perreault, t., 2005. state restructuring and the scale politics of rural

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`` ... the power to fix geographical scales into stabilized territorial frameworks can serve not only as a tool of disempowerment, exclusion, and domination but also as a means to construct empowering, inclusive, and even emancipatory countergeographies.'' Brenner (1998, page 479) `` Neo-liberalism is now, and ever was, the politics of the crisis.'' Tickell and Peck (1995, page 370) Introduction In October 2002, as the government of Bolivia considered a request for the right to export subsurface water from the southern Altiplano (high plateau), many of the country's residents braced themselves for another guerra del agua. Just two years after the previous `water war', in which citizens of the city of Cochabamba protested the granting of a concession for their city's water services to a consortium headed by the US-based firm Bechtel, the government was again proposing to privatize water, this time in Potos|¨ Department, the country's driest and poorest region (see figure1, over). Bolivian-American businessman Peter McFarren sought the right to export subsurface water to Chilean mining firms across the border. He already had the support of several high-ranking government officials, among them the Vice-minister of Environment and Natural Resources, Ovidio Roca Aè vila.The economic logic of the deal was clear: McFarren and his partners would invest US$80 million in infrastruc- ture and services, and stood to reap US$1.2 billion over ten years. There was no effective demand for the water in the poor and sparsely populated southern Altiplano, whereas the mines in Chile's parched northern desert had both the demand for the water and the capital required to extract it from its aquifer. The state would gain resource rents, and McFarren would provide funds for `local development' (amounting to about US$400 per community). Opponents of the plan were initially dismissed as radicals:``This by all means has to happen'', asserted Roca Aè vila,``Bolivia needs money State restructuring and the scale politics of rural water governance in Bolivia Thomas Perreault Department of Geography, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1020, USA; e-mail: [email protected] Received 29 July 2003; in revised form 21 January 2004 Environment and Planning A 2005, volume 37, pages 263 ^ 284 Abstract. Recent attempts to grant private concessions to water in Bolivia raise questions regarding the effects of the state's neoliberal restructuring on environmental governance. Like other Latin American states, Bolivia has enacted sweeping neoliberal reforms during the past two decades, including privatization of public sector industries, reduction of state services, and administrative decentralization. These reforms have been accompanied by constitutional reforms that recognized certain resource and political rights on the part of Bolivia's indigenous and campesino peoples. This paper examines the reregulation and rescaling of rural water management in Bolivia, and associated processes of mobilization on the part of peasant irrigators aimed at countering state reforms. Although traditional resource rights of peasant irrigators are strengthened by cultural aspects of constitutional reforms, rural livelihoods are undermined by economic liberalization. The paper examines the implications and contradictions of neoliberal reforms for rural water management in highland Bolivia. These processes are illustrated through a brief analysis of current organizational efforts on the part of peasant irrigators. DOI:10.1068/a36188

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