AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT September 23, 2015

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. Russia’s Yemen ambassador shuttled between Riyadh and Sana’a and has held meetings with principal Yemeni stakeholders in what may be a shift in Russian diplomacy in the region.

2. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continued to push back on President Hassan Rouhani when the Supreme Leader claimed that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps has a “constitutional duty” to protect the Islamic Revolution.

3. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan attacked a mosque on a Pakistani Air Force base in Peshawar, Pakistan, in retaliation for Pakistani military operations against the group in the FATA region.

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ASSESSMENT:

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al Qaeda NetworkAl Qaeda continues to face a challenge from the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), especially in terms of recruitment and attracting new groups. Some of the groups that previously expressed affiliation with al Qaeda have moved over to ISIS, probably to align themselves with what is seen as the more successful and richer of the two. The core al Qaeda network remains intact, however, and will remain a long-term threat.

Outlook: Al Qaeda will continue to emphasize the differences between its strategy and ISIS’s strategy and will point toward ISIS’s division of the Sunni ranks in Iraq and Syria as an example.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesTehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) launched an attack on a Pakistani Air Force base in retaliation for the increased military operations in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), a safe haven for Islamist militants. TTP militants killed at least 29 people in an attack on a mosque at the Badabher Air Force base in Peshawar, Pakistan. Twenty-three of those killed are known to be Pakistani Air Force officials. The Pakistani forces managed to kill 13 militants in the exchange.

The Pakistani military continued its ground and air operations in the Shawal Valley area of North Waziristan. Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the Pakistani military’s offensive in North Waziristan, is in its final phase. Last week, Pakistan announced that the Pakistani army would remain in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) until 2019.

Outlook: Pakistani military might increase its offensive against militancy in the FATA, following the TTP attack on the Badabher Air Force Base.

AL QAEDA

ASSESSMENT:

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PoliticalRussia has taken a more overt role in the ongoing Yemeni political negotiations. The Russian ambassador to Yemen met with Saudi government officials and members of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government in Riyadh and then met with al Houthi representatives in Sana’a. A delegation of al Houthi and General People’s Congress representatives then traveled to Oman to meet with the UN envoy to Yemen. The al Houthis continue to express openness toward negotiations, but have refused to accept the Hadi government’s condition that they disarm and withdraw before peace talks begin.

Outlook: A negotiated political settlement remains unlikely as long as redlines remain intact. However, if Russia successfully brokers a peace deal, Russian interests and Russo-Iranian cooperation will likely challenge U.S. interests in Yemen.

SecurityThe Saudi-led coalition continues to prepare for a future offensive in Sana’a. Coalition forces support anti-al Houthi Yemeni army and popular resistance fighters in central Yemen. Coalition airstrikes targeted bridges and government sites in Sana’a, as well as military sites in al Bayda and Taiz and al Houthi strongholds in Sa’ada. The al Houthis retain control over northern Yemen and have fixed the coalition forces along a frontline running from Taiz through southern al Bayda and western Ma’rib.

Outlook: It is not yet clear whether the coalition intends to seize Sana’a or to pressure the al Houthis into abandoning their redlines. Indicators to watch are the failure of negotiations and/or major coalition troop movement in Ma’rib or Taiz.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP and ISIS continue to expand their operational and governmental capabilities. Ansar al Sharia militants launched targeted attacks on al Houthis in al Bayda, Ibb, and al Hudaydah, and AQAP kidnapped three Yemeni security officials in al Mukalla, Hadramawt. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt released a video addressed to Muslim refugees worldwide, but reacting to the migrant crisis in Europe.

Outlook: AQAP and ISIS will continue to exploit the security vacuum in Yemen to expand and strengthen recruitment.

YEMENGULF OF ADEN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: YEMENGULF OF

ADEN

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1) SEP 16: Yemeni army and popular resistance advanced against al Houthis in western Ma’rib.2) SEP 18: AQAP kidnapped three security officials in al Mukalla.3) SEP 20: Ansar al Sharia assassinated an al Houthi financier in al Hudaydah.4) SEP 20: Al Houthis killed two Saudi border guards near Najran, Saudi Arabia.5) SEP 21: Al Houthis clashed with resistance forces and shelled residential areas in Taiz.

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe UN again stresses the need for dialogue to resolve the presidential impeachment. Tensions remain over the formation of the Central “Galmudug” State. Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ), which had backed the Somali Federal Government against al Shabaab, declared war against the SFG-sanctioned administration in Galgudud and Mudug regions.

Outlook: Political tensions in the Galmudug region are likely to escalate between the ASWJ and SFG-backed administrations.

Security Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) continued operations to clear al Shabaab from the Boni Forest region, which is on the coastal border between Somalia and Kenya. KDF and the al Shabaab-linked cell, Jaysh Ayman, clashed in the area. A number of crackdowns on suspected al Shabaab cells has also occurred in neighboring areas. Some members of the Somali security forces have occupied government buildings and set up illegal checkpoints along roads to extort travelers for money after not being paid. Outlook: Kenya’s anti-terror arrests will likely increase and security will likely be increased in Kismayo due to its proximity to the Boni Forest region, while political dialogue with unpaid SNA forces will likely occur to maintain the military’s loyalty.

Al ShabaabAl Shabaab sharply increased attacks on military and government targets within southern and central Somalia. Al Shabaab targeted Villa Somalia in Mogadishu, the presidential complex, in a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack and seized territory in Lower Shabelle region, just south of Mogadishu. There are also growing reports of al Shabaab militants massing in the Lower Jubba region.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely step up attacks on government officials and military targets in Lower and Middle Shabelle while preparing for greater conflict with KDF, AMISOM, and SNA forces in Jubbaland state.

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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HORN OF AFRICA

GULF OF ADEN

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1) 21 SEP: Al Shabaab detonated SVBIED at Somali Presidential Palace in Mogadishu.2) 16-17 SEP: KDF clashed with al Shabaab in Boni Forest and arrested suspected members.3) 16-17 SEP: Al Shabaab attacked MP convoys near Beledweyne, Hiraan.4) 19 SEP: Al Shabaab overran and looted AMISOM military camp in Janale.5) 17 SEP: Al Shabaab conducted targeted bombings of SNA officers in Kismayo.

ASSESSMENT:

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PoliticalThe United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) unveiled a final draft agreement for the formation of a Libyan unity government as the way forward in Libya. The Libyan House of Representatives (HoR), the internationally recognized Libyan government until September 20, and the General National Congress (GNC), a rival government in control of Tripoli, are now in the position of accepting the proposal or rejecting it before an October 20 deadline.

Outlook: It is not clear whether the HoR and the GNC will accept the final terms for a unity government.

SecurityGeneral Khalifa Hafter announced the start of Operation Doom, which seeks to clear Benghazi of entrenched Islamist militias and restore Libyan government control to the city. The previous operation, Operation Dignity, appeared to have stalled, despite a significant investment of soldiers and resources to the Libyan National Army (LNA). Outlook: The LNA may make initial gains in Benghazi in the upcoming week, but will encounter strong, organized resistance from the al Qaeda-linked Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council, which includes Ansar al Sharia, and ISIS forces.

Ansar al Sharia and ISIS in LibyaISIS Sirte forces continue to consolidate in Sirte and the surrounding areas, establishing governance and control. The emergence of religious police in Sirte and Harawa signals greater integration of Islamic institutions throughout their coastal enclave. Al Qaeda-aligned Mujahideen Shura Council Derna (MSCD) forces continued to resist ISIS’s attempts to recapture Derna, which had previously been an ISIS stronghold in Libya.

Outlook: ISIS Sirte will continue to follow methods of control seen in Iraq and Syria to consolidate strength in Libya. MSCD militants will probably launch a new offensive against ISIS in Derna.

LIBYAWEST AFRICA

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST

AFRICA

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1) 15 SEP: ISIS Sirte recalled its forces from Nufaliya and established new checkpoints in the vicinity of Sirte, Libya.2) 18 SEP: ISIS Wilayat Tarablus units attempted to breach a prison complex at Mitiga Airbase in Tripoli, Libya. 3) 19 SEP: LNA units began Operation Doom with attacks on enemy positions in Benghazi, Libya.4) 21 SEP: Tebu militants attacked Zwai checkpoints in Kufra, Libya.

ASSESSMENT:

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AQIM AQIM continues to compete for predominance in the region. Djamaat Houmat Daawa Salafia (DHDS), a radical Islamist group that broke from the Armed Islamic Group after AQIM’s predecessor split from it, pledged allegiance to ISIS. The Algerian group may have decided to pledge to ISIS to gain financial and recruitment resources. Although it does not represent a major loss to AQIM’s network, DHDS extends ISIS influence into western Algeria.

Outlook: ISIS will continue to challenge AQIM’s network in northern Africa, but additional AQIM brigades are unlikely to defect to ISIS unless ISIS clearly begins to dominate.

Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)Tunisia continues to strengthen its cyber security measures and locate terrorist operations. Security forces monitor social media pages, and the actions taken against those that have suspected terrorist connections seem to impede terrorist recruitment tactics. Other forces eliminated terrorist encampments in the Kef and Kasserine mountain ranges. These areas are known to hold militant training camps. Disrupting these suggests future operations will be fewer, less organized and not as well performed.

Outlook: Ansar al Sharia may seek to move their camps to a more secure location, but until then will face lower recruitment numbers and plan fewer attacks.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) Growing violence in Mali threatens to throw the country back to civil war. Al Murabitoun and the Emirate of Abu Saharan, an AQIM affiliate, claimed responsibility for the September 13 attack against MINUSMA forces, perhaps in an attempt to demonstrate their continued presence and strength. Meanwhile, GATIA, a pro-government militia, and the Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA), a separatist rebel group, clashed in northern Mali; and the Front for the Liberation of Massena, an AQIM-linked group, attacked the south-central region. People will look to the government and MINUSMA forces to intervene. Outlook: Ansar al Din will take advantage of continued, escalated fighting, where it could reinforce its positions in the south.

MAGHREB AND SAHEL

WEST AFRICA

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: MAGHREBWEST

AFRICA

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1) 17 SEP: Tunisian National Guard and Army units discovered terrorist encampments in the mountains of Kef and Kasserine, Tunisia. 2) 19 SEP: Algerian troops gathered in Dellys, Algeria, due to reports of terrorist activities.3) 19 SEP: Tunisian forces arrested two wanted militants in Tunis, Tunisia.4) 19 SEP: Tunisian forces arrested a suspected ISIS militant in Kairouan, Tunisia.

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: SAHELWEST

AFRICA

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1) 15 SEP: Security forces arrested three members of the Massena Liberation Front in Bamako, Mali.2) 17 SEP: The CMA and GATIA clashed near Inafarak, Mali. 3) 19 SEP: CMA seized Anefis, Mali and refused to withdraw. 4) 19 SEP: The Massena Liberation Front killed two policemen and two civilians in Bih, Mali.

ASSESSMENT:

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Domestic PoliticsPresident Hassan Rouhani declared that the IRGC is not the sole guardian of the Islamic Revolution at a gathering of senior IRGC commanders and officials on September 15. He added that Parliamentary representatives, the Supreme National Security Council, the armed forces, and “other institutions” share this duty with the IRGC. On September 16, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei pushed back against Rouhani’s comments by stating that no institution bears “the responsibility to protect the Islamic Revolution like the IRGC.” IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari and IRGC Qods Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani also proclaimed that the IRGC’s institutional role and responsibility is “incomparable.” Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani reinforced the Supreme Leader’s opinion by declaring the IRGC to be the living embodiment of the Islamic Revolution. Larijani also advocated measures to increase the IRGC’s role in the economy by potentially allotting it funds from the Sixth Development Plan.

Outlook: The Supreme Leader and the IRGC will jointly seek to contain Rouhani‘s influence by resisting his efforts to limit the IRGC’s economic and political role.

Domestic Politics and Reactions to the Nuclear Deal IRGC Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi claimed that Russia is in sync with Iran regarding regional crises, including Syria. The Supreme Leader’s Senior Military Advisor stated that Iran, Russia, and Lebanese Hezbollah are supporting “the government and people of Syria as well as [providing] military consultations to the axis of resistance [Syria].” Safavi also stressed that Iran’s “friendly” relations with Syria began with former Syrian President Hafez al Assad during the Iran-Iraq War. Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed regional developments with his Russian counterpart Mikhail Bogdanov in Moscow on September 21. These events follow Russia’s recent buildup at the port of Tartus and near the airfield in Latakia, Syria, as well as reports alleging that IRGC Qods Force Commander Major Qassem Soleimani met with President Vladimir Putin on July 24 in Moscow.

Outlook: Regime officials will make a concerted effort to paint Iranian-Russian involvement in the Syrian crisis as cooperation amongst equals with complimentary goals.

IRAN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN

15 SEP: President Hassan Rouhani declared that the IRGC is not the sole guardian of the Islamic Revolution and stressed the need for national unity.

15 SEP: IRGC Deputy Commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami stated that there are “no restrictions on missile launches” and denied that Iranian armed forces have a “direct presence” in Syria.

16 SEP: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei pushed back on President Rouhani’s comments by reinforcing the IRGC’s constitutional duty to protect the Islamic Revolution.

16 SEP: IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari stated that the IRGC “will properly protect the principles” of the Islamic Revolution during a meeting with the Supreme Leader.

16 SEP: IRGC Qods Force Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani called the IRGC’s role in preserving the Islamic Revolution “incomparable.”

16 SEP: Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani declared the IRGC to be the living embodiment of the Islamic Revolution and said the IRGC could potentially be allotted funds from the Sixth Development Plan.

17 SEP: National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission member Mohammad Esmail Kowsari stated that the JCPOA commission report will be presented to Parliament on October 2.

17 SEP: Islamic Republic News Agency reported that American diplomats in Iraq are interested in holding talks with Iran’s Ambassador to Iraq Hassan Danaeifar.

17 SEP: Former Iraqi Vice President al Nujaifi requested that Tehran help release 18 kidnapped Turkish workers during a meeting in Baghdad with Ambassador Danaeifar, who promised Tehran's “all-out aid and assistance.”

17 SEP: The Supreme Council of Cyberspace held its first meeting after the Supreme Leader appointed new members to serve four-year terms on September 5.

18 SEP: Cultural Media Advisor to the Commander of the IRGC Hamid Reza Moghaddam Far called the enemy’s “project of influence” the most important danger facing Iran.

20 SEP: President Rouhani and AEOI Head Ali Akbar Salehi met with IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano in Tehran. Amano also attended a session of the Special Parliamentary Commission to Review the JCPOA.

21 SEP: AEOI Spokesman Behrouz Kamalvandi stated that Iranian experts took samples at the Parchin military complex instead of IAEA inspectors.

15 SEP – 21 SEP

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ACRONYMSAtomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Pakistani Military (PakMil)Possible military dimensions (PMD)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

Katherine Zimmermansenior al Qaeda analystkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Mehrdad MoarefianIran analystmehrdad.moarefian@aei.org(202) 888-6574

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirectorfkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569