Iaff 1005: Introduction to international Affairs

Sleight of Hand: The Triggers and Catalysts of World War II in Europe

Juan Pablo Poch

Juan Pablo Poch

29/04/2015

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Introduction

After reconstructing the European house of cards for two decades, one of the most infamous conflicts in

human history was sparked the moment Hitler set his boot heel over Poland on September 1st, 1939.

However, if history repeating itself is not a craft of pure coincidence, there is room to inquire what caused

the spark of World War II in Europe. This paper seeks to address this question by conducting a

comprehensive assessment of international relations theories, with an emphasis on the features of the

international system – or third image. This investigation conceptualizes the explanations for the onset of

World War II through two separate categories of triggers and catalysts. The former act as the necessary

cause of conflict: explanations or implications without which there would not have been such an event.

Meanwhile, catalysts operate as factors or conditions that force an escalation of tensions leading to the

trigger or its build-up.

The main catalysts that contributed to the escalation of tensions leading up to World War II can

be summed up in liberalist and realist hypotheses. From the liberalist perspective, the lack of economic

interdependence between European states and the United States exemplifies the dissociation of interstate

trade relations, while the collapse of neoliberal institutionalism explains the hopeless attempt to contain

bellicose states. Once the international regime devolved into anarchy, the rationalist explanations for war

delineate states’ calculations to endure the costs of ineffective war. All of the above being catalysts, this

assessment endorses an offensive realist trigger of the inciting event of World War II as a product of Nazi

Germany’s power maximization and the Allied counterparts buck-passing.

Background

Following World War I, the power distribution shifted drastically, with the collapse of the former

Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires and the deterioration of the German Second Reich into

the Weimar Republic. Internationally, Soviet communism and Western democracy emerged as the

dominant ideologies of global politics. The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 celebrated the long-awaited

end of World War I and the leaders of the victor states gathered to shape the future foreign policy and

“peace” outlined in the Treaty of Versailles. The beginning portion established the creation of the League

of Nations, the first international political organization assembled to oversee global security and settle

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future interstate disputes. The remainder of the treaty, though, focused on sanctioning Germany for

starting the war. It condemned the beaten state to pay 132 billion marks (US $442 billion in 2012 dollars)

as reparation for damages caused during the war, to renounce to its colonies in Africa and to forfeit

Alsace-Lorraine and West Prussia ("The Treaty of Versailles"). Additionally, the charter reduced the

German military to a 100,000 men with no advanced weaponry (Kissenger 1994, 293). The settlement

was repudiated by the German state and people, yet it was enforced to the letter, only with minimal

reductions to the reparations. German domestic collapse was imminent not only because of the hyper-

inflated economy that led to the years of the Great Depression, but also due to the stigma of the “war

guilt” that degraded German identity. The transition of the Weimar Republic paved the way for the rise of

Hitler to chancellor in 1934 and totalitarian control of the ultra-right-winged Nazi party, following the

surging fascist wave that had already swept through Italy and placed Mussolini at the top of the executive

in 1925.

The agitated nationalist political theatre in central and southern Europe tested the legitimacy of

the Treaty of Versailles, where charisma subdued the legal basis of the pact, reassured the expansionist

and vindictive interests of the incipient Axis, and permeated several alerting transgressions to the accord.

Among these was the reconstruction of the German army, including the reestablishment of the Luftwaffe,

the remilitarization of the Rhineland and the frontier with France in 1936, and the annexation of Austria

and Czechoslovakia two years later. The omens of the rebirth of Germany and the Axis to challenge their

neighboring Western great powers were increasingly conspicuous as they engaged in more ambitious

political courses like the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and the weapons tests in the midst of the

Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). This resolve was widely magnified ensuing the alliance and mutual

apportionment of territory with the USSR, another sleeping giant, after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in

1939. The uproar of the challengers posed a concern if not a threat to the British and the French;

nonetheless, they opted to preserve temporary peace with the signing of the 1938 Munich Pact. It was

only a matter of time that the boiling contention would escalate against the interests of the Allies, which

neither the Munich Pact nor the League of Nations could avert from the inevitable spark of war. The

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world would not see an official end to the war until September 2, 1945, after the Allies marched

victoriously through the streets of Berlin and dropped two atomic bombs on Japan.

Literature and Hypotheses

The lack of economic interdependence among European states and with the US catalyzed the degradation

of diplomatic relations. This theory originates from the liberal assumption that states in the international

system seek not to preserve their security but instead to maximize their utility. As a consequence, the

theory postulates that “[high] trade and investment flows can lead to peace by giving states an incentive to

avoid militarized conflict and war” (Copeland 1993, 27). However, the volatility of the international

economic panorama undermines the ideal interdependence, and often drives states to seek shelter in

protectionist policies. When interdependence fails, “[the] restraint [from coercive actions] is taken away,

unleashing domestic forces and pathologies that may be lurking in the background” (Copeland 1993, 34).

In order to explain this drawback, Copeland (1993) introduces the trade expectations theory, which

reconciles liberal utilitarianism and realist security concerns by incorporating an additional variable: “a

dependent actor’s expectation of the future trade and investment environment” (Copeland 1993, 27). This

“determines when high dependence will push states toward either relatively peaceful behavior or hard-

line policies and war” (Copeland 1993, 27). In another review of the theory, Copeland formulates the

following mechanism:

“If highly interdependent states expect that trade will be severely restricted - that is, if their expectations for future trade are low - realists are likely to be right: the most highly dependent states will be the ones most likely to initiate war, for fear of losing the economic wealth that supports their long-term security. In short, high interdependence can be either peace-inducing or war-inducing, depending on the expectations of future trade” (Copeland 1996, 10)

The theory effectively explains the nuance between peace- and war-prone circumstances on the basis of a

comprehensive analysis of realism and liberalism. Nonetheless, it struggles to explain the behavior of the

less dependent state and the scenarios in which they may engage in coercive – or even imperial –

diplomacy and actions that develop into a war, such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.1

1 According to Scott Sagan, Japan launched an offensive on Pearl Harbor as a response to the U.S. oil embargo. This would have crippled the Imperial Navy, for they were considerably dependent on US petroleum imports. Sagan, Scott D. "The Origins of the Pacific War." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18.4 (1988): 908.

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The core postulate of neoliberal institutionalism is that “from the deficiency of the ‘self-system’

[a cornerstone of realism] we derive a need for international regimes” (Keohane 1984, 88). According to

Keohane (1984), regimes “resemble conventions that actors conform to, not because they are uniquely

best, but because others conform to [such conventions] as well” (Keohane 1984, 89). In order to achieve

this scenario of mutually beneficial agreements, Keohane suggests a translation of the Coase theorem

from the field of economics into the arena of international relations. This rationale provides a mechanism

to reach cooperation by reducing transaction costs, enforcing property rights and easing uncertainty

between parties.2 In the first instance, transaction costs are initially reduced “[by] making it cheaper for

governments to come together [and] negotiate”; by providing a negotiating table, an international

institution automatically relieves governments from substantial arrangement expenses. Within the bargain

itself, “linkages and side-payments among issues grouped in the same regime” facilitate lesser

bureaucratic costs (Keohane 1984, 91), while a reinforcement of these practices through iteration cuts

“the marginal cost of dealing with each additional issue” (Keohane 1984, 90). Secondly, Keohane

advocates that international institutions would oversee and sanction the agreement as the legitimate

authority, so that none of the parties would default on the agreement. This legal framework operates on

the basis of incentives and sanctions, for imposing a consistent rule of law poses an immense challenge to

state sovereignty: “costs of reneging on commitment is increased, and the costs of operating within this

framework [regime] are reduced” (Keohane 1984, 89). In other words, the international community

cannot police states without breaching domestic sovereignty and, ironically, perpetuating an act of war.

For the latter condition, Keohane suggests that these organizations could hurdle the barrier of uncertainty

“by promoting negotiations in which transparency is encouraged [and] dealing with a series of issues over

many years and under similar rules, thus encouraging honesty in order to preserve future reputation”

(Keohane 1998, 86). Thus, uncertainty would be undermined on the basis of values and incentives that

reaffirm the regime’s legitimacy and expectations.

2 Under ideal conditions, Keohane’s argument would serve as solution to Fearon’s “Rationalist Explanations for War”: it “surmounts the [private] barrier to communication” (Fearon 1995, 400), solves the deceptive commitment problems and unbinds seemingly indivisible issues.

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John Mearshimer’s offensive realism lays foundation on the concept of international anarchy,

defined as “the absence of a governing authority over the great powers” (Mearshimer 2001, 19), to

support the states’ necessity for power in the quest for survival in a lawless system. Although structural

realists, offensive and defensive, believe in the balance of power among states, Mearshimer’s assessment

suggests a different measure of the amount of power required to balance. While Kenneth Waltz’s

defensive realism identifies states as “power preservers” – assuming a stable status quo –, offensive

realism brands them as “power maximizers”, for there exist persuasive incentives to aggrandize their

capabilities “to be the hegemon of the system” (Mearshimer 2001, 21). For Mearshimer, power

distribution and incentives to buck-pass varies according to bipolar (two great powers), balanced

multipolar (many states with equal power) or unbalanced multipolar (many states with asymmetrical

power) international ordering. Consequently, these arrangements prescribe the tendency of states to

balance or buck-pass against a threat to the status quo. Oftentimes, “buck-passing is preferred over

balancing, because the successful buck-passer does not have to fight the aggressor if deterrence fails”

(Mearshimer 2001, 267). This is the luxury of balanced multipolarity, where there is always a “potential

buck-catcher”, and the tragedy of bipolarity, where there is none. However, in the case of unbalanced

multipolarity, variation occurs according to “relevant distribution of power and geography” (Mearshimer

2001, 268), and the existence of a potential hegemon.3 States would form what Mearshimer calls a

“balancing coalition” against the latter menace under the possibility of a hegemonic war that threatens

with a mercurial transformation of the status quo. Yet, “costs of containment are likely to be great,” and

states will pass the buck at the expense of others bearing such costs (Mearshimer 2001, 271). Secondly,

geography influences certain courses of action on the basis of proximity to the threat, as well as the

presence of obstacles. While adjacent states are forced to defend themselves from being the aggressor’s

prey (balance), separate countries regard the threat as an outlier and opt to buck-pass. In a similar manner,

a state shielded by physical obstacles (e.g. water masses, mountains, marshes) that create a difficult

3 Such variations “facilitated buck-passing against Napoleon (1792) and Hitler (1939), but not against Kaiser Wilhelm” (Mearshimer 2001, 269), who had to face the Triple Entente even before the July Crisis of 1914.

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access for the attacker’s military can safely assume that a rational tactician would venture through a more

favorable terrain, so the buck is passed to states without natural barriers.4

In his “Rationalist Explanations of War,” James Fearon submits the international disputes to Carl

von Clausewitz’s Bargaining Model of War in which a variety of statistical outcomes from the political

tug-of-war – including but not limited to absolute victory or defeat – leads up either to a bellicose conflict

or a diplomatic settlement of the issue. Based on this reference frame, Fearon proposes three major

mechanisms through which states rationally opt to fight wars rather than engage in diplomatic bargains to

international disputes: private information and incentives to misrepresent, commitment problems and

issue indivisibilities. The former establishes that the lack of private information about a state’s relative

power and capabilities, summed up with incentives to misrepresent the available knowledge about their

rival’s intent, means that states cannot always use subtle conciliation to discover mutually preferable

settlements. “Since the bargaining range is determined not just by relative power but also by states' values

for the issues at stake relative to the costs of fighting”, states would forego the alternative of a diplomatic

solution in order to obtain a stronger leverage in the bargaining table (Fearon 1995, 395). On second

instance, the explanation of commitment problems implies that a state cannot fully compromise to uphold

an agreement in the future under specific circumstances, particularly those that would conflict with its

vital interests. Fearon (1995) notes that the unstable “structural condition of anarchy” derives from an

“unfortunate combination of state preferences and opportunities for action [that] imply that one or both

sides in a dispute have incentives to renege on peaceful bargains” (Fearon 1995, 401); the negotiating

range changes unprecedentedly as well as the probabilities of war as an outcome. Such situation arises,

for example, over a territorial concession that could arrange a short-term entente, but would provide

crucial strategic or economic advantage to the recipient over the grantor in the occasion of a future

bargain. The latter complication of issue indivisibilities emerges from the vital and fundamental interests

that a state would tag as non-negotiable.5 Therefore, the likelihood of war augments, for “the issue allows

4 The two antipodes of this same argument are the UK, with its “splendid isolation”, and Poland, characterized by its flat terrain and neighbor of two great powers, which the Nazis were able to conquer in a month.5 An example of this sort of issue is the dispute over Alsace-Lorraine in 1914 between Germany and France.

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only a finite number of resolutions, [and] it might be that none falls within the range that both prefer

[instead of] fighting” (Fearon 1995, 382).

Evidence

The adoption of protectionist measures in the United States such as the Smoot-Hawley tariff in 1930 not

only disrupted the influx of products from struggling European economies – especially Germany –, but

also raised the prices of US exports needed in the German manufacturing sector. The ensuing wave of

domestic barriers from the “tariff wars” plunged the economies in need of recovery – to repay war debts

to the US, among other reasons – into a tighter recession, as not only were they deprived from selling

competitively in the open market, but also from producing for their own domestic needs. International

economic interdependence collapsed, yet Germany grew excessively dependent on US raw materials. In

Charles Kindleberger’s words, “the gain for one country was a loss for all” (Kindleberger 1986, 291).

Thus, in line with the trade expectations theory, the overwhelming hyperinflation fomented by

protectionist measures decreased the incentives for engaging in global trade. In the middle of German

economic distress, “the more than six million unemployed grasped for any promise of an active program

to replace the confusion of the Weimar Republic” (Eubank 1969, 23). Consequently, Hitler seized the

opportunity to gather popular support and convinced the masses of his nationalist-expansionist goals.

And, without a doubt, “the German people hailed this military rebirth with great joy” (Eubank 1969, 38).

Nevertheless, unlike Copeland’s liberalist view, the crisis led Germany to embrace autarky and even

Hitler’s advocacy for Lebensraum in Eastern Europe to “lessen German dependency on foreign sources

for raw materials and [to] make the army and the economy ready for his blitzkrieg campaigns” (Eubank

1969, 39).6 Furthermore, trade expectations theory fails to explain the compliance of the American

government to local agricultural producers’ demands, even while being in a position of low dependence

but favorable returns from trade. If the US would have remained a defendant of open economic policy,

there exists a promising probability that the German fascism and rearmament would have been avoided or

easily mitigated through economic incentives.

6 This economic reorientation served in a similar as the Kaiser’s Flottenpolitik, which, according to German Foreign Minister Prince von Bülow, was a “policy that mobilized the best patriotic forces (…) that appealed to the highest national emotions.” Wawro, Geoffrey, Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792-1914 (London: Routlege, 2000), 180.

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Provided Wilson’s idealistic collective security prevailed – an assumption that “all the nations in

the world had equal interest in peace and would therefore unite to punish those who disturbed it”

(Kissinger 1994, 51) –, the League of Nations should had stepped up to repress the Nazi threat or at least

compel the member states to balance against the rogue state. Nevertheless, the League failed to fulfill at

least two of the provisions suggested by Copeland. From its most structural aspects, the League’s legal

framework and legitimacy was not backed up by the major powers and industrial economies of the

interwar period: the US, a major power already, refused to sign the Covenant in 1919 – ironic given that it

was President Wilson’s initiative to create it –, while Germany and the USSR remained excluded until

1926 and 1934 respectively:

“Idealists imagined that the League would be the supreme arbiter of international affairs, but the great powers who dominated the League would not permit it to handle matters vital to their national interests. They were willing to use the League when it suited them—when the disputes were minor affairs involving less powerful nations” (Eubank 1969, 14)

The League imposed no credible restraint for violent member states, since its power was limited to a

public disapproval of violence rather than its actual containment or eradication. Such was the case in the

1935 Ethiopian Crisis, when “the failure of the League members to compel Mussolini to halt his invasion,

which was clearly contrary to the Covenant, doomed the League of Nations” (Eubank 1969, 55).

Secondly, regarding transaction costs, a major internal issue was the expeditious determination, for “all

decisions of the Council, as well as the Assembly, had to be unanimous” (Eubank 1969, 14). The failure

to reach a timely consensus over major issues and execute decisive action turned into another bureaucratic

loop, and implied not necessarily an explicit cost to the involved nations, but a substantial opportunity

cost from foregone self-help. John Maynard Keynes question of the institution’s efficiency remains

relevant: “does not this provision reduce the League, so far as concerns an early reconsideration of any of

the terms of the Peace Treaty, into a body merely for wasting time?” (Keynes 1920, 124)

Concerning the distribution of power, despite that the unbalanced multipolar system resembled to

a considerable extent that of pre-World War I era, it had two fundamental differences: a seemingly

weaker Central Power (Nazi Germany) and a consequently disbanded Entente (Britain, France and the

Soviet Union). In an attempt to prevent a future uprising, the Treaty imposed a multitude of conditions to

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reduce German military capabilities, from the “reduction of total effective force to 100,000 men” (Article

163) to the surrender of all offensive or specialized weaponry (Art. 164), and the “demobilization of all

the personnel of the Air Services” (Art. 198) (Tardieu 1921, 131-133). Yet, “Germany certainly had the

requisite population and wealth [resources] to build the mightiest army of Europe” (Mearshimer 2001,

305). And, once Hitler rose to power in 1933, he concealed this latent power from the naive European

powers to incite them to pass the buck among each other. Under the illusion of German lack of

hegemonic potential in the early 1930s, “the United Kingdom passed the buck to France, which tried to

push Hitler eastward against smaller states of eastern Europe and possibly the Soviet Union, which in turn

tried to pass the buck to the United Kingdom and France” (Mearshimer 2001, 308).7 In terms of

geography, the UK and the USSR had incentives to buck-pass: the former was detached from continental

Europe by the English Canal – “splendid isolation” –, and the latter used Poland as a buffer zone from

any Nazi threat. On the other hand, France shared borders with Germany, for they were not separated by a

buffer state. Instead, between them lay the Rhineland, a de-militarized zone controlled by the French – at

least until 1935. However, after the 1925 Locarno Pact, the French recognized the possibility of a future

German invasion, which motivated the adoption of contingent defensive strategies, such as the

construction of the Maginot Line in 1929.

The morning of January 30, 1933, when Hitler was appointed German Chancellor, meant a

radical change of the country’s foreign policy from Gustav Stresemann’s acquiescent cooperation to the

Fürher’s devious demands. Throughout the past decades, the British appeasement of Hitler during the

1930s has inspired many leaders in international affairs to refer to the Munich analogy as one of “lessons

learned” from awarding concessions to an imperialistic power. Even now, there exists a heated debate

over the aims of the of the British appeasement policy: while the orthodox school claims it aimed to

satiate Hitler’s lust for power, the revisionist view suggests it bought time for British rearmament.

Nonetheless, the chain of events that eventually led to the outbreak of war suggests that the policy’s

objective evolved from a mere satisfaction of Hitler’s requests to a realist calculus of power under a

limited time frame. Before the Munich Conference in 1938, Britain miscalculated Nazi Germany’s

7 In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearshimer portrays a similar “pattern of balancing and buck-passing displayed by [Napoleon’s] rivals between 1789 and 1815” (Mearshimer 2001, 288).

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willingness to fight, for “the appeaser [saw] in the successive demands of the imperialistic power,

rationally limited objectives” (Dimuccio 1998, 247). Contrary to the Allies beliefs:

“Concessions over German rearmament, the Rhineland, Austria, and Sudeten Czechoslovakia not only failed to appease Hitler, but made war even more likely by whetting his appetite for aggression and by undermining the credibility of Britain and France and the utility of their subsequent guarantee of Poland” (Ripsman and Levy 2008, 149)

Hitler acted under the pretext of self-determination to justify the annexation of neighboring weak states

with German nationals, while reserving his true intention to overthrow the status quo in the long run to his

inner circle: “The Reich Chancellor again stressed that for the next 4-5 years the main principle must be:

everything for the armed forces. Germany's position in the world was decisively dependent upon the

position of the German armed forces” (Cabinet Discussion on Budget Priorities, February 8, 1933).

Notwithstanding, Fearon’s argument of incentives to misrepresent works in the opposite way, for the

Nazis were incited “to conceal their capabilities or resolve, if they are concerned that revelation would

make them militarily (and hence politically) vulnerable or would reduce the chances for a successful first

strike” or “persuade the other side to make [further] concession” (Fearon 1995, 396).

Even so, the moment Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia en masse in 1938 – while claiming only to

occupy the former Reich’s Sudetenland – he subdued a portion of the Czech national group, and, thus,

breached the principle of self-determination: “he had crossed the line of what was morally tolerable (…)

British public opinion would tolerate no further concessions” (Kissinger 1994, 317). At this point, the

Allies had the necessary evidence to confirm the Hitler’s expansionist motives, which turned the

appeasement into a means for accelerated rearmament. Meanwhile, naive to underlying implications of

Munich, German minister of propaganda celebrated: “The world is filled with a frenzy of joy. Germany’s

prestige has grown enormously. Now we are really a world power again” (Cavendish 2008). Although

the French and the Soviets had kept large standing armies as a preventive measure, the Brits “believed

that with a major rearmament effort the military imbalance [vis-à-vis Germany] could be corrected by the

late 1930s” (Ripsman and Levy 2008, 150). Yet, the reality of this explanation is challenged by “Britain’s

economic problems [that] were compounded by the world economic crisis of the early 1930s, to the point

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that a military rearmament program was perceived as an unnecessary luxury” (Ripsman and Levy 2008,

159).

Even though Hitler’s anti-Semitism and charismatic fascism are often credited for precipitating

World War II in Europe, his ruthless pragmatism to pursue vital international security goals for Germany

reflect a set of rational power calculations. In Mein Kampf, Hitler fostered a Hobbesian perspective of the

world that appealed to a domestic solution to an international problem: “Because Germany does not

defend itself in any other way except by the flamboyant protests of our parliamentarian elect, there is no

reason why the rest of the world should take up the fight in our defense” (Hitler 1943, 475). From an

international regime that had placed the country against the wall ever since Versailles (1919), the Fürher

decisively concluded that “Germany will either become a world power or will not continue to exist at all”

(Hitler 1943, 500).8 Beyond paranoid speculation, the German leadership sustained compelling

geographical arguments to reinforce its homeland security: “[Germany] is located in the center of Europe

with few natural defensive barriers on either its eastern or western flanks, which make it vulnerable to

invasion” (Mearshimer 2001, 181). To achieve survival through hegemony, Hitler professed

“Lebensraum, or ‘living space,’ was needed if Germany was to have sufficient population, food, and

natural resources to dominate Europe” (Eubank 1969, 28). Hence, the Wehrmacht aimed to rebuild its

military might throughout the 1930s from the spoils of the Weimer Republic. Accordingly, it enhanced

the military industry, reestablished the Luftwaffe (Air Force) and enlarged the infantry sevenfold. At long

last, the Third Reich became a potential hegemon of Europe by the Munich crisis in mid-1938. Soon, by

1939, Hitler triggered his war machine and began expanding the German frontiers; first, it fed off its weak

neighboring states and, by July of 1941, the Germans marched under the Arc du Triumph. Thus, in line

with the offensive realist doctrine, the Nazis embraced the necessity for maximizing power in order to

favorably shift the balance of power and assure survival as the hegemon of the anarchic system.

Conclusion

8 Hitler’s ideas were similar to those of Kaiser Wilhelm II and Weltpolitik, which “[were] founded on the Social Darwinist belief that Germany had either to expand or stagnate.” Wawro, Geoffrey, Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792-1914 (London: Routlege, 2000), 176.

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The lack of economic interdependence and the institutional void of the prewar years contributed to the

forsaking of incentives of mutual gains and peaceful cooperation among states. Protectionism doomed the

global free trade while powerlessness within the international regime wrecked the inefficient League of

Nations. A second image perspective suggests that the Great Depression and the subsequent social unrest

instigated nationalist movements that paved the way for aggressive fascist regimes across Europe.

Nonetheless, these arguments were not sufficient causes for the spark of the Second World in Europe, for

the nationalist movements endorsed domestic reforms – interstate conflicts were not openly promoted. On

the other hand, the failure of institutions demonstrated war in defense of collective security stood not

among the great powers’ vital interests – for instance, the League lost credibility after its inaction during

crises in Manchuria and Ethiopia. In this way, the end of cooperation meant not the outbreak of war, but

rather the first step of an escalating conflict.

In view of the restoration of the anarchic system, the European unbalanced multipolarity

intensified, for the Treaty of Vienna failed at changing significantly the power distribution of the pre-

World War I stage. A first image argument could be made that certain leaders contributed to the further

destabilization of the international system. For instance, Hitler was an unpredictable amalgamation of

Kaiser Wilhelm’s hegemonic ambitions – as noted in Mein Kampf – and Bismarck’s Machiavellian

statesmanship. As mentioned by Mearshimer, “he not only played his adversaries off against each other,

but he went to considerable lengths to convince them that Nazi Germany had benign intentions”

(Mearshimer 2001, 216). Nonetheless, his concern for German security and consolidation as a powerful

nation within the international system was no different from those of his predecessors. In line with this

common intent, the figure of Hitler alone was not the cause for World War II, in the same way that

Wilhelm II was unable to declare war on the Triple Entente before finding a reason to do so in the murder

of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

Realism provides a thorough third image assessment of the systematic features that triggered

World War II. The rationalist explanations for war illustrate the appeasement situation based on the

Hitler's incentives to hide private information and to deliberately drive his adversaries to miscalculate his

willingness to fight. Yet, in this particular case, the private information and incentives to misrepresent it

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meant not to unleash hostilities, but to postpone them until the Reich reached its rearmament prospects. In

this measure, Fearon’s argument justifies Germany’s concealed and accelerated preparation for war – and

even the belated Allied rearmament at the brink of conflict –, along with Hitler’s accomplished military

advantages through the appeasement. Notwithstanding, this rationale caveat is the assumption that actors

hold no particular motivations, for Nazi Germany pursued both protectionist and expansionist enterprise.

Contrary to the previous theory, Mearshimer’s offensive realism accomplishes to integrate both

the Axis’ and the Allies’ motives to the international system’s vices that resulted in World War II. The

lack of consensus over the balance of power in Europe’s asymmetrical multipolar structure explains the

German power maximizing conduct to achieve security objectives as the dominant state in the system.

Additionally, buck-passing illustrates the Allied powers non-responsive behavior during the time the

Central Power remained an unlikely hegemon to them. Offensive realism demonstrates that, once Nazi

Germany had acquired sufficient military capabilities to overwhelm the other European powers, it would

commence hostilities to expand across the continent. Nevertheless, this line of thought leaves an inquiry

unanswered: why did not the Allies launch a preventive strike against the Axis anytime between the

Munich Conference (mid-1938) and the Poland Blitzkrieg in September of 1939?

Hitherto, the world has lived in a relatively stable long peace. Following the end of World War II,

the Cold War presented another instance of conflict within the US-USSR bipolar system, yet it never

escalated to the levels of intensity of either world war. Even though several conflicts emerged around the

globe, these were minor in comparison to the means employed in total war. Has warfare finally become a

taboo to humanity, a topic resented even when considered a viable option? Have international institutions

and trade, as well as a universal creed of democracy, kept states from exterminating one another? Or, has

the alternative of nuclear lethality driven us to draw a thin line between our private interests and

extinction? Philosopher George Santayana claims that “those who cannot learn from history are doomed

to repeat it.” But those who are not prepared for history repeating itself, might as well end up being part

of it, hunted by those with sleight of hand.

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