • Crosstalk System Model

    N users (lines) and K tones (frequency bands)

    User n’s achievable rate on tone k is

    bkn = log(1 + SINRkn

    )where

    SINRkn =pkn∑

    m 6=n αkn,mp

    km + σ

    kn

    Total data rate of user n

    Rn =∑k

    bkn

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 6 / 26

  • Network Objective: Maximize Rate Region

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 7 / 26

    Rate Region: set of all achievable rate vectors

    1

    R

    Rate Region

    2

    R

  • Network Objective: Maximize Rate Region

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 7 / 26

    Problem A: (Find One Point On the Rate Region Boundary)

    maximize{pn∈Pn}n

    ∑n

    wnRn

    User n chooses a power vector pn ∈ Pn ={∑

    k pkn ≤ Pmaxn , pkn ≥ 0

    }.

    Changing different weights trace the entire rate region boundary

    A suboptimal algorithm leads to a reduced rate region

    Rate Region: set of all achievable rate vectors

    1

    R

    Rate Region

    2

    R

  • Network Objective: Maximize Rate Region

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 7 / 26

    Problem A: (Find One Point On the Rate Region Boundary)

    maximize{pn∈Pn}n

    ∑n

    wnRn

    User n chooses a power vector pn ∈ Pn ={∑

    k pkn ≤ Pmaxn , pkn ≥ 0

    }.

    Changing different weights trace the entire rate region boundary

    A suboptimal algorithm leads to a reduced rate region

    Rate Region: set of all achievable rate vectors

    1

    R

    Rate Region

    2

    R

  • Network Objective: Maximize Rate Region

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 7 / 26

    Problem A: (Find One Point On the Rate Region Boundary)

    maximize{pn∈Pn}n

    ∑n

    wnRn

    User n chooses a power vector pn ∈ Pn ={∑

    k pkn ≤ Pmaxn , pkn ≥ 0

    }.

    Changing different weights trace the entire rate region boundary

    A suboptimal algorithm leads to a reduced rate region

    Rate Region: set of all achievable rate vectors

    R

    Rate Region

    2

    R1

  • Difficulties of Solving Problem A

    Non-convexity: total weighted rate not concave in power.

    Physically distributed: local channel information

    Performance coupling: across users (interferences) and tones (powerconstraint)

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 8 / 26

  • Dynamic Spectrum Management (DSM)State-of-art DSM algorithms:

    I IW: Iterative Water-filling [Yu, Ginis, Cioffi’02]

    I OSB: Optimal Spectrum Balancing [Cendrillon et al.’04]I ISB: Iterative Spectrum Balancing [Liu, Yu’05] [Cendrillon, Moonen’05]I ASB: Autonomous Spectrum Balancing [Huang et al.’06]

    IW

    2

    R1

    R

    Algorithm Operation Complexity PerformanceIW Autonomous O (KN) Suboptimal

    OSB Centralized O(KeN

    )Optimal

    ISB Centralized O(KN2

    )Near Optimal

    ASB Autonomous O (KN) Near Optimal

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 9 / 26

  • Dynamic Spectrum Management (DSM)State-of-art DSM algorithms:

    I IW: Iterative Water-filling [Yu, Ginis, Cioffi’02]I OSB: Optimal Spectrum Balancing [Cendrillon et al.’04]I ISB: Iterative Spectrum Balancing [Liu, Yu’05] [Cendrillon, Moonen’05]

    I ASB: Autonomous Spectrum Balancing [Huang et al.’06]

    OSB/ISB

    IW

    2

    R1

    R

    Algorithm Operation Complexity PerformanceIW Autonomous O (KN) SuboptimalOSB Centralized O

    (KeN

    )Optimal

    ISB Centralized O(KN2

    )Near Optimal

    ASB Autonomous O (KN) Near Optimal

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 9 / 26

  • Dynamic Spectrum Management (DSM)State-of-art DSM algorithms:

    I IW: Iterative Water-filling [Yu, Ginis, Cioffi’02]I OSB: Optimal Spectrum Balancing [Cendrillon et al.’04]I ISB: Iterative Spectrum Balancing [Liu, Yu’05] [Cendrillon, Moonen’05]I ASB: Autonomous Spectrum Balancing [Huang et al.’06]

    /ASBOSB/ISB

    IW

    R

    1R

    2

    Algorithm Operation Complexity PerformanceIW Autonomous O (KN) SuboptimalOSB Centralized O

    (KeN

    )Optimal

    ISB Centralized O(KN2

    )Near Optimal

    ASB Autonomous O (KN) Near Optimal

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 9 / 26

  • Optimal Spectrum Balancing

    Global optimization based on dual decomposition

    Key: the duality gap is asymptotically zero under frequency-sharingproperty

    5

    R2

    1R

    1Rtarget

    A

    C

    B

    EL − l

    l

    D

    w = 0

    w = 1

    w = γ − �

    w = γ + �

    X

    Y

    X ∩ Y

    Fig. 2. Operating points inX∩Y can be found through a weighted rate-sumoptimization

    Theorem 2:For any rate regionX, defineX as the boundaryof X, Y as the convex hull ofX, and Y as the boundaryof Y. Consider any operating pointC , (Rc1, Rc2) which isachievableC ∈ X and on the boundary of the convex hullof the rate regionC ∈ Y as depicted in Fig. 2. There existssomew such that the PSDs at pointC can be found througha weighted rate-sum maximization.

    Proof: C is on the boundary of the convex setY. Sothere exists no pointD , (Rd1, Rd2) ∈ Y such thatRd1 > Rc1andRd2 > R

    c2. This implies that for somew

    wRc1 + (1− w)Rc2 ≥ wRd1 + (1− w)Rd2, ∀ (Rd1, Rd2) ∈ Y.Now sinceX ⊂ YwRc1 + (1− w)Rc2 ≥ wRd1 + (1− w)Rd2, ∀ (Rd1, Rd2) ∈ X.

    So the pointC gives the maximum weighted rate-sum of allachievable points within the rate regionX for some particularweightw. Hence the pointC is optimal in the weighted rate-sum (11) for thatw and can be found through a weightedrate-sum maximization.

    Corollary 1: For any convex rate-region, all optimal oper-ating points on the boundary of the rate region can be foundthrough a weighted rate-sum optimization.

    Proof: In a convex rate region, the boundary of theconvex hull Y, contains the entire boundary of the rateregion andX = Y. All optimal operating points in termsof the original spectrum management problem (3) lie on theboundary of the rate region. Hence Theorem 2 implies thatall optimal operating points can be found through a weightedrate-sum optimization.Theorem 2 implies that any achievable operating point on theboundary of the convex hull of the rate region can be foundthrough a weighted rate-sum optimization. If the rate regionis close to being convex, then the majority of the optimaloperating points can be found. Thankfully this is the case inDSL channels as is now explained.

    In the wireline medium there is some correlation betweenthe channels on neighbouring tones. If the channel is sampled

    finely enough then neighbouring tones will see almost thesame channels (both direct and crosstalk).

    Imagine that the tone spacing is fine enough such thathn,mk ' hn,mk+l , 0 ≤ l ≤ L − 1. Consider two points inthe rate region,A = (Ra1 , R

    a2) andB = (R

    b1, R

    b2) and their

    corresponding PSDs(s1,ak , s2,ak ) and(s

    1,bk , s

    2,bk ). It is possible

    to operate at a pointE = ( lLRa1 +

    L−lL R

    b1,

    lLR

    a2 +

    L−lL R

    b2) for

    any0 ≤ l ≤ L−1 as depicted in Fig. 2. This is done by settingthe PSDs to(s1,ak , s

    2,ak ) on tonesk ∈ {pL+ 1, . . . pL+ l} for

    all integer values ofp, and to(s1,bk , s2,bk ) on all other tones.

    For example, to operate at a point 2/3 betweenA andB (on the side closer toA), it is required thatl = 2and L = 3. Thus the PSDs are set to(s1,ak , s

    2,ak ) on tones

    k ∈ {1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, . . . ,K − 1} and to (s1,bk , s2,bk ) on tonesk ∈ {3, 6, 9, . . . ,K}. For this to work the tone spacing mustbe small enough such that the channel is approximately flatover L = 3 neighbouring tones. That is, it is necessary thathn,mk ' hn,mk+1 ' hn,mk+2, ∀ k ∈ {1, 4, . . . ,K − 2}.

    For largeL (small tone spacing), practically any operatingpoint betweenA andB can be achieved. Thus for any twopoints in the rate region, any point between them is also withinthe rate region. This is the definition of a convex set. As suchthe rate region is approximately convex in DMT systems withsmall tone spacings. This approximation becomes exact asthe tone-spacing approaches zero. For the remainder of thispaper, we assume that the DMT tone spacing is small suchthat the rate region is convex. This is justified for practicalDSL systems for which∆f is 4.3125 kHz.

    Note that one should not confuse convexity of the rate-region with convexity of the objective function (11). In practicethe rate regions are seen to be nearly-convex, however theoptimisation problem is highly non-convex, exhibiting manylocal maxima. For this reason conventional convex optimisa-tion techniques cannot be applied and an exhaustive search isrequired on each tone.

    B. Dual Decomposition

    In the previous section it was shown that the spectrummanagement problem (3) can be solved through a weightedrate-sum optimization (11). It was also shown that in DSLthe rate region is approximately convex, allowing almost alloptimal operating points to be found. This section will showhow the weighted rate-sum optimization can be solved in acomputationally tractable way.

    The total power constraints (4) can be incorporated into theoptimization problem by defining the Lagrangian

    L , wR1 + (1− w)R2 − λ1∑

    k

    s1k − λ2∑

    k

    s2k. (12)

    Hereλn denotes the Lagrangian multiplier for usern and ischosen such that either the power constraint on usern is tight∑k s

    nk = Pn or λn = 0. The constrained optimization (11)

    can now be solved via the unconstrained optimization

    maxs1,s2

    L(w, λ1, λ2, s1k, s2k). (13)

    c©Cendrillon et. al., ICC, 2004

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 10 / 26

  • Optimal Spectrum Balancing

    Partial Lagrangian:

    L (p1, ...,pN) =∑n

    wn∑k

    log(1 + SINRkn

    )−∑n

    λn

    (∑k

    pkn − Pmaxn

    )

    Decompose K nonconvex subproblems, one for each tone k:

    maximize{pkn}∀n≥0

    ∑n

    wn log(1 + SINRkn

    )−∑n

    λnpkn

    I Joint exhaustive search of optimal transmission power of all users

    Optimal values of λ1, ..., λN can be found using bisection orsubgradient search

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 11 / 26

  • Optimal Spectrum Balancing

    ProsI Solve a long-standing open problemI Find the global optimal solution (asymptotically)I Linear complexity in K

    ConsI Centralized algorithmI Exponential complexity in N

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 12 / 26

  • Iterative Water-FillingGame-theoretic model based on selfish optimizationsEach user wants to maximize payoff: total achievable rate

    Sn(pn,p−n

    )= Rn

    (pn,p−n

    )

    Best Response: the power vector that maximizes payoff

    Bn(p−n) , arg maxpn∈Pn

    Sn(pn,p−n

    )I Convex optimizationI Coupled across tones by total power constraintI Can be solved by dual decompositionI Solution: water-fillingYU et al.: DISTRIBUTED MULTIUSER POWER CONTROL FOR DIGITAL SUBSCRIBER LINES 1109

    that no interference subtraction is performed regardless ofinterference strength, the data rates are

    (6)

    (7)

    Comparing the above expression with (2), it is easy to identify

    (8)

    (9)

    and similarly for and . Thus, the simplified modelincurs no loss of generality. The interference channel game con-sidered here is not a zero-sum game, i.e., one player’s loss is notequal to the other player’s gain.

    The main objective here is to characterize all pure-strategyNash equilibria in an interference channel game. At a Nash equi-librium, each user’s strategy is the optimal response to the otherplayer’s strategy. So fixing , the optimal must bethe solution to the following optimization problem:

    s.t.

    (10)

    The solution to this problem is the well-known water-fillingpower allocation. More precisely, let

    . Then, the water-filling power allocation is

    if

    if(11)

    where is a constant chosen so that the power constraint ismet. Likewise, fixing , the optimal should also bea water-filling power allocation against the combined interfer-ence from and the noise. Thus, a Nash equilibrium isreached if and only if the water-filling condition is simulta-neously achieved for both users. The characterization of Nashequilibria is therefore equivalent to a characterization of “simul-taneous water-filling” points. The idea of simultaneous water-filling is illustrated in Fig. 4. The following theorem offers sev-eral sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of theNash equilibrium in the two-user case.

    Theorem 1: Suppose that , ,then at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in thetwo-user Gaussian interference game exists. Further, let

    , ,, and

    . If any of the followingconditions, , , or is satisfied,then the Nash equilibrium is unique and is stable.

    The proof of Theorem 1 is lengthy and it is included in theAppendix. The basic idea is that under suitable conditions, the

    Fig. 4. Simultaneous water-filling.

    Nash equilibrium can be reached by an iterative water-fillingprocedure, where each user successively optimizes his powerspectrum while regarding other users’ interference as noise. Themain purpose of Theorem 1 is to characterize conditions underwhich such an iterative water-filling procedure converges. Thefollowing corollary is a direct consequence of the proof.

    Corollary 1: If the condition for existence and uniquenessof the Nash Equilibrium is satisfied, then the iterative water-filling algorithm for the two-user Gaussian interference game,where in every step, each modem updates its PSD regarding allinterference as noise, converges, and it converges to the uniqueNash equilibrium from any starting point.

    The condition of Theorem 1 is not a mere technicality.The following simple example illustrates a case wherethe Nash equilibrium is not unique. Consider a two-usercase where there are only two frequencies of concern. Let

    . Let powerconstraints and background noise all be 1. The set of powerallocations andis one Nash equilibrium, and the set of power allocations

    and is a differentNash equilibrium.

    IV. DISTRIBUTED POWER CONTROL

    Because of the frequency-selective nature of the DSL channel,power control algorithms for DSL applications need to allocatepower optimally not only among different users, but also inthe frequency domain. This requirement brings in many extra

    YU et al.: DISTRIBUTED MULTIUSER POWER CONTROL FOR DIGITAL SUBSCRIBER LINES 1109

    that no interference subtraction is performed regardless ofinterference strength, the data rates are

    (6)

    (7)

    Comparing the above expression with (2), it is easy to identify

    (8)

    (9)

    and similarly for and . Thus, the simplified modelincurs no loss of generality. The interference channel game con-sidered here is not a zero-sum game, i.e., one player’s loss is notequal to the other player’s gain.

    The main objective here is to characterize all pure-strategyNash equilibria in an interference channel game. At a Nash equi-librium, each user’s strategy is the optimal response to the otherplayer’s strategy. So fixing , the optimal must bethe solution to the following optimization problem:

    s.t.

    (10)

    The solution to this problem is the well-known water-fillingpower allocation. More precisely, let

    . Then, the water-filling power allocation is

    if

    if(11)

    where is a constant chosen so that the power constraint ismet. Likewise, fixing , the optimal should also bea water-filling power allocation against the combined interfer-ence from and the noise. Thus, a Nash equilibrium isreached if and only if the water-filling condition is simulta-neously achieved for both users. The characterization of Nashequilibria is therefore equivalent to a characterization of “simul-taneous water-filling” points. The idea of simultaneous water-filling is illustrated in Fig. 4. The following theorem offers sev-eral sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of theNash equilibrium in the two-user case.

    Theorem 1: Suppose that , ,then at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in thetwo-user Gaussian interference game exists. Further, let

    , ,, and

    . If any of the followingconditions, , , or is satisfied,then the Nash equilibrium is unique and is stable.

    The proof of Theorem 1 is lengthy and it is included in theAppendix. The basic idea is that under suitable conditions, the

    Fig. 4. Simultaneous water-filling.

    Nash equilibrium can be reached by an iterative water-fillingprocedure, where each user successively optimizes his powerspectrum while regarding other users’ interference as noise. Themain purpose of Theorem 1 is to characterize conditions underwhich such an iterative water-filling procedure converges. Thefollowing corollary is a direct consequence of the proof.

    Corollary 1: If the condition for existence and uniquenessof the Nash Equilibrium is satisfied, then the iterative water-filling algorithm for the two-user Gaussian interference game,where in every step, each modem updates its PSD regarding allinterference as noise, converges, and it converges to the uniqueNash equilibrium from any starting point.

    The condition of Theorem 1 is not a mere technicality.The following simple example illustrates a case wherethe Nash equilibrium is not unique. Consider a two-usercase where there are only two frequencies of concern. Let

    . Let powerconstraints and background noise all be 1. The set of powerallocations andis one Nash equilibrium, and the set of power allocations

    and is a differentNash equilibrium.

    IV. DISTRIBUTED POWER CONTROL

    Because of the frequency-selective nature of the DSL channel,power control algorithms for DSL applications need to allocatepower optimally not only among different users, but also inthe frequency domain. This requirement brings in many extra

    c©Yu, Ginnis and Cioffi, JSAC, 2002

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 13 / 26

  • Iterative Water-FillingGame-theoretic model based on selfish optimizationsEach user wants to maximize payoff: total achievable rate

    Sn(pn,p−n

    )= Rn

    (pn,p−n

    )Best Response: the power vector that maximizes payoff

    Bn(p−n) , arg maxpn∈Pn

    Sn(pn,p−n

    )I Convex optimizationI Coupled across tones by total power constraintI Can be solved by dual decomposition

    I Solution: water-fillingYU et al.: DISTRIBUTED MULTIUSER POWER CONTROL FOR DIGITAL SUBSCRIBER LINES 1109

    that no interference subtraction is performed regardless ofinterference strength, the data rates are

    (6)

    (7)

    Comparing the above expression with (2), it is easy to identify

    (8)

    (9)

    and similarly for and . Thus, the simplified modelincurs no loss of generality. The interference channel game con-sidered here is not a zero-sum game, i.e., one player’s loss is notequal to the other player’s gain.

    The main objective here is to characterize all pure-strategyNash equilibria in an interference channel game. At a Nash equi-librium, each user’s strategy is the optimal response to the otherplayer’s strategy. So fixing , the optimal must bethe solution to the following optimization problem:

    s.t.

    (10)

    The solution to this problem is the well-known water-fillingpower allocation. More precisely, let

    . Then, the water-filling power allocation is

    if

    if(11)

    where is a constant chosen so that the power constraint ismet. Likewise, fixing , the optimal should also bea water-filling power allocation against the combined interfer-ence from and the noise. Thus, a Nash equilibrium isreached if and only if the water-filling condition is simulta-neously achieved for both users. The characterization of Nashequilibria is therefore equivalent to a characterization of “simul-taneous water-filling” points. The idea of simultaneous water-filling is illustrated in Fig. 4. The following theorem offers sev-eral sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of theNash equilibrium in the two-user case.

    Theorem 1: Suppose that , ,then at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in thetwo-user Gaussian interference game exists. Further, let

    , ,, and

    . If any of the followingconditions, , , or is satisfied,then the Nash equilibrium is unique and is stable.

    The proof of Theorem 1 is lengthy and it is included in theAppendix. The basic idea is that under suitable conditions, the

    Fig. 4. Simultaneous water-filling.

    Nash equilibrium can be reached by an iterative water-fillingprocedure, where each user successively optimizes his powerspectrum while regarding other users’ interference as noise. Themain purpose of Theorem 1 is to characterize conditions underwhich such an iterative water-filling procedure converges. Thefollowing corollary is a direct consequence of the proof.

    Corollary 1: If the condition for existence and uniquenessof the Nash Equilibrium is satisfied, then the iterative water-filling algorithm for the two-user Gaussian interference game,where in every step, each modem updates its PSD regarding allinterference as noise, converges, and it converges to the uniqueNash equilibrium from any starting point.

    The condition of Theorem 1 is not a mere technicality.The following simple example illustrates a case wherethe Nash equilibrium is not unique. Consider a two-usercase where there are only two frequencies of concern. Let

    . Let powerconstraints and background noise all be 1. The set of powerallocations andis one Nash equilibrium, and the set of power allocations

    and is a differentNash equilibrium.

    IV. DISTRIBUTED POWER CONTROL

    Because of the frequency-selective nature of the DSL channel,power control algorithms for DSL applications need to allocatepower optimally not only among different users, but also inthe frequency domain. This requirement brings in many extra

    YU et al.: DISTRIBUTED MULTIUSER POWER CONTROL FOR DIGITAL SUBSCRIBER LINES 1109

    that no interference subtraction is performed regardless ofinterference strength, the data rates are

    (6)

    (7)

    Comparing the above expression with (2), it is easy to identify

    (8)

    (9)

    and similarly for and . Thus, the simplified modelincurs no loss of generality. The interference channel game con-sidered here is not a zero-sum game, i.e., one player’s loss is notequal to the other player’s gain.

    The main objective here is to characterize all pure-strategyNash equilibria in an interference channel game. At a Nash equi-librium, each user’s strategy is the optimal response to the otherplayer’s strategy. So fixing , the optimal must bethe solution to the following optimization problem:

    s.t.

    (10)

    The solution to this problem is the well-known water-fillingpower allocation. More precisely, let

    . Then, the water-filling power allocation is

    if

    if(11)

    where is a constant chosen so that the power constraint ismet. Likewise, fixing , the optimal should also bea water-filling power allocation against the combined interfer-ence from and the noise. Thus, a Nash equilibrium isreached if and only if the water-filling condition is simulta-neously achieved for both users. The characterization of Nashequilibria is therefore equivalent to a characterization of “simul-taneous water-filling” points. The idea of simultaneous water-filling is illustrated in Fig. 4. The following theorem offers sev-eral sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of theNash equilibrium in the two-user case.

    Theorem 1: Suppose that , ,then at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in thetwo-user Gaussian interference game exists. Further, let

    , ,, and

    . If any of the followingconditions, , , or is satisfied,then the Nash equilibrium is unique and is stable.

    The proof of Theorem 1 is lengthy and it is included in theAppendix. The basic idea is that under suitable conditions, the

    Fig. 4. Simultaneous water-filling.

    Nash equilibrium can be reached by an iterative water-fillingprocedure, where each user successively optimizes his powerspectrum while regarding other users’ interference as noise. Themain purpose of Theorem 1 is to characterize conditions underwhich such an iterative water-filling procedure converges. Thefollowing corollary is a direct consequence of the proof.

    Corollary 1: If the condition for existence and uniquenessof the Nash Equilibrium is satisfied, then the iterative water-filling algorithm for the two-user Gaussian interference game,where in every step, each modem updates its PSD regarding allinterference as noise, converges, and it converges to the uniqueNash equilibrium from any starting point.

    The condition of Theorem 1 is not a mere technicality.The following simple example illustrates a case wherethe Nash equilibrium is not unique. Consider a two-usercase where there are only two frequencies of concern. Let

    . Let powerconstraints and background noise all be 1. The set of powerallocations andis one Nash equilibrium, and the set of power allocations

    and is a differentNash equilibrium.

    IV. DISTRIBUTED POWER CONTROL

    Because of the frequency-selective nature of the DSL channel,power control algorithms for DSL applications need to allocatepower optimally not only among different users, but also inthe frequency domain. This requirement brings in many extra

    c©Yu, Ginnis and Cioffi, JSAC, 2002

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 13 / 26

  • Iterative Water-FillingGame-theoretic model based on selfish optimizationsEach user wants to maximize payoff: total achievable rate

    Sn(pn,p−n

    )= Rn

    (pn,p−n

    )Best Response: the power vector that maximizes payoff

    Bn(p−n) , arg maxpn∈Pn

    Sn(pn,p−n

    )I Convex optimizationI Coupled across tones by total power constraintI Can be solved by dual decompositionI Solution: water-fillingYU et al.: DISTRIBUTED MULTIUSER POWER CONTROL FOR DIGITAL SUBSCRIBER LINES 1109

    that no interference subtraction is performed regardless ofinterference strength, the data rates are

    (6)

    (7)

    Comparing the above expression with (2), it is easy to identify

    (8)

    (9)

    and similarly for and . Thus, the simplified modelincurs no loss of generality. The interference channel game con-sidered here is not a zero-sum game, i.e., one player’s loss is notequal to the other player’s gain.

    The main objective here is to characterize all pure-strategyNash equilibria in an interference channel game. At a Nash equi-librium, each user’s strategy is the optimal response to the otherplayer’s strategy. So fixing , the optimal must bethe solution to the following optimization problem:

    s.t.

    (10)

    The solution to this problem is the well-known water-fillingpower allocation. More precisely, let

    . Then, the water-filling power allocation is

    if

    if(11)

    where is a constant chosen so that the power constraint ismet. Likewise, fixing , the optimal should also bea water-filling power allocation against the combined interfer-ence from and the noise. Thus, a Nash equilibrium isreached if and only if the water-filling condition is simulta-neously achieved for both users. The characterization of Nashequilibria is therefore equivalent to a characterization of “simul-taneous water-filling” points. The idea of simultaneous water-filling is illustrated in Fig. 4. The following theorem offers sev-eral sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of theNash equilibrium in the two-user case.

    Theorem 1: Suppose that , ,then at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in thetwo-user Gaussian interference game exists. Further, let

    , ,, and

    . If any of the followingconditions, , , or is satisfied,then the Nash equilibrium is unique and is stable.

    The proof of Theorem 1 is lengthy and it is included in theAppendix. The basic idea is that under suitable conditions, the

    Fig. 4. Simultaneous water-filling.

    Nash equilibrium can be reached by an iterative water-fillingprocedure, where each user successively optimizes his powerspectrum while regarding other users’ interference as noise. Themain purpose of Theorem 1 is to characterize conditions underwhich such an iterative water-filling procedure converges. Thefollowing corollary is a direct consequence of the proof.

    Corollary 1: If the condition for existence and uniquenessof the Nash Equilibrium is satisfied, then the iterative water-filling algorithm for the two-user Gaussian interference game,where in every step, each modem updates its PSD regarding allinterference as noise, converges, and it converges to the uniqueNash equilibrium from any starting point.

    The condition of Theorem 1 is not a mere technicality.The following simple example illustrates a case wherethe Nash equilibrium is not unique. Consider a two-usercase where there are only two frequencies of concern. Let

    . Let powerconstraints and background noise all be 1. The set of powerallocations andis one Nash equilibrium, and the set of power allocations

    and is a differentNash equilibrium.

    IV. DISTRIBUTED POWER CONTROL

    Because of the frequency-selective nature of the DSL channel,power control algorithms for DSL applications need to allocatepower optimally not only among different users, but also inthe frequency domain. This requirement brings in many extra

    YU et al.: DISTRIBUTED MULTIUSER POWER CONTROL FOR DIGITAL SUBSCRIBER LINES 1109

    that no interference subtraction is performed regardless ofinterference strength, the data rates are

    (6)

    (7)

    Comparing the above expression with (2), it is easy to identify

    (8)

    (9)

    and similarly for and . Thus, the simplified modelincurs no loss of generality. The interference channel game con-sidered here is not a zero-sum game, i.e., one player’s loss is notequal to the other player’s gain.

    The main objective here is to characterize all pure-strategyNash equilibria in an interference channel game. At a Nash equi-librium, each user’s strategy is the optimal response to the otherplayer’s strategy. So fixing , the optimal must bethe solution to the following optimization problem:

    s.t.

    (10)

    The solution to this problem is the well-known water-fillingpower allocation. More precisely, let

    . Then, the water-filling power allocation is

    if

    if(11)

    where is a constant chosen so that the power constraint ismet. Likewise, fixing , the optimal should also bea water-filling power allocation against the combined interfer-ence from and the noise. Thus, a Nash equilibrium isreached if and only if the water-filling condition is simulta-neously achieved for both users. The characterization of Nashequilibria is therefore equivalent to a characterization of “simul-taneous water-filling” points. The idea of simultaneous water-filling is illustrated in Fig. 4. The following theorem offers sev-eral sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of theNash equilibrium in the two-user case.

    Theorem 1: Suppose that , ,then at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in thetwo-user Gaussian interference game exists. Further, let

    , ,, and

    . If any of the followingconditions, , , or is satisfied,then the Nash equilibrium is unique and is stable.

    The proof of Theorem 1 is lengthy and it is included in theAppendix. The basic idea is that under suitable conditions, the

    Fig. 4. Simultaneous water-filling.

    Nash equilibrium can be reached by an iterative water-fillingprocedure, where each user successively optimizes his powerspectrum while regarding other users’ interference as noise. Themain purpose of Theorem 1 is to characterize conditions underwhich such an iterative water-filling procedure converges. Thefollowing corollary is a direct consequence of the proof.

    Corollary 1: If the condition for existence and uniquenessof the Nash Equilibrium is satisfied, then the iterative water-filling algorithm for the two-user Gaussian interference game,where in every step, each modem updates its PSD regarding allinterference as noise, converges, and it converges to the uniqueNash equilibrium from any starting point.

    The condition of Theorem 1 is not a mere technicality.The following simple example illustrates a case wherethe Nash equilibrium is not unique. Consider a two-usercase where there are only two frequencies of concern. Let

    . Let powerconstraints and background noise all be 1. The set of powerallocations andis one Nash equilibrium, and the set of power allocations

    and is a differentNash equilibrium.

    IV. DISTRIBUTED POWER CONTROL

    Because of the frequency-selective nature of the DSL channel,power control algorithms for DSL applications need to allocatepower optimally not only among different users, but also inthe frequency domain. This requirement brings in many extra

    c©Yu, Ginnis and Cioffi, JSAC, 2002Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 13 / 26

  • Iterative Water-filling

    ProsI Autonomous: no explicit communication among users (interference

    plus noise can be locally measured)I Low computational complexity of O(KN): separable across users and

    tonesI Achieve better performance than the current practice

    ConsI Selfish optimizationI No consideration for damages to other usersI Highly suboptimal in the mixed CO/RT case

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 14 / 26

  • Autonomous Spectrum Balancing

    Key idea: reference line - static pricing for static channel

    I A virtual line representative of the typical victim in the networkI Good choice: the longest CO lineI Parameters (power, noise, crosstalk) are publicly known

    Each user will choose its transmit power to protect the reference line

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 15 / 26

  • Reference Line

    CP

    RT

    RT

    RT

    CP

    CO CP

    CP

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 16 / 26

  • Reference Line

    Actual Line

    Reference Line

    CO

    CPCO

    RT CP

    RT

    RT

    CP

    CP

    CP

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 16 / 26

  • Reference Line’s Rate

    User n’s obtains the reference line parameters locally

    Length & LocationReference Crosstalk:

    Reference Noise:

    Reference Power:OperatorReference Line

    Database

    pk,ref

    σk,ref

    αk,refn

    The reference line rate

    R refn =∑k

    log

    (1 +

    pk,ref

    αk,refn pkn + σk,ref

    )

    I Interference only depends on user n’s transmit power pknI Locally computable without explicit message passing

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 17 / 26

  • Reference Line’s Rate

    User n’s obtains the reference line parameters locally

    Length & LocationReference Crosstalk:

    Reference Noise:

    Reference Power:OperatorReference Line

    Database

    pk,ref

    σk,ref

    αk,refn

    The reference line rate

    R refn =∑k

    log

    (1 +

    pk,ref

    αk,refn pkn + σk,ref

    )

    I Interference only depends on user n’s transmit power pknI Locally computable without explicit message passing

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 17 / 26

  • Frequency Selective Water-filling

    Under high SNR approximation of the reference line

    Bkn(p−n

    )=

    wnλn + α

    k,refn /σk,ref · 1{pk,ref>0}

    −∑m 6=n

    αkn,mpkm − σkn

    +

    I Reference line is not active in high frequency tones

    Special case: traditional water-filling (ignore αk,refn /σk,ref)

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 18 / 26

  • Frequency Selective Water-filling

    Under high SNR approximation of the reference line

    Bkn(p−n

    )=

    wnλn + α

    k,refn /σk,ref · 1{pk,ref>0}

    −∑m 6=n

    αkn,mpkm − σkn

    +

    I Reference line is not active in high frequency tones

    Special case: traditional water-filling (ignore αk,refn /σk,ref)

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 18 / 26

    Power

    Traditional Water−Filling

    Frequency

    Interference & Noise

  • Frequency Selective Water-filling

    Under high SNR approximation of the reference line

    Bkn(p−n

    )=

    wnλn + α

    k,refn /σk,ref · 1{pk,ref>0}

    −∑m 6=n

    αkn,mpkm − σkn

    +

    I Reference line is not active in high frequency tones

    Special case: traditional water-filling (ignore αk,refn /σk,ref)

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 18 / 26

    Power

    Active Reference Line

    Frequency−Selective Water−Filling

    Frequency

    Interference & Noise

  • Convergence of ASB Algorithm

    ASB Algorithm: users update their individual power allocationaccording to best responses either sequentially or in parallel

    Theorem

    ASB algorithm globally and geometrically converges to the unique N.E. ifthe crosstalk channel is small, i.e.,

    maxn,m,k

    αkn,m <1

    N − 1.

    Independent of the reference line parameters.

    Recover the convergence of iterative water-filling as a special case.

    Proof: contraction mapping

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 19 / 26

  • Proof Outline

    1 Key Lemma: min-max of an increasing function and an decreasingfunction is achieved at the intersection.

    2 Construct two such functions based on the ASB algorithm.

    3 Show the maximum difference between the PSD during adjacentiterations is decreasing.

    maxn

    max

    {∑k

    [pk,t+1n − pk,tn

    ]+,∑k

    [pk,t+1n − pk,tn

    ]−}

    ≤maxn

    max

    {∑k

    [pk,tn − pk,t−1n

    ]+,∑k

    [pk,tn − pk,t−1n

    ]−}

    I Sequential updates: bound the maximum eigenvalue of the mappingmatrix.

    I Parallel updates: more realistic with cleaner proof.

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 20 / 26

  • ASB Performance

    4 ADSL lines.

    Mixed CO/RT deployment.

    Practical channel and background noise models.

    Both users 2 and 3 acheive fixed rates 2Mbps.

    Examine the rate region in terms of users 1 and 4’s rates.

    User 4

    CP

    RT CP

    CP

    CO CP5Km

    4Km

    3.5Km

    3Km

    2Km

    3Km

    4Km

    RT

    RT

    User 1

    User 2

    User 3

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 21 / 26

  • ASB Performance

    4 ADSL lines.

    Mixed CO/RT deployment.

    Practical channel and background noise models.

    Both users 2 and 3 acheive fixed rates 2Mbps.

    Examine the rate region in terms of users 1 and 4’s rates.

    User 4

    CP

    RT CP

    CP

    CO CP5Km

    4Km

    3.5Km

    3Km

    2Km

    3Km

    4Km

    RT

    RT

    User 1

    User 2

    User 3

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 21 / 26

  • Achievable Rate Regions of Different Algorithms

    12/7/05 Multi-user DSL 60

    60Raphael Cendrillon

    12/7/05University of Queensland

    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 80.2

    0.4

    0.6

    0.8

    1

    1.2

    1.4

    1.6

    1.8

    User 4’s Rate (Mbps)

    Use

    r 1’s

    Rat

    e (M

    bps)

    Optimal (OSB)

    Best Available Today (IW)

    ASB

    R. Cendrillon, M. Moonen, “Iterative Spectrum Balancing for Digital Subscriber Lines”, ICC 2005.

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 22 / 26

  • Power Allocation

    Power Allocation under ASB Power Allocation under Iterative Waterfilling

    R1 = 1 Mbps, R2 = 2 Mbps, R3 = 2 Mbps

    R4= 7.3 Mbps under ASB, and 3 Mbps under Iterative Waterfilling.I Around 150% rate increase for user 4

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 23 / 26

  • Robustness of Reference Line Choice

    downstream transmissions

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    ������������������������

    ������������������������

    ������������������������

    5km

    CO

    3km

    RT

    4km

    crosstalk

    ������������������������

    ������������������������

    Two-line Topology

    0 2 4 6 80

    0.5

    1

    1.5

    2

    RT Rate (Mbps)

    CO

    Rat

    e (M

    bps)

    4010 m4020 m4050 m4100 m5000 m6000 m

    Rate Region w/ various Reference Line Choice

    Performance is robust to reference line choices.

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 24 / 26

  • Summary

    Topic: spectrum management in DSL multiuser interference channels

    Key idea: static pricing using reference line

    Algorithm: ASB: autonomous, low complexity, and robust

    Performance: close to optimal, provable convergence

    Practice: achieve significantly larger rate region compared with thestate-of-the-art distributed algorithm

    Main contribution: static pricing for static coupling

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 25 / 26

  • Background Reading

    IW: W. Yu, G. Ginis, and J. Cioffi, “Distributed multiuser powercontrol for digital subscriber lines,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas inCommunication, June 2002

    OSB: R. Cendrillon, W. Yu, M. Moonen, J. Verlinden, andT. Bostoen, “Optimal multi-user spectrum balancing for digitalsubscriber lines,” IEEE Transactions on Communications, May 2006

    ASB: R. Cendrillon, J. Huang, M. Chiang, and M. Moonen,“Autonomous spectrum balancing for digital subscriber lines,” toappear in IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 2007

    Jianwei Huang (Princeton) DSL Spectrum Management March 2007 26 / 26

    Introduction