AEI’s Critical Threats ProjectUpdate and Assessment

November 8, 2016

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

1. Al Qaeda may resume an attack campaign targeting the U.S. homeland from its safe havens. It is planning external attacks from Afghanistan and Syria.

2. ISIS may resurge during a pause in U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations in central Libya.

3. Al Shabaab is moving to expand its territorial control in Somalia as the AMISOM coalition weakens.

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| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA

al Qaeda NetworkAl Qaeda may be refocusing its efforts on targeting the U.S. after establishing safe havens in Syria and Afghanistan and strengthening its network of affiliates. A senior FBI official warned of potential al Qaeda attacks in the U.S. homeland on November 7, one day before the U.S. presidential election. The alleged attack was linked to a senior al Qaeda commander killed by a U.S. airstrike in Afghanistan on October 23. Al Qaeda has continued to plan attacks against the U.S. and Western targets while developing regional footholds and seeking to incite a global insurgency.

Outlook: Al Qaeda will continue to plan attacks against the U.S. and the West.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesThe Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) continues to target Pakistani security forces. The TTP carried out an attack at a Pakistani military camp in Kurram Agency in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on November 1. The TTP’s Umar Media claimed that the attack killed eight Pakistani soldiers.

Outlook: Salafi-jihadi groups will continue efforts to undermine the Pakistani state by attacking security, judicial, and sectarian targets.

SecurityPolitical and military tensions remain high between the Indian and Pakistani governments. Cross-border firing continued along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. Indian intelligence reiterated its accusation that the Pakistani military allowed the Salafi-jihadi group Jaish-e-Mohammed to operate “terror launch pads” near Pakistani military bases in order to infiltrate Indian territory. The governments of India and Pakistan accused Indian and Pakistani diplomats in their countries of spying and promoting terrorism.

Outlook: The governments of India and Pakistan will attempt to de-escalate tensions along the Line of Control.

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PoliticalPresident Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi is an obstacle in Yemen’s peace process. Hadi rejected a revised peace proposal that would have limited his executive authority. Saudi officials have privately expressed their support for the peace deal, though are unlikely to use leverage to change Hadi’s decision until there is a named vice president option, and former president Ali Abdullah Saleh called it a “good basis for negotiations.” Al Houthi-Saleh forces released a detained U.S. citizen as a possible goodwill gesture for the peace process. Yemen’s Southern Movement demonstrated against the peace proposal. Its supporters argued that marginalizing Hadi, who has empowered southern leaders, threatens southern representation.

Outlook: President Hadi’s prioritization of his own political survival will continue to stall the diplomatic process.

SecurityYemen’s major frontlines in the civil war remain fixed. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance is using ballistic missiles to both defend its position in Sana’a and impose costs on Saudi Arabia for its air campaign in Yemen. The Saudi-led coalition continued to target transportation infrastructure and al Houthi-Saleh leadership in an effort to degrade the faction’s military capabilities. The coalition continued to reinforce its blockade of Yemen’s Red Sea coast.

Outlook: Both sides will attempt to advance their objectives militarily while the peace process remains stalled.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP continues to position itself as the defender of the Sunni population in central and southern Yemen. AQAP militants assassinated multiple al Houthi-Saleh field commanders in Ibb and al Bayda governorates. AQAP militants also targeted government officials and security forces in formerly AQAP-held population centers in Abyan, Shabwah, and Hadramawt governorates. ISIS Wilayat al Bayda claimed to repel an al Houthi-Saleh attack in western al Bayda governorate.

Outlook: AQAP attacks against al Houthi-Saleh forces in central Yemen may decrease as AQAP reallocates resources for anti-government operations in its historic base of support in southern Yemen.

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

1) 01 NOV: Coalition warplanes bombed a bridge in al Mahwit.2) 02 NOV: Coalition airstrikes destroyed al Houthi-Saleh vessels near Mokha port city. 3) 03 NOV: AQAP detonated a SVBIED in Hadramawt. 4) 04 NOV: Al Houthi-Saleh forces launched a ballistic missile toward Jazan, Saudi Arabia. 5) 04 OCT: ISIS repelled an al Houthi-Saleh attack in Qifa, al Bayda.6) 07 NOV: AQAP militants assassinated an al Houthi-Saleh artillery expert in Ibb.

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PoliticalRelations between the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop contributing countries (TCCs) are deteriorating. Kenyan authorities rejected a claim by a UN Security Council report that Kenyan forces have embezzled tens of millions of dollars from the illegal charcoal trade in Somalia. The Burundian Minister of Defense announced that Burundian forces may withdraw from the AMISOM contingent on November 3 due to months of unpaid salaries. Ethiopia is unlikely to redeploy the forces it recently withdrew from Somalia to deal with domestic protests.

Outlook: The AMISOM mission likely requires international political support to sustain troop presence and fulfill its mandate.

Security Repeated ceasefire attempts have not stopped the violence between Puntland and Galmudug security forces in central Somalia. Artillery exchanges between Galmudug and Puntland security forces on November 6 ended a November 1 ceasefire agreement, killed at least 20 individuals, and wounded 80 others. UN Special Envoy to Somalia Michael Keating led a second round of ceasefire talks on November 7 that disintegrated as clashes continued on November 8. Keating warned that the continued violence and instability in the area has drawn additional al Shabaab forces to the region. This round of fighting between the rival administrations began following a September 14 U.S. airstrike that killed 14 Galmudug security forces. Galmudug blamed the strike on Puntland intelligence.

Outlook: Clashes between Galmudug and Puntland security forces will continue into 2017.

Al Shabaab Al Shabaab is attempting to expand its areas of control in Middle Shabelle region. Al Shabaab launched a series of attacks on Burundian AMISOM forces near Mahaday, Middle Shabelle region on November 4 and 6. Al Shabaab occupies much of the territory west of Mogadishu and is likely trying to increase its control in Middle Shabelle to encircle Mogadishu and facilitate attacks on the city from the north.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely attack strategic cities north of Mogadishu, including Bal’ad and Jowhar.

GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

1) 02 NOV: Unidentified warships fired missiles into Qandala, Bari region, which is occupied by pro-ISIS militants. 2) 02 NOV: An al Shabaab IED targeted KDF forces in El Wak, Gedo region.3) 04 NOV: Al Shabaab attacked AMISOM forces near Mahaday, Middle Shabelle region.4) 05 NOV: Al Shabaab detonated a SVBIED near Somalia’s Parliament.5) 06 NOV: Puntland and Galmudug forces clashed in Galkayo, Mudug region. 4

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PoliticalThe economic crisis is causing a security breakdown in Tripoli, Libya. Clashes between rival militias over contested neighborhoods and access to cash have begun to produce casualties. Instability in Tripoli emboldens militias that oppose the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), which controls only limited parts of Libya’s capital and has failed to deliver promised economic recovery to the population.

Outlook: The liquidity crisis will continue to erode the GNA’s limited popular support and inspire rival actors, including members of a rump Islamist parliament, to openly challenge the GNA for control of government institutions.

SecurityThe GNA’s defense minister, Mehdi al Barghathi, may be preparing to mount a military challenge to Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s over control of the central Libyan oil crescent. Barghathi, a Benghazi native with favorable relationships to former army units, powerful tribes, and Islamist militant groups in eastern Libya, is massing forces in al Jufra district. The LNA mobilized reinforcements to secure its oil ports in response.

Outlook: Rising tensions in the oil crescent will siphon manpower away from the holding force meant to combat ISIS.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS may be positioned to resurge during a pause in the U.S. air campaign in Sirte. ISIS continues to resist GNA-allied forces that are attempting to clear the group’s final stronghold in Sirte’s al Jiza neighborhood. The group has also reconstituted attack teams in the desert south of Sirte that are capable of attacking GNA-allied positions and supply lines. ISIS may attempt to deploy explosive capabilities that have been suppressed by U.S. air support. ISIS views the Sirte fight as ongoing and continues to recruit foreign fighters to Libya.

Outlook: ISIS may attempt to re-occupy strategic neighborhoods in Sirte.

WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA

1) 04 NOV: Attackers attempted to assassinate the head of the Magharba tribe in Sidi Faraj, Benghazi. 2) 05 NOV: Attackers killed two GNA-allied militiamen near al Abyar. 3) 05 NOV: ISIS resisted the advance of GNA-allied militias in al Jiza, Sirte. 4) 07 NOV: Rival tribal militias clashed at a cash exchange in al Siyahiya, Tripoli. 5) 07 NOV: The Mujahideen Shura Council of Derna clashed with the LNA in al Fata’ih, Derna.

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Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the MaghrebISIS may be building networks in northern African states that are capable of conducting repeated small-scale attacks and degrading security forces within their support zones. ISIS militants are reportedly infiltrating Constantine city in northeastern Algeria, where the group’s Algerian affiliate recently claimed credit for the assassination of a police officer. An ISIS militant killed a national guardsman in western Tunisia’s Kasserine governorate, where ISIS reportedly maintains a safe haven. Moroccan security forces broke up an ISIS cell in northern Morocco that may have had explosive capabilities.

Outlook: ISIS will conduct assassination campaigns to degrade security in the areas in which it operates.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)AQIM’s Ansar al Din may be increasing the scale and complexity of its attacks against international and Malian forces. Ansar al Din and its southern brigade, the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), conducted at least four attacks between November 4 and November 7, including a raid on a Malian barracks, a bank robbery, and a prison break. They also maintained a steady tempo of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against Malian and MINUSMA convoys. AQIM discouraged opposition to its northern Mali safe haven by publicizing its execution of several purported spies.

The Boko Haram faction loyal to ISIS may be using the marshlands of Lake Chad as a base of operations. This mimics the strategy of Abubakar Shekau’s rival Boko Haram faction, which is based in the Sambisa Forest. Nigerien Minister of Foreign Affairs Ibrahim Yacoub expressed frustration with the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) for its inability to conduct successful operations in the lake bed. Lake Chad’s water levels fluctuate, making islands and passable waterways ever-changing, especially during the rainy season. The Nigerian military continues to focus its efforts on clearing the Sambisa Forest in southeastern Borno State, allowing the pro-ISIS faction to grow stronger in northern Borno State.

Outlook: Ansar al Din will maintain its current rate of attacks using IEDs and mortars, but may try to conduct more frequent large-scale raids to acquire additional resources and personnel. Boko Haram’s pro-ISIS faction will continue to strengthen and conduct operations near the former lakebed of Lake Chad.

WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB

1) 02 NOV: The Tunisian National Guard arrested six ISIS members in Tataouine Province, Tunisia.2) 02-04 NOV: Moroccan police arrested an ISIS member in TIflet, Khémisset Province, and five ISIS members in Tetouan, Morocco.3) 06 NOV: An ISIS militant assassinated a Tunisian soldier in his home in Meghila, Kasserine Governorate, Tunisia. Tunisian soldiers launched an operation to find the assassin on 07 NOV.

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1) 07 NOV: Macina Liberation Front militants robbed a bank and freed 21 prisoners in Banamba, Koulikoro region, Mali.2) 08 NOV: Militants killed five Nigerien soldiers in Bani Bangou, Tillaberi region, Niger. 3) 05 NOV: ISIS’s West Africa Province, a faction of Boko Haram, attacked Nigerian forces near Mallum Fatori, Borno State, Nigeria.4) 06 NOV: Ansar al Din militants raided an army barracks in Gourma Rharous, Timbuktu region, Mali.

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ACRONYMS

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Pakistani Military (PakMil)Possible military dimensions (PMD)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569