troika chief's view jul2011

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    In accordance with US SEC Regulation AC, analyst certification can be found at http://www.troika.ru/eng/research/disclosure.wbp.

    [email protected], www.troika.ru

    RUSSIA | ECONOMICS

    JULY 29, 2011

    Evgeny Gavrilenkov Chief Economist,Managing Director

    [email protected]

    Chief Economists ViewIf the US Gets Downgraded

    So What?Amid continuous speculation about the debt problems in Europe and the US,

    rating agencies have kept downgrading European peripheral countries, but have

    done nothing to US ratings, apart from occasionally sending warnings of a

    possible downgrade. Meanwhile, European governments eventually were able

    to agree on a temporary solution for Greece based on a combination of a bailout

    with public funds and the voluntary restructuring of Greek debt by private

    bondholders, which many considered a model solution for other indebted

    European countries. So far, the US has not come up with any solution, but its

    rating remains at the highest level.

    Early in the year, S&P downgraded Japans rating to AA on the grounds of the

    absence of a coherent strategy to curb debt levels. The US administration lacks this

    strategy as well, but still retains its top rating. Clearly, Japans debt/GDP ratio is

    twice as high as that in the US, but the bulk of Japanese debt is held by locals, which

    makes the country less vulnerable. In contrast, around a third of US Sovereign debt

    is held by foreign investors (over $4.4 trln), such as other countries Sovereign funds

    and central banks. Given that Japan is a country where inflation is not an issue and

    deflation used to be quite regular, domestic investors holding lowyielding public

    debt was not the worst option. At least they did not lose money.

    Rating agencies normally cut ratings when they see a threat of investors losing

    money, which in some sense occurred in the case of US debt held by foreigners,

    as the dollar has weakened 1215% against many currencies. In the past twelve

    months, for instance, the US currency depreciated around 12% against the

    Japanese yen thus, Japanese investors, who hold around $0.9 trln in US debt,

    lost about $0.1 trln. The Korean won, Singapore dollar and the euro also

    appreciated 1112% against the dollar over the past year, while the Brazilian

    real gained over 13% in the same period.

    That said, in the case of the US, there is a combination of at least three factors that

    have in the past encouraged rating agencies to downgrade other countries. These

    include the lack of a coherent strategy of debt reduction, US politicians inabilityto come up with a mutually acceptable solution regarding the debt ceiling, and the

    threat of continued loss of external money invested in US government paper,

    which could eventually undermine the myth of US exclusiveness.

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    JULY29,2011 CHIEFECONOMISTSVIEWIFTHEUSGETSDOWNGRADEDSOWHAT?

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    Decision making in the US has proven to not always be as efficient as it was traditionally considered.

    Economic and financial issues have become hostages of a political struggle between the two parties.

    Indeed, the current debate on the debt ceiling centers not around debt reduction strategy (which ideally

    should be coherent, as required by S&P, for instance), but whether the debt ceiling will be raised to a

    level sufficient to finance expenditures throughout 2012 or if it will be a series of hikes (say, quarterly). In

    the latter case, it will be much more difficult for Democrats and President Barack Obama personally to

    compete with a Republican presidential candidate, as the current US administration will be held on a

    short leash by Republicans. That said, despite the bombastic populist rhetoric from both sides, economic

    issues are in fact of secondary importance. Politicians do not care that the uncertainty surrounding the

    debt ceiling dispute is a less than ideal environment for investors. This is very similar to Russias

    continuous uncertainty regarding whether the next presidential candidate will be Vladimir Putin or

    Dmitri Medvedev. Both politicians are trying to keep it a secret so neither becomes a lame duck too early,

    while the economy and investors interests are considered less important.

    Taking the above observations into account, it looks as though the US deserves rating cuts, due to

    remaining double deficits (current account and the budget balance), decelerating growth and a

    rising debt/GDP ratio. The fact that the greenback has weakened over the past year illustrates that

    markets, to some extent, have priced this in already. From this standpoint, it is already of secondary

    importance (albeit, still an essential issue for the markets) whether or not rating agencies

    downgrade the US and when, should the answer be yes. In our view, quantitative easing alone was

    enough reason to downgrade US paper, and at minimum, one of the three rating agencies should

    bring the US down at least one notch relatively soon, which is still a rather modest punishment for

    longterm macroeconomic mismanagement. The problem is that the entire rating system is tied to a

    single benchmark, namely the US paper, and if the benchmark is moved it is not completely clear

    what to do with the rest, which is why markets have once again proven to be ahead of rating

    agencies as the dollar has depreciated.

    Given that the magnitude of economic imbalances in the US is of far larger scale than that in theEurozone, further weakening of the dollar will be the most likely outcome, despite the fact that the

    prospects of eliminating those imbalances are quite unclear on both sides of the Atlantic. Partial

    forced selling of US government paper (inevitable in the case of a rating downgrade) will inevitably

    increase borrowing costs nationwide (at least a bit, which might encourage the Fed to resort to a

    new series of quantitative easing). Higher borrowing costs will look normal. It seems much more

    abnormal (and unsustainable, as a result) that a country with a weakening currency, sustainable

    budget deficit of around 910% of GDP and debt/GDP ratio of around 100% pays only 0.4%

    interest on a 2y note. Higher costs of borrowing will most likely accelerate inflation. This may help

    increase tax collection and slightly soften the debt problem, but not provide a solution, as it will

    eventually require quite unpleasant and seemingly unacceptable austerity measures aimed at

    eliminating internal imbalances, such as overeager defense spending (the US share of global

    defense expenditures is around 50%, while the country produces around 23% of global GDP).

    Raising domestic fuel taxes is, in theory, another measure to reduce the budget deficit, though it is

    highly unpopular and seemingly unacceptable at least for now.

    We are not in the position to discuss in detail how the US administration should try to deal with the

    budget deficit and debt problems, but some currently unacceptable steps might need to be taken

    if appetite for US paper goes down amid potential rating downgrades (we do not consider US

    default a serious option, as, being optimists, we trust that the countrys politicians will eventually

    discover their longlost common sense).

    Overall, it looks as though the dollar will remain crippled and could weaken even more, which iswhat makes the difference between the current situation and the 2008 crisis at that time,

    investors rushed for safety and moved money to US Treasuries, which caused the dollar to

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    appreciate and commodity prices to fall, while these days, such move would not seem logical.

    Money stopped moving at end 2008 as a result. It looks likely that in the event that the US finds

    itself in undesirable trouble (such as hypothetical technical default), money will still keep moving

    at least away from the US dollar.

    The greenbacks fundamental weakness will maintain commodity prices at a relatively high level a

    rather comfortable environment for Russia. Moreover, Russias economy currently looks less

    vulnerable than it did before the Lehman Brothers crash, as the economy is not as overheated as it

    was three to four years ago. Russia looks to be in quite good shape versus many other economies,

    demonstrating growth of around 45% we think that growth is actually closer to the higher

    number, while official statistics, which are quite inconsistent, point to the former. Inflation has

    declined to 0.20.4% mom since February, which could bring yoy inflation to around 6.5% (or

    even lower) by year end (from 9.6% in January). In 1H11, Russia once again became a twin surplus

    economy, while the foreign debt/GDP ratio remains below 30%. That said, we expect the Russian

    market to rally once the dust settles.

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    This research report is prepared by TROIKA DIALOG or its affiliate named herein and provides general information only. Neither the information nor any opinion expressed constitutes arecommendation, an offer or an invitation to make an offer, to buy or sell any securities or other investment or any options, futures or derivatives related to such securities or investments. It is notintended to provide personal investment advice and it does not take into account the specific investment objectives, financial situation and the particular needs of any specific person who may receivethis report. Investors should seek financial advice regarding the appropriateness of investing in any securities, other investment or investment strategies discussed or recommended in this report andshould understand that statements regarding future prospects may not be realized.

    Investors should note that income from such securities or other investments, if any, may fluctuate and that price or value of such securities and investments may rise or fall. Accordingly, investors mayreceive back less than originally invested. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance.

    Any information relating to the tax status of financial instruments discussed herein is not intended to provide tax advice or to be used by anyone to provide tax advice. Investors are urged to seek taxadvice based on their particular circumstances from an independent tax professional.

    Foreign currency rates of exchange may adversely affect the value, price or income of any security or related investment mentioned in this report. In addition, investors in securities such as ADRs orGDRs, whose values are influenced by the currency of the underlying security, effectively assume currency risk.

    The information contained herein has been obtained from, and any opinions herein are based upon, sources believed to be reliable, but no representation is made that it is accurate or complete and itshould not be relied upon as such. All such information and opinions are subject to change without notice.

    From time to time, TROIKA DIALOG or its affiliates or the principals or employees of its affiliates may have or have had positions or derivative positions in the securities or other instruments referred toherein or make or have made a market or otherwise act or have acted as principal in transactions in any of these securities or instruments or may provide or have provided investment banking or

    consulting services to or serve or have served as a director or a supervisory board member of a company being reported on herein.TROIKA DIALOG maintains strict internal policies, which are designed to manage any actual or potential conflicts of interest fr om harming the interests of investors.

    Further information on the securities referred to herein may be obtained from TROIKA DIALOG upon request.

    This report may not be reproduced, copied nor extracts taken from it, without the express written consent of TROIKA DIALOG.

    For residents of the United States: This research report is being distributed in the United States by TROIKA DIALOG USA, INC., which accepts responsibility for the contents hereof. Any U.S. personreceiving this report who wishes to effect transactions in any securities referred to herein should contact TROIKA DIALOG USA, INC., not its affiliate. Further information on the securities referred toherein may be obtained from TROIKA DIALOG USA, INC. upon request.

    For residents of the United Kingdom and rest of Europe: Except as may be otherwise specified herein, this research report is communicated to persons who are qualified as eligible counterparties orprofessional clients (as defined in the FSA Rules) and is made available to such persons only. The information contained herein is not intended for, and should not be relied upon by, retail clients (asdefined in the FSA Rules).

    TROIKA DIALOG 2011